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Chapter 1
Introduction
Three notions have lately come to the center of attention in macroeconomics. First, the
behavior of research and development expenditures is highly procyclical, which may have
significant consequences for growth in face of severe shocks (see Figure 1.1). Second,
the cyclical behavior of establishments (plants) is of utmost importance to growth in the
long run, while exhibiting very turbulent patterns over the business cycle (see Figure
1.3). Third, changes in entry and exit patterns of establishments (see Figure 1.2) have
significant consequences on the behavior of other macroeconomic variables.
My original contribution to knowledge is twofold. First, I build a tractable model of
heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive establishments that endogenously choose the
intensity of research and development activities, and are subject to endogenous entry and
exit pressures. Both entry and exit pressures, as well as incentives for conducting research
and development vary over the business cycle, generating procyclical pattern of aggregate
research and development expenditures. Second, I apply this model to investigate how
certain economic policies, specifically static and countercyclical subsidies, affect incentives
for conducting research and development activities and how this translates to the behavior
of other macroeconomic variables and what are their welfare effects.
The key equation that is responsible for the majority of results obtained in this thesis,
and is derived formally in Chapter 2, can be informally expressed as follows:
endogenous growth rate = contribution of incumbents × contribution of entrants (1.1)
The rate of endogenous growth depends on the contribution of two groups of economic
agents: already active establishments (incumbents), and new establishments (entrants).
The key reason why this equation is of interest is that the efforts of both incumbents and
(potential) entrants depend on the phase of the business cycle. As a consequence, business
cycle fluctuations affect the underlying rate of economic growth, and can have long-lasting
effects. The objective of this thesis is to integrate several strands of literature, including
endogenous growth, business cycle and firm and establishment dynamics literature, and
provide a new assessment of the welfare cost of business cycles, as well as novel guidance
on industrial policy.
I find that business cycle fluctuations have a noticeable impact on the endogenous
growth rates. The results from the baseline model, as well as its extensions, indicate
that around 6-7% of a transitory shock to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is translated
to a permanent shift in the Balanced Growth Path (BGP) of the model economy, and
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around 50% of this effect is already in place after 5 years following the initial shock.
This generates significant welfare consequences, as the resulting cost of business cycle
fluctuations is of two orders of magnitude higher than in the exogenous growth variant
of the model.
The presence of large welfare effects and the ability to potentially affect the growth
rates and volatility of the economy through appropriate industrial policy creates ample
space for policy intervention. For example, positive welfare effect is achieved through
countercyclical subsidies to incumbents’ operating cost, as it prevents excessive exits and
encourages more R&D spending. Moreover, once the costs of labor market turnover over
the business cycle are appropriately accounted for, it turns out that static subsidies to
incumbents’ operating cost are also welfare improving, a result at odds with prior findings
in the endogenous growth literature, which did not pay much attention to the effects of
business cycle fluctuations.
The dissertation is structured as follows. The remainder of this Chapter provides a
review of the relevant literature, both in the areas of endogenous growth and business
cycles, and documents several stylized facts on research and development expenditures
and establishment dynamics over the business cycle. Chapter 2 develops the baseline
model, presents the method for solving for both the Balanced Growth Path (BGP) and
the stochastic equilibrium, and then applies it to study the effects a number of static
and countercyclical subsidy schemes. Chapter 3 extends the baseline model by includ-
ing physical capital and frictional labor markets, which allows to examine the effects
of subsidy schemes in a richer context. In Chapter 4 the model is further extended by
including financial shocks, which allows me to capture salient features of the 2008-2009
financial crisis and its aftermath. The last Chapter concludes and discusses the policy
recommendations stemming from the results of the previous Chapters.
3
1.1 Related literature and stylized facts on R&D
expenditures and establishment dynamics
Research in macroeconomics is predominantly focused on two broad topics: long-run
growth and business cycles, which used to be separate topics analyzed with markedly
different models and tools. Thanks to the seminal contributions of Ramsey (1928) and
Solow (1956) in the field of economic growth, and Brock & Mirman (1972) and Kydland &
Prescott (1982) in the business cycles research, the (stochastic) neoclassical growth model
has become the workhorse model and vantage point in both strands of macroeconomic
literature. This unification has led Cooley & Prescott (1995) to proclaim that “growth
and fluctuations are not distinct phenomena to be studied with separate data and different
analytical tools”. Despite his optimism, both fields to this day remain largely separate.
The late 1980s and early 1990s have seen the emergence of the first generation of
endogenous growth theory with the breaking-ground contributions by Romer (1987),
Romer (1990), Grossman & Helpman (1991) and Aghion & Howitt (1992, 1998, 2008).
Especially the work by Aghion and Howitt rekindled the interest in the then fifty years old
ideas of creative destruction by Schumpeter (1942). Jones (1995) pointed out a fatal flaw
in the first generation of endogenous growth models, namely the presence of scale effects,
and in attempt to rectify the defect, he proposed a semi-endogenous growth model. The
subsequent intellectual effort gave rise to the so-called second generation of endogenous
growth models.
From the perspective of this dissertation, the contributions by Dinopoulos & Thomp-
son (1998), Peretto (1998), Young (1998) and Howitt (1999) all share the interesting
feature in that the attention is redirected from the entire economy toward individual es-
tablishments. In short, while in the aggregate the population of R&D scientists may rise,
the important statistic is the R&D labor per establishment, which remains constant under
mild assumptions regarding the market structure. Indeed, Laincz & Peretto (2006) show
that since 1964 the number of full-time equivalent R&D employees per establishment has
been almost constant and was not trending over time.
The idea that business cycles and endogenous growth are intertwined is not new.
In one of the early contributions, Ozlu (1996) shows that shocks to learning-by-doing
and human capital investment processes can generate aggregate fluctuations similar to
business cycles. Further work in this vein of endogenous business cycles includes papers
by e.g. Maliar & Maliar (2004), Jones et al. (2005), Walde (2005), Phillips & Wrase
(2006), where various factors influencing endogenous growth rate are found to generate
persistent business cycles. In an interesting vein of research Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu
et al. (2012) utilize the granularity and networking features of real economies to argue that
in such circumstances idiosyncratic shocks do not average out and give rise to aggregate
fluctuations. Rozsypal (2015) models the consequences of market complementarities and
imperfect information that lead to a contagion-type effects of idiosyncratic innovative
activities, causing persistent business cycles even if idiosyncratic shocks are not persistent
themselves.
The wealth of works analyzing endogenous business cycles contrasts with the scarcity
of literature that considers the causality going in the other direction, i.e. the impact
of business cycle fluctuations on the endogenous growth rates. Among the few papers
that do so, Fatas (2000) relies on aggregate demand externalities modeled after Shleifer
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(1986) to generate more persistent business cycles that impact R&D expenditures and
growth. Comin & Gertler (2006) employ the notion of medium-term business cycles. In
their work, transitory TFP shocks procyclically influence invention of new technologies
and adoption of existing ones, creating more persistent effects1. Anzoategui et al. (2016)
successfully extend this framework to argue that large demand shocks at the onset of the
Great Recession and the subsequent drop in R&D activity may explain the weak recovery.
As argued by Barlevy (2004), if business cycles influence endogenous growth rate of
the economy, the welfare cost of business cycles as estimated by Lucas (1987) may be
biased downward by a few orders of magnitude. Fatas (2000) and Barlevy (2007) provide
ample evidence that R&D expenditures in the US are volatile and procyclical2, as can be
seen in Figure 1.1. However, as Aghion & Saint-Paul (1998) point out, under standard
endogenous growth framework a rational firm manager would find it optimal to engage
in R&D more intensively during recessions, as the opportunity cost of R&D relative
to production drops, generating countercyclical R&D expenditure patterns. Therefore,
Barlevy (2007) relies on dynamic externalities to R&D making entrepreneurs “short-
sighted” to counteract the aforementioned effect. Nuño (2011) extends the model of
Aghion & Howitt (1998) to a stochastic setting and is able to generate procyclical R&D
pattern, although his model does not allow for innovation by incumbents.
Figure 1.1: Cyclical behavior of US R&D expenditures, 1948q1-2017q3
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Source: Total R&D: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Gross Domestic Product: Research and
Development. Industrial R&D: National Science Foundation (NSF), Industrial R&D performed in the
United States, by source of funds, expenditures financed from all private and non-federal sources. The
second time series is available at annual frequency for years 1953-2015. Deflated by the GDP deflator
and detrended with the Hodrick & Prescott (1997) (HP) filter. Shaded bars indicate NBER recessions.
While procyclicality of R&D expenditures may be the main factor affecting long-run
endogenous growth, impacting welfare via shifts in the Balanced Growth Path (BGP),
1The key difference between Comin & Gertler (2006) and my work is that they use an ad-hoc, rather
than microfounded aggregate innovation functions. This obviously precludes analysis of industrial policy.
2Walde & Woitek (2004) find similar patterns among other G-7 countries for the 1973-2000 period.
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another source of welfare consequences of business cycles are firm and establishment
dynamics. The early seminal contributions in the field of industry equilibrium and dy-
namics are Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). Both of these papers assume that
a firm’s productivity is drawn from a certain distribution at entry, and remains fixed af-
terwards. Bartelsman & Doms (2000) provide a review of the early literature focused on
documenting productivity differences and growth across firms and linking these phenom-
ena to aggregate outcomes. Foster et al. (2001) emphasize the role of cyclical entry for
aggregate productivity growth. The role of entry and exit channels for macroeconomic
dynamics has been recognized and studied by e.g. Devereux et al. (1996), Campbell
(1998), Jaimovich & Floetotto (2008), Samaniego (2008), Bilbiie et al. (2012), Chatterjee
& Cooper (2014) and Lee & Mukoyama (2015), although none of these works incorporate
the full set of firm dynamics considered here.
Figure 1.2: Cyclical behavior of US establishment annual net entry rates, 1985-2016
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Source: CBP: US Census Bureau, County Business Patterns. BDM: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), Business Employment Dynamics. The second time series is available starting in 1992q3.
Note: the definition of net entry from BDM is (births-deaths) over the average number of establishments
in two consecutive periods. Average annual net entry rate is slightly above 1%.
Recently, the experience of the Great Recession and the subsequent slow recovery
motivated researchers to investigate possible links between cyclical changes in firm and
establishment dynamics and other macroeconomic variables, a phenomenon dubbed miss-
ing generation of firms. Clementi & Palazzo (2016) study full firm dynamics over business
cycle, although their analysis focuses on the firm-level investment in physical capital,
rather than innovation. Messer et al. (2016) show using regional US data that low entry
rates in the 2007-2009 period contributed significantly to low employment and labor pro-
ductivity growth. Siemer (2014) finds that tight financial constraints during the Great
Recession were responsible for both low employment growth and firm entry rates. Indeed,
a cursory look at establishment dynamics in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 reveals a very turbulent
picture, with significant deviations from the trend during the dot-com bubble recession
of 2001 and very large deviations during the financial crisis of 2008-2009.
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Figure 1.3: Cyclical behavior of US establishments, 1992q3-2017q1
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Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics. Detrended with HP filter.
In the light of above facts, a surprising feature of the US economy is the remarkably
stable distribution of establishment sizes (measured in number of employees), a fact em-
phasized by Rossi-Hansberg & Wright (2007) and Luttmer (2010). Figure 1.4 tracks this
distribution over time, with the left hand axis showing the proportion of establishments
employing at least as many employees as the respective cutoff points on the right hand
size axis indicate. The distribution exhibits very little, if any, cyclical variation. The
biggest visible change in the size distribution occurs between years 1982-1983, although
it is not directly related to the period’s recession, but rather to a change in the statistical
definition of an active establishment.3 Therefore, any theory describing cyclical behavior
3A methodological note of the County Business Patterns reads: “This series represents an extension
of a program that has been published annually since 1964 and at irregular intervals dating back to
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of establishments has to be consistent with the apparent time and cycle invariance of
their size distribution. One approach to guarantee it is to assume or generate a distribu-
tion of sizes that follows a power law distribution, e.g. Pareto, as these distributions are
invariant with respect to their left cutoff point.
Figure 1.4: Establishment size distribution over time, 1975-2015
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Source: US Census Bureau, County Business Patterns. The figure plots the counter-cumulative distri-
bution of establishments’ size in terms of employment. The numbers at the right hand size axis denote
the size cutoff points, e.g. the curve corresponding to number 5 tracks the proportion of establishments
that employ at least 5 employees.
Following the seminal contribution by Klette & Kortum (2004), there is a frugal
literature on the relationship between innovation and firm dynamics. Klette & Kortum
(2004) merge endogenous growth theory with industry dynamics, with firms innovating
in order to enhance their product lines portfolio and growth emerging as the result of
creative destruction. Lentz & Mortensen (2008) use a panel of Danish firms and are able
to provide empirical support for the model. Acemoglu et al. (2013) develop a parsimonious
model where firms have either high or low innovative capacity and show that they can
generate steady-state behavior consistent with the stylized facts such as high growth
rates and high exit probability among young firms. Related works include Akcigit &
Kerr (2010) and Acemoglu & Cao (2015). The common assumption in these papers is
that the incumbent firms innovate on their own products in a neo-Schumpeterian quality-
ladder setup. I contribute to that literature by considering similar underlying mechanisms
in a stochastic setup, which allows me to analyze the effect of countercyclical subsidies.
In the remaining literature close in spirit to my work, Annicchiarico et al. (2011),
Annicchiarico & Rossi (2015) and Annicchiarico & Pelloni (2016) employ a New Key-
nesian model with endogenous growth as a result of learning-by-doing to study optimal
monetary policy. Their work however has no scope for deliberate R&D investment nor
1946. The comparability of data may be affected by: a definitional change to an “establishment” basis
of tabulation from a “reporting unit” concept prior to 1974; the determination of “active” status of an
establishment prior to 1983; and changes in industrial classification beginning in 1988.”
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firm dynamics. Benigno & Fornaro (2017) build a New Keynesian growth with innovating
entrants as in Aghion & Howitt (1992) to study the effects of large policy interventions
in persistent liquidity traps. Cozzi et al. (2017) estimate a business cycle model with
Schumpeterian components such as creative destruction to assess the relative importance
of several shocks on the recent performance of the US economy, but they abstract from
welfare or policy analysis. Welfare considerations and optimal industrial policy are at the
heart of paper by Atkeson & Burstein (2011), although their analysis employs a determin-
istic model. Finally, Nuño (2011) studies the effects of several static and countercyclical
subsidy schemes in a stochastic Aghion & Howitt (1998) model and finds that a time-
varying countercyclical subsidy to R&D has no positive effect on welfare. However, all
of these papers abstract from endogenous R&D expenditures by incumbents over the
business cycle, a crucial mechanism analyzed in this thesis.
9
Chapter 2
Business cycles, innovation
and growth: welfare analysis
How (and if) should we foster innovations? Should we reduce entry barriers for new
establishments, or maybe should we subsidize establishments investing in research and
development? What are the consequences of those policies on economic growth rate and
the effects of business cycles?
Economic literature has attempted to answer the above, and similar, questions. How-
ever, existing studies had to pick between analyzing those issues from the vantage points
of either endogenous economic growth, or business cycles. This Chapter presents a novel,
tractable approach that allows for analyzing the effects of aforementioned policies in a
model featuring both economic growth and business cycle fluctuations. Thanks to that
the results are more robust and it is possible to study the effects of additional policies
that are absent in the extant literature.
This Chapter builds a model of heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive estab-
lishments (plants) that endogenously choose the intensity of research and development,
while subject to endogenous entry and exit. The objective of this Chapter is to integrate
several strands of literature on the long-lasting effects of temporary shocks and provide
a new assessment of the welfare cost of business cycles, as well as novel guidance on
industrial policy over the business cycle.
I find that business cycle fluctuations have a noticeable impact on the endogenous
growth rates. Two main channels are responsible for this effect. First, incumbents behave
procyclically, investing more in R&D in good times, and less in bad times. Second, net
entry is also strongly procyclical. As the innovations performed by entrants tend to be
more radical than those by incumbents, reduced entry rates put downward pressure on
aggregate growth rates.
The results from the model indicate that almost 6% of a temporary shock is translated
to the level shift in the Balanced Growth Path, and 4% of the shock is embedded within
the first 5 years. This has significant welfare consequences, as the cost of business cycle
fluctuations is of two orders of magnitude higher than in the exogenous growth variant of
the model. The presence of large welfare effects and the ability to potentially affect the
growth rates and volatility of the economy through appropriate industrial policy creates
space for policy intervention via countercyclical subsidies. Of those the most positive
welfare effect is achieved through countercyclical subsidies to incumbents’ operating cost,
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as it prevents excessive exits and encourages more R&D spending.
The Chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the model, with
particular emphasis on the problem of an incumbent establishment. The second section
provides the solution for the Balanced Growth Path of the model economy to gain some
intuition on the model mechanisms and discusses the stochastic solution procedure. The
third section presents the data and calibration, as well as stochastic properties of the
model economy in comparison to the data. This section offers also an application of the
model to the aftermath of the Great Recession and points out to sources of seemingly
permanent level shift in the US GDP. The fourth section is devoted to welfare analysis,
providing an estimate of the welfare cost of business cycles for the US economy, an
analysis of sensitivity of model outcomes to assumed parameter values, and a discussion
on welfare improving subsidy schemes. The last section concludes.
2.1 Model
The model developed in this Chapter is mostly inspired by a closed economy version of
the model sketched in the Endogenous Firm Productivity section of Melitz & Redding
(2014), assuming very similar market structure and innovation process. Some inspiration
is also drawn from Acemoglu et al. (2013), especially regarding the distinction between
skilled and unskilled labor. This assumption effectively breaks the effect present in other
endogenous growth models that since in recession the cost of labor is lower, it is optimal
to increase R&D intensity.
The model focuses heavily on the cyclical behavior of the intermediate goods pro-
ducers, and so I consciously keep the complexity of setup along other dimensions at a
reasonable minimum. In the following exposition I employ the following notational con-
vention. All aggregate and nominal variables are written in uppercase letters. Lowercase
letters are reserved for real prices and variables related to individual establishments or
households.
2.1.1 Households
There is a unit mass of households. As in Acemoglu et al. (2013), there are two types of
workers: those that supply skilled and unskilled labor. Each household is modeled as a
large family with a fixed mass s of skilled workers1 and mass 1 − s of unskilled workers
who pool their incomes and consume identical amounts regardless of their labor market
status.
A representative household maximizes the following social welfare function which takes
into account the utilities of both types of households’ laborers with proportional weights:
U0 = (1− s)Uu0 + sU s0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−θt
1− θ − (1− s)ψ
u
t
(nut )
1+κ
1 + κ − sψ
s
t
(nst)
1+κ
1 + κ
]
(2.1)
where Uu0 and U s0 are the lifetime expected utilities of unskilled and skilled laborers,
respectively, ct denotes per capita consumption, while nut and nst denote labor supply
1See Laincz & Peretto (2006) for empirical evidence that the share of employees engaged in R&D has
been stationary in the time period between 1964-1999.
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of unskilled and skilled laborers, respectively. Parameter β is the discount factor and
the shape of the utility function is regulated by the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal
substitution parameter θ and the inverse of Frisch elasticity parameter κ. Both ψut and
ψst are normalization factors that grow together with the aggregate quality index of the
economy Qt and ensure that unskilled and skilled labor supply is equal to 1 along the
Balanced Growth Path (BGP)2.
I assume that physical capital plays no part in the production process3. The only
asset in this economy in net positive supply are claims on the shares of establishments.
Accordingly, the budget constraint of the household is constructed as follows:
ct + psht sht+1 = wut nut + wstnst + sht
(
psht + Πt
)
where psht is the real price of a share of firm portfolio that pays real dividends Πt, sht
is the mass of shares owned by the representative household, and wut and wst denote,
respectively, real unskilled and skilled wages.
The first order conditions of the utility maximization problem reduce to the following
two intratemporal equations and the Euler equation:
(1− s)ψut (nut )κ = wut c−θt (2.2)
sψst (nst)
κ = wst c−θt (2.3)
1 = Et
[
β
(
ct+1
ct
)−θ psht+1 + Πt+1
psht
]
The stochastic discounting kernel of the household is then defined as follows:
Λt,t+i = Et
[(
ct+i
ct
)−θ]
(2.4)
2.1.2 Final goods producer
The final goods producing sector is modeled as a single, representative, perfectly compet-
itive firm that transforms a continuum of massMt ∈ (0, 1) of intermediate good varieties4
into the final good using the CES aggregator:
Yt =
[∫ Mt
0
yt (i)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
2While Boppart & Krusell (2016) show that balanced growth is possible when hours worked per
worker are falling over time, a large body of research in macroeconomics employs utility functions of
the convenient King et al. (1988) form which yield constant hours worked along the BGP. Trabandt &
Uhlig (2011) prove that when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution differs from unity, only one
functional form is characterized by both King-Plosser-Rebelo assumptions and constant Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. Due to the restrictiveness of this specification, many authors, e.g. Mertens & Ravn
(2011), employ a modeling shortcut in the form of time-dependent disutility of labor. Following this line
of reasoning, I set the formula for labor disutility as ψit = ψiQ1−θt (with i = {u, s} and where Q is a
trending variable discussed further), which ensures constant labor supply along the BGP.
3This assumption will be relaxed in the subsequent Chapters.
4The condition that the mass of intermediate goods varieties is bounded between 0 and 1 is supported
by assuming that each individual possesses an idea for a differentiated product, but only a subset of those
individuals are entrepreneurs and only a fraction of possible goods is actively produced.
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where yt (i) denotes the quantity of i-th variety used in final good production process
and σ ∈ (1,∞) is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The standard
solution of the cost minimization problem yields the price index of the final good as a
function of the varieties’ prices Pt (i):
Pt =
[∫ Mt
0
Pt (i)1−σ di
] 1
1−σ
as well as the Hicksian demand function for the i-th variety:
yt (i) = Ytpt (i)−σ (2.5)
where pt (i) = Pt(i) /Pt is the variety’s price relative to the price index.
2.1.3 Intermediate goods producers
The intermediate goods producing sector is modeled as a single industry sector populated
by monopolistically competitive continuum of mass Mt of active single-establishment
firms5, each producing a distinct variety. Once an establishment hires f units of skilled
labor (this can be thought of as managers and other non-production employees), it gains
access to the following production function:
yt (i) = Ztqt (i)nt (i)
where Zt is the stochastic aggregate productivity parameter, qt (i) is the quality level of
i-th variety at time period t and nt (i) denotes the employment of unskilled labor.
It is straightforward to show that the optimal pricing strategy given flexible prices
and the demand for an individual variety given by Equation 2.5 follows the standard
constant mark-up pricing formula:
pt (i) =
σ
σ − 1
wut
Ztqt (i)
2.1.4 Aggregation
It is very convenient to introduce a measure of aggregate quality of intermediate goods
produced in the economy. As in Melitz (2003), I assume that the distribution of es-
tablishment specific products’ quality at time t is described by some probability density
function µt (q) with support on a subset of (0,∞). Then one can define an aggregate
quality index Qt which is designed so that the aggregate state of the intermediate goods
sector can be summarized as if it was populated by mass Mt of establishments all with
quality level Qt. The index is given by the following formula:
Qt =
[∫ ∞
0
qσ−1µt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
(2.6)
5Klette & Kortum (2004) in a relatively similar setting show that the behavior of multi-product firms
can be summarized as if they consisted of a number of independent product lines (establishments).
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As a consequence, the aggregate output of the final good can be expressed as:
Yt = QtZtM
1
σ−1
t N
u
t (2.7)
where the dependence of output on Mt reflects the love-for-variety phenomenon and Nut
is the aggregate unskilled labor supply.
The model features three aggregate state variables: aggregate quality levelQt, stochas-
tic productivity Zt and active establishment mass Mt. The aggregate quality level evo-
lution will be discussed at length in Subsection 2.1.7. Following the business cycles lit-
erature, I assume the exogenous common productivity shock to follow an AR(1) process
in logs:
lnZt+1 = ρZ lnZt + εt+1 (2.8)
where ρZ is the autoregressivity of the process and εt+1 is a random, normally distributed
innovation with mean 0 and standard deviation σZ .
The mass of active establishments evolves according to the following, endogenously
determined law of motion:
Mt+1 = Mt −Mxt − δt (Mt −Mxt ) +M et (2.9)
where Mxt denotes mass of establishments exiting “voluntarily” due to product obsoles-
cence, δt is the state-dependent, endogenous probability of receiving an exit shock and
M et is the mass of successful entrants who attempted entry at time period t. Due to
the presence of fixed costs, the mass of active establishments stabilizes around the value
characteristic for the BGP, although it fluctuates over the business cycle. The only source
of sustained long-run economic growth is the continuing improvement in the aggregate
quality level.
2.1.5 Incumbents
2.1.5.1 Research and development
Each incumbent establishment can engage in R&D activities in order to attempt to raise
the quality of its variety in the next period. Innovations performed by incumbents should
be interpreted as incremental, rather than radical. The success probability function of
an establishment is modeled as in Pakes & McGuire (1994) and Ericson & Pakes (1995):
χt (i) =
axt (i)
1 + axt (i)
where χt (i) denotes the probability of making a quality improvement, and a is a param-
eter that describes the efficiency of R&D input xt (i) in generating improvements. The
R&D input has the following formula:
xt (i) =
nxt (i)
(qt (i) /Qt)σ−1
where nxt (i) denotes skilled R&D labor input and (qt (i) /Qt)
σ−1 is a relative quality
adjustment factor. As a consequence, establishments with higher quality products need
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to employ more R&D labor to have the same success probability as their lower quality
competitors.
The logic behind introducing this adjustment is based on two reasons. First, since the
incumbents’ innovations are incremental, a lot of those improvements stem from imitation
rather than pure innovation. It is then reasonable that establishments producing low
quality varieties have a bonus due to their distance from the “average” quality frontier,
since they can easily imitate what the establishments producing higher quality varieties
do. Conversely, establishments far ahead with respect to their products’ quality have
little opportunities to imitate, and rather have to innovate themselves, raising the input
requirement.
The second reason is empirical, and relates to the Gibrat’s law (Gibrat (1931)), which
postulates that there is no correlation between firm size (which in the model is directly
related to quality) and firm growth rates (which in the model result from the innovation
success probability χ). Without the adjustment, establishments producing higher quality
varieties would have comparative advantage of performing R&D relative to ones producing
varieties of lower quality. However, empirical evidence on the evolution of firms shows
that either the Gibrat’s law cannot be rejected for large enough firms (see e.g. Hall (1987))
or that the larger firms have slower rates of growth (see e.g. Evans (1987), Dunne et al.
(1989) or Rossi-Hansberg & Wright (2007)).
It is convenient to introduce a new variable φt (i) for this relative quality adjustment
factor, so that:
φt (i) ≡ (qt (i) /Qt)σ−1
Given the above functions, one can derive the demand for R&D labor as a function
of target success probability χt (i):
nxt (i) =
1
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)φt (i)
and the real cost of innovation equals the R&D employment times the real skilled wage.
Making further use of the relative quality variable φt (i), the real operating profit of
an establishment at time t can be rewritten as:
piot (i) =
Yt
σMt
φt (i)− wstf
and the real profit function, after taking into account R&D expenditures, is given by:
pit (i) = Yt
[(
1
σMt
− ωt
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
)
φt (i)− ωtf
]
(2.10)
where ωt ≡ wst/Yt denotes the ratio between the skilled wage and aggregate output.
2.1.5.2 Recursive formulation
I will now recast the incumbents’ problem into dynamic programming form. Since all
intermediate goods producers that share the same value of φ will make the same decisions,
I drop the subscript i. Moreover, if the expected continuation value is negative, an
establishment will exit at the end of the current period. An incumbent establishment
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maximizes its real discounted stream of profits, conditional on the expected paths of state
variables and the control variable χ:
Vt (φt) = max
χt∈[0,1)
{pit (φt, χt) + max {0,Et [βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)Vt+1 (φt+1|φt, χt)]}}
where Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor consistent with households’ valuation of
current and future marginal utility from consumption (Equation 2.4) and the relative
quality of a variety in t+ 1 period is subject to the following lottery6:
φt+1 =
ιφt/ηt with probability χtφt/ηt with probability 1− χt
where ι denotes the size of the innovative step and η is the rate of growth of the aggregate
quality index (raised to the σ − 1 power):
ηt ≡
(
Qt+1
Qt
)σ−1
Here I assume that the value of η is taken as given by the individual establishments.
This assumption is justified in the case of a continuum of atomistic agents7.
As is common in the dynamic programming literature, I shall proceed with the follow-
ing notational convention. Variables without the time subscript shall denote time period
t variables, while variables with a prime ′ shall denote the t+ 1 variables. Let the vector
S ≡ {Q,Z,M} denote the aggregate state of the economy.
Due to the presence of trending variables in the original formulation of the problem,
I shall also normalize the value function by expressing it as a product of aggregate out-
put, dependent only on the economy’s state, and time-independent component v, which
depends both on the aggregate state and idiosyncratic relative quality:
Y (S) v (φ,S) = max
χ∈[0,1)
{
Y (S)
[(
1
σM
− ω(S)
a
χ
1−χ
)
φ− ω (S) f
]
+ max {0,E [βΛ (S,S′) (1− δ (S))Y (S′) v (φ′,S′)]}
}
Both sides of the above expression can be divided by the aggregate output, reducing
the problem to the form that can be handled via standard contraction mapping pro-
cedures. Note that the “relative” skilled wage ω is established on a period by period
basis via the skilled labor market equilibrium, upon which I expand later. Moreover,
the state space is effectively reduced to contain only two aggregate variables: stochastic
productivity Z and active establishment mass M . The normalized value function of an
establishment thus equals:
v (φ,S) = max
χ∈[0,1)
{ [( 1
σM
− ω(S)
a
χ
1−χ
)
φ− ω (S) f
]
+ max {0,E [βΛ (S,S′) γ (S,S′) (1− δ (S)) v (φ′,S′)]}
}
(2.11)
6The underlying absolute quality levels evolve according to the lottery:
qt+1 =
{
ι1/(σ−1)qt with probability χt
qt with probability 1− χt
7For the case of a finite number of firms, see the “oblivious equilibrium” concept developed in Wein-
traub et al. (2008).
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where γ (S,S′) ≡ Y (S′) /Y (S) denotes the growth rate of aggregate output between
two subsequent periods.
2.1.5.3 Tractability and obsolescence
For large enough φ the probability that an establishment will in the future exit due to
obsolescence is negligible. The problem then simplifies to:
v (φ,S) = max
χ∈[0,1)
{ [( 1
σM
− ω(S)
a
χ
1−χ
)
φ− ω (S) f
]
+E [βΛ (S,S′) γ (S,S′) (1− δ (S)) v (φ′,S′)]
}
(2.12)
and in optimum the R&D success probability does not depend on the quality of establish-
ments’ variety. The above problem is affine in φ, as both the immediate payoff (profit)
function and the expected continuation value function are affine in φ8.
On the low end of the φ distribution, if an establishment chooses to exit, it does not
invest in R&D at all (χ = 0) and its current value is also affine in φ:
v (φ,S) = 1
σM
φ− ω (S) f (2.13)
The true value function is nonlinear in the area where establishments are not yet
willing to exit (the expected continuation value is still positive), but the probability that
they will choose to do so in the future is not negligible. This leads them to invest in R&D
less than their higher quality competitors do. Furthermore, some establishments may
choose not to invest in R&D at all if their expected continuation value is positive but
small. Keeping this non-linearity would make the entire distribution of establishments’
qualities (or at least a set of its moments) a state variable, and would require much more
advanced numerical techniques to solve9.
In order to improve the problem’s tractability and sidestep the issue of distribution
tracking, I consider an approximation of the true problem, as depicted in Figure 2.1. I ex-
tend the linear parts of the true value function and construct an approximating piecewise
linear value function. This simplification implies that the approximate policy function
becomes a piecewise constant function of φ, with all continuators choosing exactly the
same R&D success probability χ. The establishments that are active but will exit in the
current period choose not to innovate at all. The Appendix contains a proof10 that if
the innovation probabilities are independent of establishment size but there is a lower
bound on establishment quality, the distribution of establishment qualities converges in
the upper tail to an ergodic Pareto distribution regardless of the initial distribution of
entrants’ qualities.
8It is straightforward to prove that the sum of two affine functions is also an affine function. Consider
f (x) = a+bx and g (x) = c+dx. Then their sum, h (x) = (a+ c)+(b+ d)x, is clearly an affine function
as well. This procedure generalizes to the case of an infinite sum.
9Krusell & Smith (1998) is the seminal paper in the literature on heterogeneous agents subject to
both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
10The proof is based on the Web Appendix for the Melitz & Redding (2014).
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Figure 2.1: Accurate and approximated value and policy functions
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Let φ∗ denote a level of relative quality such that an establishment is indifferent
between exiting at the end of the current period and continuing into the next period,
conditional on setting the common R&D success probability χ. This cutoff value is given
implicitly by the following condition:
ω (S)
a
χ
1− χφ
∗ = E
[
βΛ (S,S′) γ (S,S′) (1− δ (S)) v
(
(φ∗)′ ,S′
)]
(2.14)
The cyclical movements in φ∗ are responsible for the endogenous “voluntary” exit
margin. To provide a closed form equation of this process, I will assume that the dis-
tribution of establishment qualities follows exactly the Pareto distribution with power
parameter equal to 1 for the entirety of its support11. The mass of establishments exiting
due to obsolescence is equal to:
Mxt = Mt (1− χt)
(
1− φ
∗
t−1
φ∗tηt−1
)
(2.15)
2.1.6 Entrants
There is an unconstrained mass of prospective entrants. Within each period, they can
exert innovative effort to attempt to successfully enter the market. To do that, they hire
skilled labor in the similar manner the incumbents do. I also assume that prospective
11This assumption is common in the firm size distribution literature. For empirical support see e.g.
Axtell (2001). Note that this is the only place where I need to assume a specific functional form for
the distribution of quality levels. All other results hold for generic distributions, although only the
distributions whose upper tail converge to Pareto are consistent with the other assumptions of the
model.
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entrants face positive skilled labor fixed cost, f e. The real cost of attempting entry
conditional on success probability χet is thus equal to:
tcet = wst
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
Upon successful entry an entrant draws the initial quality level from the distribution
of incumbent qualities, scaled up by [σ/ (σ − 1)]1/(σ−1) 12. This assumption reflects the
fact that innovations developed by entrants tend to be more radical, as stressed by i.a.
Acemoglu & Cao (2015) and Garcia-Macia et al. (2016). A successful entrant begins
operation at the beginning of the next period, and discounts this fact accordingly. The
expected value of entry is expressed as:
V et = max
χet∈[0,1)
{
−Ytωt
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
+ χetEt
[
βΛt,t+1Vt+1
(
φet+1
)]}
where φet+1 is the relative quality draw upon entry. Again, using the dynamic program-
ming notation and after normalization with aggregate output, one obtains:
ve (S) = max
χe∈[0,1)
 −ω (S)
(
f e + 1
ae
χe
1−χe
)
+χeE
[
βΛ (S,S′) γ (S,S′) v
(
(φe)′ ,S′
)]  (2.16)
Since the pool of entrants is unbounded, in each state of the economy the following
free entry condition applies:
ve (S) ≤ 0 (2.17)
where in the case of a negative value of entry the mass of entrants is 0. Finally, if the
mass of successful entrants is denoted by M e and the success probability is χe then in
equilibrium the mass of prospective entrants is determined by M e/χe in case of positive
χe and 0 otherwise.
2.1.6.1 Creative destruction
Although entry is undirected, there is a possibility of an entrant leapfrogging over an
incumbent. To model that possibility, I assume that the space of all possible varieties
occupies a unit interval, and active establishments occupy its subset Mt. This can be
justified by assuming that each individual person has a potential business idea, but only a
subset of them is realized at any given time. It is then natural that the mass of potential
ideas is proportional to (here equal to) the unit household mass. A successful entrant
draws its location from the entire interval, and a fraction Mt of all entrants replaces
previously active establishments13.
To account for the fact that the entrants who replace the incumbents have leapfrogged
over them, I assume that the quality advantage of entrants is high enough to ensure no
12This assumption ensures that each variety is produced by a single establishment and that no estab-
lishment needs to resort to limit pricing as opposed to the regular markup pricing.
13One could make an alternative assumption that the mass of potential varieties is unbounded. Al-
though it is a frequent assumption in case of expanding varieties models, it would be hard to reconcile
with creative destruction.
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limit pricing. Thus, an establishment in which an incumbent successfully innovated but
was replaced by an entrant will be characterized by [ι · σ/ (σ − 1)]1/(σ−1) times higher
quality compared to the previous period and the establishment where an incumbent was
unsuccessful in innovating and got replaced will be characterized by [σ/ (σ − 1)]1/(σ−1)
times higher quality. Therefore, the expected relative quality of an entrant is equal to:
φe = σ
σ − 1 (2.18)
It is now possible to characterize the aggregate establishment mass dynamics. Incum-
bents exit for three reasons, which I assume to happen in the following order. First, their
relative quality becomes low enough that they decide to exit due to the obsolescence of
their product. Second, they may receive an exogenous exit shock, δexo. Finally, their
establishment may be creatively destroyed by a successful entrant.
Successful entrants’ varieties may or may not overlap with already produced varieties.
Creative destruction is a churning process, where outflows and inflows are by definition
equal. Thus, I only need to account for exogenous exit and entry into previously inactive
varieties:
Mt+1 = (1− δexo) (Mt −Mxt ) + [1− (1− δexo) (Mt −Mxt )]M et (2.19)
where I use the fact that the mass of active establishments just before entry is equal to
(1− δexo) (Mt −Mxt ).
A comparison between Equations 2.9 and 2.19 reveals that the following relationship
holds:
δt = 1− (1− δexo) (1−M et ) (2.20)
2.1.7 Aggregate quality evolution
Following Melitz (2003), I consider the current period distribution of quality levels µt (q)
to be a truncated part of an underlying distribution gt (q), so that:
µt (q) =
1/
[
1−Gt
(
q∗t−1
)]
gt (q) if q ≥ q∗t−1
0 otherwise
where the lowest quality level among all active establishments at period t is equal to pre-
vious period’s cutoff quality level q∗t−114. The aggregate quality level defined by Equation
2.6 can be rewritten as:
Qt =
[
1
1−Gt (q∗t−1)
∫ ∞
q∗t−1
qσ−1gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
There are two mechanisms that affect the distribution of incumbents’ quality levels.
First, lowest quality establishments exit, raising the next period’s lowest quality level to
q∗t . Second, while 1−αt share of incumbents do not change their quality levels, share χt of
incumbents innovate successfully and raise their quality levels by ι1/(σ−1). The aggregate
14The absolute level of cutoff quality can be recovered from the relative cutoff quality via the formula
q∗t = (φ∗t )
1/(σ−1)
Qt.
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quality level after exits15 and innovation resolution but before entry can be expressed as
follows:
Q∗t =
[
(1− χt + χtι) 11−Gt (q∗t )
∫ ∞
q∗t
qσ−1gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
Entrants draw their quality levels from the above distribution, upscaled by factor
σ/ (σ − 1). The share of new establishments in the t+ 1 period equals M et /Mt+1 and the
aggregate quality level in t+ 1 is described by:
Qt+1 =
[
(1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
1
1−Gt (q∗t )
∫ ∞
q∗t
qσ−1gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
Finally one can derive the transformed aggregate growth rate ηt16:
ηt =
(
Qt+1
Qt
)σ−1
= (1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
(2.21)
Ceteris paribus, aggregate quality grows faster when incumbents engage more in-
tensively in R&D and when entry rates are elevated. In general equilibrium those two
forces moderate each other, as both incumbents and potential entrants compete for scarce
skilled labor and incumbents face a direct threat of being creatively destroyed by entrants,
reducing their willingness to innovate.
2.1.8 Market clearing
There are two labor markets that clear each period. Since the aggregate mass of unskilled
workers is equal to 1−s, the following relationship between aggregate and individual labor
supply holds:
Nut = (1− s)nut (2.22)
As the production function depends linearly on unskilled labor, the unskilled wage is
independent of the supply side. Unskilled labor supply is determined via the unskilled
intratemporal condition (Equation 2.2) and is given by:
nut =
[
σ − 1
σ
Z1−θt M
1−θ
σ−1
t (1− s)−(1+θ) /ψu
] 1
κ+θ
(2.23)
where I use the assumption about the labor disutility normalization factors that ψut =
ψuQ1−θt and with ψu chosen so that along the BGP individual unskilled labor supply is
equal to unity.
As opposed to the unskilled labor market, which behaves rather mechanically, finding
equilibrium in the skilled labor market is more involved. First, using the skilled intratem-
poral condition (Equation 2.3) I obtain the relationship between skilled labor supply and
15Note also that due to the assumption that probabilities of both exogenous exit shock and creative
destruction do not depend on establishment quality, they do not affect the quality distribution.
16If the density g is assumed to be Pareto, which is immutable with respect to the truncation point,
the argument holds with equality. Otherwise, this result is an approximation relying on assuming that
the shifts in cutoff quality levels are small enough to not affect significantly the entire distribution.
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the relative skilled wage ωt:
nst =
[
ωt
(
ZtM
1
σ−1
t N
u
t
)1−θ
/ (sψs)
] 1
κ
(2.24)
where again I use the assumption about the labor disutility normalization factors that
ψst = ψsQ1−θt and with ψs chosen so that along the BGP individual skilled labor supply
is equal to unity.
Second, the relative skilled wage influences the R&D intensity choices made by in-
cumbents and prospective entrants. The skilled labor demand, which implicitly depends
on ωt, is expressed as:
N st = Mtf + (Mt −Mxt )
(
1
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ M
e
t
χet
(
1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
(2.25)
and emerges from three sources: “managerial” demand from all active establishments,
R&D demand from active and non-obsolete establishments, and “managerial” and R&D
demand from prospective entrants. In equilibrium, relative skilled wage ωt adjusts to
equate skilled labor demand and supply, so that:
N st = snst (2.26)
Finally, the goods market clears:
Yt = (1− s) ct + s · ct (2.27)
2.2 Solution procedure
2.2.1 Balanced growth path
To provide more intuition on the working of the model and discuss its stability properties,
I first present the salient parts of the solution for the BGP which can be to a large extent
derived analytically. The labor market is assumed to equilibrate when both individual
skilled and unskilled labor equals to 1 and the households’ stochastic discount factor
(Equation 2.4) can be expressed as:
Λ = γ−θ
where γ is the gross rate of growth of output along the BGP.
2.2.1.1 Incumbents
I exploit the property that the value function of the incumbent with high enough φ,
given by Equation 2.12, is affine. As along the BGP the reduced aggregate state is time-
invariant, all variables present in the incumbents’ problem are constant, and the value
function can be stated as:
A+Bφ = max
χ∈[0,1)

[(
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1−χ
)
φ− ωf
]
+ξ
[
χ
(
A+B ιφ
η
)
+ (1− χ)
(
A+B φ
η
)] 
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where ξ ≡ βγ1−θ (1− δ) is the effective incumbents’ discount factor.
The resulting first order and envelope conditions are:
0 = −ω
a
1
(1− χ)2φ+ ξB
φ (ι− 1)
η
B =
(
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1− χ
)
+ ξBχ (ι− 1) + 1
η
There are two approaches that can be used to solve this problem – partial equilibrium
and explicit solutions17. Both solutions are derived in the Appendix. Here I present only
the result of the partial equilibrium solution where an establishment treats “aggregate”
and individual R&D success probabilities as separate objects. This allows to focus on
the intuition behind the factors driving incumbents’ decisions. The optimal R&D success
probability equals:
χ =
1
σM
a
ω
− 1− ξζ
ξ
η
ι− ζη
1 + 1
σM
a
ω
where ζ ≡ [χ (ι− 1) + 1] /η can be interpreted loosely as the contribution of incumbents
to raising the aggregate quality level and is treated as given by an individual establish-
ment.
Note that while χ is smaller than one for any economically sensible parametrization,
one needs to ensure that it is positive. For that to be true, the sign of the numerator has
to be positive, which implies that the real revenue for the average establishment needs to
be high enough to justify investment in R&D.
The following set of partial derivatives conforms with intuition and previous research
in endogenous growth theory literature. Incumbents invest less in R&D when their mo-
nopolistic power is low, market is fragmented among many firms and when the R&D
labor cost is high. Incumbents invest more in R&D when R&D labor is more productive,
discount factor is closer to unity and the innovative step size is high.
∂χ
∂σ
< 0, ∂χ
∂M
< 0, ∂χ
∂ω
< 0
∂χ
∂a
> 0, ∂χ
∂ξ
> 0, ∂χ
∂ι
> 0
A second set of partial derivatives relates to the stability properties of the prob-
lem. Partial derivatives with respect to transformed aggregate quality growth rate and
incumbents’ contribution to growth are negative18 which ensures that the BGP is a sta-
ble equilibrium of the system and can be reached by a trial-and-error process (i.e. the
equilibrium is learnable19):
17Obviously the problem can be also solved numerically via value function iteration which can then
be subsequently extended to the stochastic environment case.
18The partial derivative w.r.t. incumbents’ contribution to growth is negative for reasonable
parametrizations. The formal condition for the negativity is ξι > η, which is easily satisfied when
the effective discount factor is close to unity.
19For a game-theoretic discussion on learning in non-cooperative games see e.g. Milgrom & Roberts
(1990).
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∂χ
∂η
< 0, ∂χ
∂ζ
< 0
Once the optimal R&D success probability level is found, the parameters of the closed
form of the value function can be easily recovered:
B =
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1− χ
1− ξζ , A =
ωf
1− ξ
2.2.1.2 Entrants
The problem of entrants from Equation 2.16 remains unchanged, except for the fact that
growth rates and entry value are known with certainty:
ve = max
χe∈[0,1)
{
−ω
(
f e + 1
ae
χe
1− χe
)
+ χeξe (A+Bφe)
}
where ξe ≡ βγ1−θ is the effective entrants’ discount factor.
The first order condition for potential entrants results in:
χe = 1−
√
ω
aeξev (φe)
that is, entry success probability is higher when R&D labor is more productive, discount
factor is closer to unity and the expected entry value is higher. Entry success probability
is lower when R&D labor is more costly.
The free entry condition, which in BGP has to hold with equality, pins down the entry
success probability in equilibrium:
χe = a
ef e ±√aef e
(aef e − 1)
In the above expression I need to assume that aef e > 1 and then only one root lies
within the unit interval. Note that entry success probability along the BGP depends
neither on the expected entry value nor on the R&D labor cost. This result does not
carry over outside the BGP and in general changes in entry rates are driven both by the
extensive (mass of potential entrants) and intensive (success probability) margins.
2.2.1.3 General equilibrium
To close the model, I need to pin down the variables responsible for establishment dy-
namics, which are determined by the following system of equations:
Mx = (1− χ) (1− 1/η)M
M e = δM + (1− δ)Mx
δ = 1− (1− δexo) (1−M e)
η = (1 + χ (ι− 1)) (1 + δ/ (σ − 1))
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Finally, the skilled labor market clears. Since by assumption the individual skilled
labor supply along the BGP is unity, the aggregate skilled labor supply equals the mass
of skilled households s and the equilibrium in the skilled labor markets occurs whenever:
s = Mf + (M −Mx)
(
1
a
χ
1− χ
)
+ M
e
ae
(
f e + 1
ae
χe
1− χe
)
Thanks to the favorable stability properties of the model, the solution can be easily
found. Using an initial guess for “relative” skilled wage rate ω, endogenous exit prob-
ability δ and the mass of active establishments M , one can iterate the system forward
until convergence is reached. I keep iterating as long as the L∞ norm between subsequent
iterations is higher than 10−12.
2.2.2 Global solution
Under stochastic environment obtaining analytical results is not possible. Therefore, I
solve the model using global methods, and employ stochastic value function iteration.
The two state variables, exogenous aggregate productivity level Z and endogenous mass
of active establishmentsM are discretized on a 15 by 15 grid. The grid for establishments
spans the range of ±10% deviation from the BGP value.
The stochastic process for the changes in aggregate productivity is recast in the form
of a Markov chain. Following the analysis in Kopecky & Suen (2010), I employ the
method proposed by Rouwenhorst (1995), instead of more popular methods by Tauchen
(1986) or Tauchen & Hussey (1991), as the former generates a better approximation to
the underlying continuous process for highly persistent (ρZ > 0.9) processes. For the
chosen parameters of the productivity process (ρZ = 0.95, σZ = 0.0055) and the desired
grid density the Rouwenhorst (1995) method generates a grid for aggregate productivity
level spanning the range of (0.93, 1.07).
The initial values for the endogenous variables are set to be equal to their BGP values.
The stochastic value functions given by Equations 2.12 and 2.16 are iterated over each
point on the grid as long as the L∞ norm between subsequent iterations is higher than
10−9. Also, for each point on the grid the general equilibrium consistency is ensured.
The resulting policy functions, conditional on assumed parameter values discussed at
length in Subsection 2.3.1, are displayed in subsequent figures. Figure 2.1 demonstrates
the dependence of the incumbents’ R&D success probability χ on the state variables, Z
and M . The success probability increases with the value of the temporary productivity
shock and decreases with the mass of active establishments. The intuition for the former
is straightforward – when current stochastic productivity is higher than average, it is
expected to be higher than average also in the future. The latter result seems counter-
intuitive at first. However, whenever the mass of active establishments is lower than
average, entry is more attractive. Therefore, incumbents face higher risk of being cre-
atively destroyed, which lowers their effective discount factor, decreasing incentives to
innovate.
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Figure 2.1: Incumbents’ policy function χ (%)
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The policy function of potential entrants, expressed in terms of desired entry rate,
is depicted in Figure 2.2. As could be expected, entry is more desirable when current
productivity is higher than average and the mass of active establishments is lower than
average. Note that the combination of low productivity and high mass of active estab-
lishments may make entry unattractive enough so that no potential entrant is willing
to invest in R&D (upper left portion of the graph). This creates a non-linearlity in the
policy functions of both entrants and incumbents, and emphasizes the usefulness of the
global solution of the model.
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Figure 2.2: Entrants’ policy function (expressed as desired entry rate M e/M, %)
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2.3 Data and results
2.3.1 Data and calibration
The data used in this Chapter come from four major sources. The primary source of
data on establishment dynamics comes from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Business Employment Dynamics (BDM) database. The BDM, based on the Quarterly
Census on Employment and Wages (QCEW), records changes in the employment level of
more than 98% of economic entities in the US. Unfortunately, the data series is relatively
short, starting as late as of 1992q3. Supplementary sources include the data from US
Bureau of Economic Analyses (BEA), National Science Foundation (NSF) and County
Business Patterns (CBP).
In the BDM, an establishment is defined as an economic unit that produces goods or
services, usually at a single physical location, and engages in one, or predominantly one,
activity for which a single industrial classification may be applied20. Thus an establish-
ment, as measured by the BLS, corresponds quite closely to the theoretical concept of
establishment considered in the model.
Expansions (contractions) are defined as units with positive employment in the third
month in both the previous and current quarters, with a net increase (decrease) in em-
ployment over this period. Viewed through the lens of the model, expansions are the
result of a successful innovation, while contractions are a consequence of being unable to
innovate an thus declining relative quality level. Openings are defined as establishments
20This and the following definitions are quoted from the Business Employment Dynamics Technical
Note, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cewbd.tn.htm.
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with either positive third month employment for the first time in the current quarter,
with no links to the prior quarter, or with positive third month employment in the cur-
rent quarter following zero employment in the previous quarter. Closings are defined
as establishments either with positive third month employment in the previous quarter,
with no employment or zero employment reported in the current quarter.
The problem with using these statistics directly is that both openings and closings
are an upward biased measure of “true” entry and exit patters, as they are very sensi-
tive to seasonal employment patterns. To correct for this issue, BLS produces data on
establishment births and deaths, which are a subset of openings and closings, controlled
for re-openings and temporary shutdowns via “waiting” for three quarters for status con-
firmation. While this correction introduces some discrepancies in the aggregate data,
the gains from using data series that are closer to the model objects should significantly
outweigh the associated cost.
The model is calibrated to replicate key features of the US economy. The model BGP
outcomes are compared to the long-run averages of the corresponding objects in the US
data. Several parameters, such as the discount factor or the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES) are taken from literature.
The parameter value for the inverse of Frisch utility is non-standard, and the particular
choice is dictated by the need to obtain sufficiently strong, positive reaction of labor
supply in face of the productivity shock. Nevertheless, the resulting volatility of hours is
still much smaller than that of output, a ubiquitous issue in the business cycle literature.
The standard deviation of the productivity shock is smaller than usually adopted in the
literature, and this is due to the model having stronger amplification properties compared
to the baseline real business cycle models.
The parameter pinning down the share of skilled workers in the economy is chosen to
be well inside the plausible range of values discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2013) 21 and
close to their estimated value of 7.8%. Since in their model a part of innovations arise
spontaneously (due to e.g. learning by doing) and in this model all innovations result
from deliberate R&D investment, it is natural that the share of skilled workers needs to
be increased. Moreover, sensitivity analysis in Subsection 2.4.2 shows that this parameter
does not have a major role in influencing the most salient outcomes.
Parameters specific to the model are chosen to match the targeted moments. As I
have 6 free parameters to match 5 moments, I impose an additional restriction on the
efficiency of R&D labor in the potential entrants sector to be equal to the efficiency
of the R&D labor in the incumbents sector, as there is no specific a priori reason why
they should differ. Table 2.1 documents chosen parameter values and the justification
for the choices. Note that in the Targeted section of the table the justification should be
viewed as a joint system of conditions rather than a 1:1 correspondence between a specific
parameter and targeted moment. Table 2.2 compares the model outcomes to targeted
moments. Apart from the share of R&D expenditures in GDP, which is slightly lower in
the model than in the data22, all moments are replicated satisfactorily.
The lower part of the Table 2.2 reports also the comparison of two non-targeted model
21Acemoglu et al. (2013) estimate their model using SMM and obtain point a estimate of 7.8%.
However, basing on other sources, they consider any number between 3.9% and 16.2% to be plausible.
22It should be noted that the Gross Domestic Product: Research and Development by BEA contains
all R&D expenditures performed in the US economy, and not only those performed by private businesses.
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outcomes and their empirical counterparts. The “skilled wage premium” is obtained by
calculating the ratio of weekly wages of supervisory employees to that of non-supervisory
and production employees, which corresponds relatively well with the model object. How-
ever, as in the data around 17% of employees are considered “skilled” (versus 10% in the
model), the empirical measure of “skilled wage premium” is very likely to be biased
downwards.
Admittedly, the share of profits in GDP predicted by the model is lower than in
the data, even if the model’s elasticity of substitution is relatively low compared to the
usual parameter values. One reason for that may be that the model assumes that all
establishments belong to a single industry, which lowers profitability compared to the
situation of many industries with higher intra-industry but lower inter-industry elasticity
of substitution.
Table 2.1: Calibration of the model parameters
Parameter Description Value Justification
Fixed
β Discount factor 0.99 Standard (quarterly)
θ Inverse of IES 2 Standard
κ Inverse of Frisch elasticity 1− 2θ Volatility of hours worked
σ Elasticity of substitution 4 Christopoulou & Vermeulen (2010)
ρZ Autocorr. of TFP process 0.95 Cooley & Prescott (1995)
σZ Std. dev. of TFP shock 0.0055 Match std. dev. of output
s Share of skilled workers 10% Ballpark estimate
Targeted
ι Innovative step size 1.015 Annual pc. GDP growth
a Incumbent R&D eff. 10 Expansions ≈ contractions
ae Entrant R&D eff. 10 a = ae
f Incumbent labor req. 1 Share of R&D employment
f e Entrant labor req. 1 Share of R&D in GDP
δexo Exog. exit shock prob. 0.02 Exit rate
Table 2.2: Long-run moments: comparison of model and data
Description Model Data Source
Targeted
Annual pc. GDP growth 2.02% 2.08% BEA, 1948q1-2016q2
Relative share of expanding estabs. 1.00 1.01 BDM, 1992q3-2016q2
Exit ratea 3.07% 3.07% BDM, 1992q3-2016q2
Share of R&D employment 0.97% 0.98% NSF & CBP, 1964-2008
Share of R&D in GDP 2.07% 2.23% BEA, 1948q1-2016q2
Non-targeted
“Skilled wage premium” 2.59 2.09 BLS, 2006q1-2016q2
Share of profits in GDP 4.65% 6.53% BEA, 1948q1-2016q2
aCalculated from the data as the average between death and birth rates.
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2.3.2 Model performance
As is standard in the business cycle literature, I present the comparison between the
HP-filtered moments generated by the model and the data.
Data for the variables presented in the upper part of the table are based on the 1948q1-
2016q2 sample. Output is based on Real Gross Domestic Product by BEA, Hours on
Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons23 by BLS and Research and Development
on appropriately deflated Gross Domestic Product: Research and Development by BEA.
Data for variables presented in the lower part of the table are based on the 1992q3-
2016q2 sample, covering 97 periods, and come from the BDM. All variables before filtering
were divided by the US labor force.
Table 2.3: Business cycle moments: comparison of model and data
Standard deviation Correlation with Y Autocorrelation
Variable Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 1.58 1.58 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.77
Hours 1.36 0.73 0.86 0.99 0.89 0.72
R&D 2.36 2.95 0.32 0.98 0.89 0.68
Establishments 0.62 0.64 0.71 0.70 0.87 0.88
Expansions 2.84 1.22 0.82 0.89 0.75 0.91
Contractions 2.38 0.42 -0.11 -0.46 0.69 0.39
Net Entry 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.49 0.24 0.40
Model moments are based on 10000 simulated periods. Table 2.3 presents the set of
moment statistics comparing model performance to data. Overall, the model is quite
successful in capturing the cyclical characteristics of establishment dynamics.
The cyclical properties of the number of establishments are perfectly in line with the
data. The model underpredicts the volatility of expansions and contractions, which may
be caused by the fact that a significant share of US establishments does not adjust its
employment quarter over quarter. It also underpredicts the volatility of hours worked,
but this issue is common across the majority of business cycles literature. The model
also slightly overpredicts the standard deviation of R&D expenditures, although as the
next exercise shows, compared to R&D performed by private businesses, this statistic
may well be too low.
As an additional exercise to confirm that the model is able to replicate the comove-
ments of variables in the data, I obtain the values of productivity shocks hitting the
economy so that the HP-deviations of model output and US GDP are identical24. In the
next step I run the model conditional on this particular history of shocks and compare
23Since in general the nonfarm business sector variables are more volatile than their economy-wide
counterparts, the reported standard deviation of HP-deviations in hours is normalized by dividing by
the ratio of volatility of Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Output by BLS and Real Gross Domestic
Product.
24In this step I construct a first-order approximation of the model and use Dynare version 4.4.3 to
obtain the shock history via the estimation step.
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the HP-deviations of model variables and their empirical counterparts. The results of
this exercise are reported in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Hodrick-Prescott trend deviations: comparison of model and data (%)
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The performance of the model is very satisfactory as all the predicted movements
match the data quite closely. The right hand column contains graphs where the volatility
of the deviations is much bigger in the data than in the model and two scales are intro-
duced. In the panel (e), instead of using the Research and Development series by BEA, I
use the appropriately deflated Industrial R&D series by the National Science Foundation
as it tracks specifically the R&D performed in the private business sector, although un-
fortunately is available only at the yearly frequency and with a significant lag. While the
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model captures very well the dynamics of R&D in the vicinity of the dot-com bubble, it
overpredicts the reduction in R&D at the beginning of the Great Recession.
2.3.3 Long shadows of temporary shocks
Figure 2.2 presents the impulse response function to a 1% productivity shock. A tem-
porary increase in productivity (a) boosts output (b) directly, but also indirectly via an
increase in hours worked (c) and the mass of active establishments (f), which gets big-
ger due to elevated net entry (i). The mass of expanding establishments (g) increases
while the mass of contracting establishments (h) decreases on impact, while after a while
increases due to bigger mass of active establishments. Last but not least, a positive
shock to the goods producing sector increases R&D expenditures (e), which results in
an increase of aggregate quality index (d) above its trend. Notice well that even if the
shock eventually dissipates, the effects of the shock due to a level shift in quality, and in
consequence the balanced growth path, remain. Almost 6% of the shock is translated to
the level shift in the BGP, and around 2/3 of this effect is already in place 5 years after
the shock.
Figure 2.2: Impulse response functions to 1% productivity shock (%)
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2.4 Welfare analysis
The issue of quantifying welfare effects of business cycles has been recognized at least
since Lucas (1987). His original assessment, basing on the variance of consumption, puts
the cost of business cycles at roughly 1/20th of a percent of consumption. Although
economic intuition suggests that those costs are probably much higher, the subsequent
literature had limited success in generating large welfare effects of business cycles, see
Lucas (2003) and Barlevy (2004).
When the aggregate quality process is endogenous, which gives rise to hysteresis, the
welfare costs of business cycles are likely to be larger than in the case when aggregate
quality follows an exogenous trend. Moreover, since the trend “productivity” growth can
now be influenced, it naturally creates space for potentially welfare-improving policies.
2.4.1 Welfare cost of business cycles
The welfare cost of business cycles can be readily assessed using the consumption equiv-
alent transformation. It denotes a lifetime percentage change in the consumption path
of an agent which makes her indifferent across living in two distinct states of the world.
The equivalent, denoted with eq, can be computed via the following procedure:
W (eq) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
((1 + eq) ct)1−θ
1− θ + u
n
t
]
= (1 + eq)1−θ U c0 + Un0 = UBGP0
eq =
(
UBGP0 − Un0
U c0
) 1
1−θ
− 1
where unt denotes the instantaneous disutility of labor, and U c0 and Un0 denote expected
lifetime utility from consumption and expected lifetime disutility of labor, respectively.
Table 2.4 presents the comparison of expected welfare in three states of the world:
non-stochastic (BGP) and two stochastic: one in which growth is exogenous, i.e. where
the R&D activity is not sensitive to the shocks, and the one with the endogenous growth
subject to business cycles mechanism. In line with the literature, the cost of business
cycles, expressed in consumption equivalent terms, is very small if the growth rate is
exogenous, since the path of output returns to the balanced growth path reasonably
quickly. However, if endogenous growth rates react to shocks, generating level shifts in
the Balanced Growth Path, the expected output path becomes much more volatile and
can deviate from the BGP significantly. This increased uncertainty in outcomes translates
to an almost 100-fold increase in the consumption equivalent, making the number two
orders of magnitude higher than in the exogenous growth case.
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Table 2.4: Welfare cost of business cycles
State of the world Welfare U c Un Consumption equivalent
Non-stochastic (BGP) -122.26 -168.06 45.80 –
Stochastic with exogenous growth -122.37 -168.19 45.83 0.06%
Stochastic with endogenous growth -129.89 -175.73 45.83 4.54%
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Before I analyze the effects of policies, I discuss how the key model statistics – aggregate
growth rate, the level shift in the BGP after 5 and 25 years, and the expected social
welfare – depend on the model parameters. For most of the parameters I will consider
a 10% change in a parameter value. The exception to this operation are the discount
factor β, where I increase it from 0.99 to 0.995 and productivity shock autocorrelation
ρZ which is increased from 0.95 to 0.97. Table 2.5 documents the effects of the changes
in parameter values on the aggregate outcomes and welfare.
Both the growth rate along the BGP, as well as in the stochastic equilibrium, are
higher when: innovative step is larger, incumbents’ R&D efficiency is higher, incumbents’
fixed cost is higher, exogenous exit shock probability is higher, and households are more
patient. The reason why an economy with higher incumbents’ fixed cost grows faster
stems from the fact that it is populated by fewer establishments and each of them can
employ more R&D labor. An economy with higher exit shock probability grows faster
since the mass of entrants, who perform more radical innovations than the incumbents,
is higher. The economy grows slower when the elasticity of substitution is higher, as the
gains from innovation are smaller.
The shift in level of BGP due to a shock is higher when: innovative step is larger,
entrants’ R&D efficiency is higher, exogenous exit shock probability is higher, both the
productivity autocorrelation and volatility are higher, and households are more patient
and more risk-averse. Again, higher exit shock probability results in higher population
of entrants, and a higher entry rate in response to a positive shock. In this model, higher
risk aversion amplifies the reaction in skilled labor, which results in stronger reaction of
aggregate quality. The shift in level of BGP is smaller when incumbents’ R&D efficiency
is higher, fixed costs are higher, and elasticity of substitution is higher. Higher R&D
efficiency of incumbents increases their share of R&D employment at the expense of
entrants who have innovative advantage, thus dampening the effect of a shock.
As it turns out, the share of skilled workers in the economy does not influence the
aggregate growth rate nor the cyclical properties of the model, although it affects the
population of active establishments in the economy.
When discussing welfare issues, I exclude the parameters that directly influence the
social welfare function, as comparing across different utility functions is infeasible. The
last column of Table 2.5 includes the consumption equivalent between the world with
a changed parameter and the baseline world. Slightly counter-intuitively, positive con-
sumption equivalent signals welfare deterioration. A general pattern that emerges from
comparing aggregate outcomes and changes in the welfare is that the larger the shifts
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in the BGP, the lower the welfare, even if the aggregate growth rates are higher. This
underscores the importance of the welfare costs stemming from living in a fundamentally
more uncertain world, compared to the one where “productivity” reverts to an exogenous
trend.
Accordingly, higher innovative step size and higher standard deviation of shocks are
strongly welfare deteriorating. On the other hand, higher entry barriers also have a
slightly negative effect on welfare, but this effects stems from slightly lower aggregate
growth rates, rather than from the volatility channel. Higher probability of an exit
shock, higher elasticity of substitution, higher incumbent’s fixed costs and higher R&D
efficiency all bring welfare improvements. Usually those improvements are a result of
lowered volatility of the economy, although in the case of exit shock probability an increase
in aggregate growth rates dominates the effect of slightly elevated volatility.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this exercise. First, the quantitative impact of
a shock on the shift in BGP is relatively robust with respect to changes in specific pa-
rameters. The parameters which have the strongest impact on the quantitative effect –
elasticity of substitution, productivity process autocorrelation and elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution – were all taken from previous literature and did not depend on the
specifics of calibration. Second, there is ample scope for policy intervention as policies
limiting the economy’s volatility are expected to generate nontrivial welfare effects.
Table 2.5: Sensitivity analysis
γBGP γ ∆Q20 ∆Q100 UBGP U U c Un eqa
Baseline 2.02 2.04 2.25 3.15 -122.26 -129.89 -168.06 45.80 –
ι 2.16 2.19 2.33 3.28 -127.88 -136.22 -184.22 48.00 3.56%
a 2.06 2.09 2.17 3.03 -120.87 -128.04 -173.35 45.31 -1.06%
ae 2.02 2.04 2.26 3.16 -121.52 -129.11 -174.67 45.55 -0.45%
f 2.06 2.08 2.21 3.07 -119.78 -126.92 -171.82 44.90 -1.70%
f e 2.02 2.04 2.22 3.12 -122.67 -130.29 -176.28 45.99 0.22%
δexo 2.09 2.11 2.28 3.20 -115.34 -122.31 -165.46 43.15 -4.38%
σ 1.68 1.71 1.86 2.64 -119.14 -126.01 -173.87 47.86 -2.19%
ρZ = 0.97 2.02 2.04 2.24 4.03 -122.26 -129.85 -175.71 45.86 -0.03%
σZ 2.02 2.05 2.48 3.47 -122.26 -131.50 -177.34 45.84 0.91%
β = 0.995 2.08 2.11 2.29 4.14
θ 2.00 2.04 3.66 6.61
κ 2.02 2.04 1.79 3.25
s 2.02 2.04 2.25 3.15
aThe lower the number, the higher the welfare gain
2.4.3 Policy experiments
The conclusions of the previous sections also have implications for the optimal industrial
policy. In particular, encouraging entry by either lowering entry barriers or by subsidizing
entrants’ R&D yields positive welfare effects in the stochastic equilibrium. Additionally,
direct subsidies to incumbents are welfare deteriorating, while R&D subsidies boost wel-
fare.
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The above results fall in line with those obtained by the endogenous growth literature
in deterministic settings25. The value added of my approach is in considering the ef-
fects of countercyclical subsidies. Such subsidies do not affect significantly the aggregate
growth rates directly, but can act as moderators of business cycle fluctuations and via
the volatility channel affect welfare.
As neither the productivity shock nor the aggregate quality level are observable, I set
up a scheme where subsidy reacts to variables that are observable almost in real time:
the level of output Y and mass of active establishments M . Both of those schemes yield
similar outcomes26. The subsidy/tax is financed by lump sum taxes/transfers levied on
the households. As the fixed and R&D costs are in effect incomes of skilled workers,
the subsidy/tax does not redirect the resources from the private economy, and merely
affects the incentives of entrants and incumbents. Therefore, one must take the results
with a grain of salt as implementable tax/subsidy schemes would introduce additional
distortions.
Table 2.6 documents the effects of applying countercyclical subsidies to the model
economy. A symmetric subsidy/tax lowers the effective costs of skilled labor in the
recession and increases those costs during expansions, therefore counteracting the cyclical
effects on the skilled workers’ wage. Similarly as in the constant subsidy case, subsidizing
either entrants’ R&D efforts or lowering the costs of entry generates positive welfare
effects.
The situation is however radically different in the case of incumbents: while it is
welfare improving to implement a constant subsidy to incumbents’ R&D efforts, coun-
tercyclical subsidies are welfare deteriorating. This effects is the result of competition
for skilled labor between entrants and incumbents: subsidy to incumbents’ R&D diverts
resources from entrants where they are needed the most: in times when entry is already
depressed. This is also evidenced by increased impact of shock on the level shift in BGP
compared to the baseline.
On the other hand, countercyclical subsidies to the fixed cost of incumbents increase
welfare, whereas constant subsidies were welfare deteriorating. The reason is that while
permanent subsidies discourage entry, maintain lower productivity establishments and
thus divert resources from more efficient uses, countercyclical subsidies prevent inefficient
exits and thus reduce significantly the volatility of the economy. In fact, those subsidies
generate the strongest positive welfare effects. This conclusion, if supported by further
studies, gives justification for policies designed to support existing establishments in the
severe downturns.
25See e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2013).
26Since the volatility of establishments is lower than that of output, it is natural that the quantitative
estimates will be lower in the case of establishment subsidy.
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Table 2.6: Effects of countercyclical subsidies
∆Q20 ∆Q100 U U c Un µa
Baseline 2.25 3.15 -129.89 -175.73 45.83 –
0.5% subsidy if Y is 1% below trend
f 0.91 1.22 -128.84 -174.66 45.82 -0.60%
a 3.03 4.42 -133.16 -179.00 45.84 1.86%
f e 2.14 2.99 -129.67 -175.51 45.83 -0.13%
ae 2.22 3.10 -129.83 -175.66 45.83 -0.04%
0.5% subsidy if M is 1% below trend
f 1.69 2.33 -129.64 -175.47 45.83 -0.14%
a 2.58 3.71 -130.99 -176.82 45.84 0.62%
f e 2.24 3.12 -129.74 -175.57 45.83 -0.09%
ae 2.25 3.15 -129.85 -175.68 45.83 -0.03%
aThe lower the number, the higher the welfare gain
2.5 Conclusions
As documented by Comin & Gertler (2006), Barlevy (2007) and Anzoategui et al. (2016),
expenditure on R&D is volatile and procyclical. In this Chapter I have presented an
endogenous growth model, featuring monopolistically competitive, heterogeneous estab-
lishments that endogenously decide on the intensity of R&D. The model is consistent
with the above-mentioned facts and generates predictions on the strength of the impact
of business cycle fluctuations on the endogenous growth rates of the economy.
The results suggest that the mechanism governing innovation dynamics generates
hysteresis effects of temporary shocks on the BGP level, translating almost 6% of the
strength of a shock to the level shift of the BGP. This observation, coupled with other
“missing generation of firms” effects, as identified by Siemer (2014) and Messer et al.
(2016), urges to reassess the previous estimates of the welfare costs of business cycles.
I find that the welfare effects of business cycles are nontrivial and of two orders
of magnitude higher than in the models with exogenous growth. Considerable welfare
effects and the potential to influence endogenous growth rates makes scope for policy
intervention. In line with existing endogenous growth literature, e.g. Acemoglu et al.
(2013), I find that subsidizing incumbents is welfare deteriorating, while subsidizing entry
and R&D investments is welfare improving. These results do not carry over to the case
of countercyclical subsidies, where I find that subsidizing incumbents’ R&D expenditures
is strongly welfare deteriorating, while subsidizing incumbents’ operation costs becomes
welfare enhancing. This conclusion, if supported by further studies, gives justification for
policies designed to support existing establishments in the severe downturns.
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Chapter 3
Innovation and endogenous growth
over business cycle with frictional
labor markets
The issue of interactions between endogenous growth rates and unemployment dynamics
has been analyzed at least since Aghion & Howitt (1994). To contribute to this literature,
I extend the model from Chapter 2 by including a frictional labor market, subject to
the search and matching friction in the tradition of Diamond (1982) and Mortensen
& Pissarides (1994). I follow an approach proposed by Gertler & Trigari (2009) that
assumes nonlinear vacancy posting costs and is remarkably successful in replicating the
labor market dynamics. Therefore this Chapter is also related to the literature focusing
on the impact of labor market frictions, such as the presence and level of firing costs,
on reallocation and productivity growth. In a seminal paper Hopenhayn & Rogerson
(1993) assess the impact of firing costs on reallocation and productivity, and find non-
negligible negative effects. Similar conclusions are reached by the works reviewed and
systematized in Hopenhayn (2014). Bassanini et al. (2009) find that firing costs tend to
reduce growth in industries where firing costs are more likely to be binding. Davis &
Haltiwanger (2014) argue that a recent decrease in labor market fluidity in the United
States negatively impacted job reallocation rates and harmed productivity growth. Da-
Rocha et al. (2016) find much bigger static and dynamic losses in aggregate total factor
productivity when the presence of firing costs alters the establishment-level productivity
distribution. Mukoyama & Osotimehin (2017) analyzes the effects of firing taxes in
a model with rich firm dynamics, although the model does not incorporate aggregate
shocks. Although the analysis of the impact of firing costs is not possible in the setup
chosen for this Chapter, the fluidity of the labor market is affected by the level of hiring
costs, and some parallel conclusions can be drawn.
The Chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the model, deriving
the problem of incumbents and potential entrants, and describing the details of labor
market frictions. The second section discusses the data sources and parameter values,
including those that are estimated. This section also documents stochastic properties
of the model economy in comparison to the data. The third section is devoted to a
discussion of policy implications, providing an estimate of the welfare cost of business
cycles for the US economy and a comparison of the effects of several subsidy schemes.
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The last section concludes.
3.1 Model
Compared to the previous Chapter, the model presented here features two major changes.
First, I introduce physical capital as another factor of production. Second, instead of mod-
eling the labor market as Walrasian, I assume that labor market is subject to the search
and matching friction as in Gertler & Trigari (2009). Following Christiano et al. (2011)
I assume that the hiring and wage bargaining processes are managed by employment
agencies who then supply firms with labor services at a common price.
3.1.1 Households
There is a unit mass of representative households. Each representative household con-
sists of a large family of workers, giving rise to within-household insurance, as in Merz
(1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Any individual worker may be within a given time period
employed and receiving wage income or unemployed and receiving unemployment ben-
efits1. As in Acemoglu et al. (2013), there are two types of workers: skilled of mass s
and unskilled of mass 1− s. Regardless of the labor market status or skill category each
individual enjoys the same level of consumption.
The representative household aims to maximize expected lifetime utility of its mem-
bers:
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−θt
1− θ (3.1)
where β is the discount factor ct denotes per capita consumption and θ is the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The household is subject to the following
budget constraint:
ct + kt+1 = (1 + rt − dp) kt + s [wstnst + bst (1− nst)] + (1− s) [wut nut + but (1− nut )] + tt
where kt denotes per capita stock of physical capital which yields interest rate rt, dp is
the rate of capital depreciation, wst and wut are real wage rates for skilled and unskilled
labor, respectively, nst and nut are the shares of skilled and unskilled workers that are
currently employed, bst and but denote unemployment benefits, and tt denotes any lump
sum net transfers that households receive, including all profits.
The first order conditions of the households result in the following Euler equation:
c−θt = Et
[
βc−θt+1 (1 + rt+1 − dp)
]
(3.2)
As all firms in the economy are ultimately owned by households, I assume that their
managers discount future profit streams consistent with the stochastic discounting kernel
of the households:
Λt,t+1 = Et
[(
ct+1
ct
)−θ]
(3.3)
1Note that I abstract from the real-world possibility that an individual is not active on the labor
market.
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3.1.2 Final goods producer
The final goods producing sector is modeled as a single representative perfectly competi-
tive firm that transforms a continuum of mass Mt ∈ (0, 1) of intermediate good varieties2
into final goods using the CES aggregator:
Yt =
[∫ Mt
0
yt (i)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
where yt (i) denotes the output of i-th variety and σ ∈ (1,∞) is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between any two varieties. The standard solution of the cost minimization problem
yields the price index of the final good as a function of the varieties’ prices Pt (i):
Pt =
[∫ Mt
0
Pt (i)1−σ di
] 1
1−σ
as well as the Hicksian demand function for the i-th variety:
yt (i) = Ytpt (i)−σ (3.4)
where pt (i) = Pt(i) /Pt is the variety’s price relative to the price index.
3.1.3 Intermediate goods producers
The intermediate goods producing sector is modeled as a single industry sector populated
by monopolistically competitive continuum of mass Mt of active establishments, each
producing a distinct variety. To produce, an establishment needs to incur fixed costs
ft, representing expenditures on management and other non-production activities. The
production function of an establishment is of a Cobb-Douglas functional form:
yt (i) = Ztkpt (i)α [qt (i)npt (i)]1−α
where Zt is the stochastic aggregate productivity parameter, kpt (i) and npt (i) denote,
respectively, the employment of capital services and unskilled labor, qt (i) is the quality
level of i-th variety at time period t, and α is the elasticity of output with respect to
capital.
The solution of the cost minimization problem yields the following expression for the
marginal cost, depending on the idiosyncratic quality level of an establishment:
mcpt (i) =
1
Zt
(
rt
α
)α (w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α
where w˜ut denotes the unskilled wage paid to the employment agency.
It is straightforward to show that the optimal pricing strategy given flexible prices
and the demand for an individual variety given by Equation 3.4 follows the standard
constant mark-up pricing formula:
pt (i) =
σ
σ − 1mct (i)
2The condition that the mass of intermediate goods varieties is bounded between 0 and 1 is supported
by assuming that each individual possesses an idea for a product, but only a subset of those individuals
are entrepreneurs and only a fraction of possible goods is actively produced.
40
Following Melitz (2003), I assume that the distribution of idiosyncratic quality levels
at time t is described by some probability density function µt (q) with support on a
subset of (0,∞). It is convenient to define an aggregate quality index Qt such that the
aggregate state of the intermediate goods producing sector can be summarized as if it
was populated by mass Mt of establishments all with quality level Qt. The index is given
by the following formula:
Q1−αt =
[∫ ∞
0
(
q1−α
)σ−1
µt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
As the aggregate quality level grows over time, the idiosyncratic quality levels of
individual establishments are best expressed in relative terms. Therefore, I construct the
following measure of relative quality:
φt (i) ≡ (qt (i) /Qt)(1−α)(σ−1)
The aggregate final goods output can be then expressed as:
Yt = M
1
σ−1
t Zt (Kpt )α (QtNpt )1−α (3.5)
where Kpt and Npt denote, respectively, aggregate capital stock and employment in the
production sector and the dependence of output on Mt reflects the love-for-variety phe-
nomenon.
3.1.4 Incumbents
I assume that each incumbent establishment can direct resources to R&D activities in
attempt to improve their varieties’ quality. The success probability function is taken from
Pakes & McGuire (1994) and Ericson & Pakes (1995):
χt (i) =
axt (i)
1 + axt (i)
where χt (i) denotes the probability of making a quality improvement and a is a parameter
that describes the efficiency of R&D input xt (i) in generating improvements. R&D input
requires a combination of skilled labor and capital:
xt (i) =
kxt (i)
α [Qtnxt (i)]
1−α
Qtφt (i)
where kxt (i) and nxt (i) denote, respectively, the employment of capital services and skilled
labor.
The presence of aggregate and relative quality levels in the expression lends itself to
an intuitive interpretation. Aggregate quality level in the numerator multiplies with R&D
laborers as they have access to a pool of common knowledge. However, over time it is
harder to come up with new ideas unless more resources are committed to R&D activities,
which is captured by aggregate quality level in the denominator. Finally, the presence of
relative quality level in the denominator represents the catch-up and headwind effects,
depending on establishments’ position in the quality distribution.
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The solution of the cost minimization problem results in the following expression for
the marginal cost in the R&D sector:
mcxt (i) = Qαt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜st
1− α
)1−α
φt (i) ≡ m¯cxt φt (i)
where w˜st denotes the skilled wage paid to the employment agency, and m¯cxt is the skilled
marginal cost component common to all establishments.
I also assume that the managerial activities require the same combination of physical
capital and skilled labor as R&D activities. Therefore, the fixed cost can be expressed as
a product of the common skilled marginal cost and a constant f . Accordingly, the real
profit can be expressed as the following function, which is affine in terms of φt (i):
pit (i) = Yt
[(
1
σMt
− ωt
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
)
φt (i)− ωtf
]
(3.6)
and where ωt ≡ m¯cxt /Yt is the ratio of common skilled marginal cost and aggregate
output.
The dynamic problem of the incumbents can be cast in the recursive form. Since all
establishments with the same relative quality levels will make identical decisions, I drop
the subscript i. Additionally, for establishments with low enough φt the expected stream
of future profits turns negative and they decide to exit at the end of the current period.
The value of an establishment with relative quality level φt is given by the following
expression:
Vt (φt) = max
χt∈[0,1)
{pit (φt, χt) + max {0,Et [βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)Vt+1 (φt+1|φt, χt)]}}
where Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor consistent with the households’ valuation of
current and future marginal utility from consumption (Equation 3.3), δt denotes endoge-
nous establishment death shock probability, which will be described in detail later, and
the relative quality of a variety in the next period is subject to the following lottery3:
φt+1 =
ιφt/ηt with probability χtφt/ηt with probability 1− χt
where ι denotes the size of the innovative step and ηt is the rate of growth of the aggregate
quality index (raised to a certain power), taken as given by the individual establishments:
ηt ≡
(
Qt+1
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
Since the aggregate quality index is trending upwards over time, it is useful to consider
the following stationarization. Define vt (φt) ≡ Vt (φt) /Yt to be the ratio of the value
3The underlying absolute quality levels evolve according to the lottery:
qt+1 =
{
ι1/[(1−α)(σ−1)]qt with probability χt
qt with probability 1− χt
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function and current aggregate output. For the problem rewritten in relative terms the
level of aggregate quality becomes irrelevant, and its rate of growth is a function of the
current state only.
Moreover, for large enough φt the probability that an establishment will want to exit
in the foreseeable future is very small, and the max {0, ·} operator can be disregarded. As
the real profit function is affine in φt and the value function is a weighted sum of present
and future profit streams, it is also affine in φt. Therefore, I impose the affine functional
form on vt (φt) ≡ At +Btφt:
At +Btφt = max
χt∈[0,1)

(
1
σMt
− ωt
a
χt
1−χt
)
φt − ωtf
+Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
(At+1 +Bt+1φt+1)
]  (3.7)
The solution to the incumbents’ problem must then satisfy the following first order
and envelope conditions:
0 = −ωt
a
1
(1− χt)2
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
Bt+1
(ι− 1)
ηt
)]
(3.8)
Bt =
(
1
σMt
− ωt
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
]
(3.9)
Note that the relative quality level does not impact the optimal innovative success
probability χt, as long as φt is high enough, in line with Gibrat’s law.
Obviously, one needs to specify the decisions of establishments with lower levels of φt.
For sufficiently low levels of φt the establishment exits and thus does not engage in R&D
activities at all. Therefore, its value function is given by:
At +Btφt =
1
σMt
φt − ωtf (3.10)
It now remains to specify what happens in the intermediate range of relative quality
levels. For the sake of tractability I opt to represent the true value function with its
piecewise linear approximation, namely, I extend the functions given by Equations 3.7
and 3.10 until they intersect for the relative quality level φ∗t , given implicitly by the
following condition:
ωt
a
χt
1− χtφ
∗
t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
At+1 +Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
φ∗t
)]
(3.11)
All establishments with relative quality levels no higher than φ∗t exit, and all continu-
ators choose the same level of χt. By assuming that the quality is distributed according
to the Pareto distribution with power parameter equal to one4, I am able to provide a
closed form expression for the mass of establishment exits:
Mxt = Mt (1− χt−1)
(
1− φ
∗
t−1
φ∗tηt−1
)
(3.12)
4This assumption is ubiquitous in the firm size distribution literature. For empirical support see e.g.
Axtell (2001).
43
3.1.5 Entrants
The mass of prospective entrants is assumed to be a priori unbounded. Similar to active
establishments, they can engage in R&D activities. In contrast to incumbents, the suc-
cessful outcome of their innovation effort is not an improvement in an existing product,
but rather creating a new one, which may or may not replace an existing variety.
To attempt entry, prospective entrants hire physical capital and skilled labor just as
incumbents do, including also the necessity to cover fixed costs. Successful entrants begin
their production in the next period. The stationarized expected value of entry is given
by:
vet = max
χet∈[0,1)
{
−ωt
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
+ χetEt
[
Λt,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
vt+1
(
φet+1
)]}
(3.13)
where χet is the probability of entering the market next period, ae is a parameter that
describes the efficiency of R&D input and φet+1 denotes the relative quality draw upon
entry. Since entrants tend to perform more radical innovations than incumbents, as
emphasized by e. g. Acemoglu & Cao (2015) and Garcia-Macia et al. (2016), I assume
that they draw from the incumbents’ distribution of quality levels, upscaled by a factor
which precludes the need to resort to limit pricing.
The first order condition of the entrants’ problem can be expressed as:
ωt
ae
1
(1− χet )2
= Et
[
Λt,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
vt+1
(
φet+1
)]
(3.14)
Additionally, since the mass of prospective entrants is unbounded, the following free
entry condition holds in every period5:
vet = 0 (3.15)
Hence, if the mass of successful entrants is denoted by M et and the chosen success
probability is χet , then the mass of agents attempting entry has to equal M et /χet .
The modeled entry process is undirected, but allows for the possibility that a successful
entrant leapfrogs over an incumbent. To capture this feature, I assume that the space
of all possible varieties occupies a unit interval, while active establishments occupy its
subset Mt. This represents the notion that every individual in an economy possesses
a potential business idea but only a fraction of them become entrepreneurs and their
varieties are produced. Since the mass of households equals unity, it is natural to assume
that the mass of potential ideas also equals unity.
Upon successful entry the new establishment randomly draws its “location” from
the unit interval and a fraction of them replaces active establishments. To ensure no
limit pricing in equilibrium, I assume that entrants enjoy a relative quality advantage
over the incumbents. Therefore, if an entrant replaces an incumbent that has inno-
vated successfully, the product line will be characterized by [ισ/ (σ − 1)]1/[(1−α)(σ−1)] times
higher quality level than in the previous period, and in case of replacing an incumbent
that has not succeeded in innovating the product line’s quality increases by a factor of
5The model in the previous Chapter admitted the possibility of no entry. However, the model in this
Chapter is solved using perturbation methods which do not allow for inequality constraints.
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[σ/ (σ − 1)]1/[(1−α)(σ−1)]. Accordingly, the expected relative quality level of entrants is
equal to:
Et
[
φet+1
]
= σ
σ − 1
I can now specify the process for the endogenous probability of an incumbent receiving
an exit shock. There are three conditions under which an active establishment exits,
and I assume that at the end of each period the events follow a specific order. First,
the incumbents with relative quality level below φ∗t exit “voluntarily” as their varieties
become obsolete. Second, incumbents receive exogenous exit shocks. Finally, a fraction
of incumbents are leapfrogged by entrants and thus creatively destroyed. Therefore, the
mass of active establishments in the next period is given by:
Mt+1 = Mt −Mxt − δexo (Mt −Mxt ) + [1− (1− δexo) (Mt −Mxt )]M et
where δexo is the exogenous exit shock probability and the mass of successful entrantsM et
is multiplied by the probability that an entrant draws an “unoccupied” location. As by
definition creative destruction replaces an incumbent with an entrant, it does not directly
affect the mass of active establishments. The expression for active establishment mass
can be also written as:
Mt+1 = Mt −Mxt − δt (Mt −Mxt ) +M et (3.16)
Then by comparing the two formulations one gets the following expression for endoge-
nous exit shock probability:
δt = 1− (1− δexo) (1−M et ) (3.17)
Intuitively, the probability of not receiving an exit shock is a product of the probabil-
ities of not receiving an exogenous shock and not being creatively destroyed, as the two
are independent from each other.
It is now possible to characterize the process governing the evolution of the aggregate
quality index. First, by the law of large numbers, a fraction χt of incumbents with relative
quality levels above φ∗t manage to improve their varieties, while the incumbents with
obsolete varieties exit. Second, incumbents receive death shocks which are uncorrelated
with their quality levels and thus leave the distribution unchanged. Finally, entrants
draw their quality from the distribution of incumbents’ qualities, rescaled upwards. By
assuming Pareto distribution of quality levels it is possible to derive the exact closed form
expression for the rate of growth of the aggregate quality index:
ηt = (1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
(3.18)
3.1.6 Frictional labor markets
I assume that labor markets are subject to the search and matching friction. At the end
of each period a constant fraction of workers randomly separates from their previously
held job positions and enter the pool of unemployed. The transition from the unemployed
to employed state depends on the endogenously determined job finding probability, which
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is influenced by the intensity of hiring. The assumption of constant separation rate and
fluctuating hiring rate is consistent with the US data, as argued by Shimer (2005, 2012),
although Petrongolo & Pissarides (2008) point out that it might not be an appropriate
assumption for other countries.
I also assume that the unskilled and skilled labor markets are separated, with differing
unemployment rates, vacancy rates, and so on. To facilitate exposition, and since both
markets operate based on the same principles, I present the workings of the representative
labor market, omitting the superscript.
3.1.6.1 Aggregate labor market dynamics
By excluding the possibility that an agent can be inactive on the labor market, the mass
of unemployed workers is given by:
ut = 1− nt (3.19)
The mass of new matchesmt is a function of the mass of unemployed and the aggregate
mass of vacancies vt:
mt = σmuψt v1−ψt (3.20)
where the parameter σm describes the efficiency of the matching process and ψ is the
elasticity of matches with respect to the mass of unemployed.
The job finding probability pt and job filling probability qt can be obtained via the
following transformation:
pt = mt/ut (3.21)
qt = mt/vt (3.22)
Following Gertler & Trigari (2009) and Gertler et al. (2008), and in contrast to the
standard modeling approach by Mortensen & Pissarides (1994), I assume convex costs
with respect to the hiring rate6:
xt =
qtvt
nt
(3.23)
The process for mass of employed workers is given by the following relationship:
nt+1 = (ρ+ xt)nt (3.24)
where 1− ρ is a constant separation rate.
3.1.6.2 Employment agencies and workers
Since the problem of the individual establishments is already quite complex and adding
idiosyncratic employment and wage levels would make the model intractable, I follow
Christiano et al. (2011) in assuming that both hiring and wage bargaining is managed
by employment agencies. The agencies then supply labor services to establishments at
6As noticed by Fujita (2004), the standard search and matching model generates counterfactual shape
of the impulse response function of vacancies to labor productivity shocks. The setup proposed by Gertler
& Trigari (2009) and Gertler et al. (2008) alleviates this issue.
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uniform cost determined on the agencies-establishments side of the labor market, although
the wages individual workers receive will differ due to the assumption of staggered real
wage contracts.
Each employment agency chooses its desired hiring rate to maximize the value of
contracting an extra worker, conditional on the agency-specific wage level:
Jt (j) = max
xt(j)
{
w˜t − wt (j)− κ2x2t (j)
+ (ρ+ xt (j)) Et [βΛt,t+1Jt+1 (j)]
}
The first order condition of the agency can be expressed in the following two forms:
κxt (j) = Et [βΛt,t+1Jt+1 (j)]
κxt (j) = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
[
w˜t+1 − wt+1 (j) + κ2x
2
t+1 (j) + ρκxt+1 (j)
]]
and all agencies with the same level of offered wages will choose the same hiring rate.
The workers can be either employed or unemployed, and I denote the values of those
states by E and U , respectively. The value of being employed by j-th agency is given by:
Et (j) = wt (j) + Et [βΛt,t+1 [ρEt+1 (j) + (1− ρ)Ut+1]]
An unemployed worker is a priori uncertain about the wage offer she will receive
upon creating a successful match with an agency. By denoting with G the cumulative
distribution of wages the expected value of being newly hired is approximated by:
Et ≈
∫
Et (wt) dG (wt)
where the approximation is valid up to a first order conditional on wage distribution
along the Balanced Growth Path to be degenerate7. The value of being unemployed then
follows:
Ut = bt + Et [βΛt,t+1 [ptEt+1 + (1− pt)Ut+1]]
Accordingly, the surplus of a worker employed by agency j and the average surplus
of newly hired workers equal:
Ht (j) = Et (j)− Ut
Ht = Et − Ut
And the individual worker’s surplus can be rewritten as:
Ht (j) = wt (j)− bt + Et [βΛt,t+1 [ρHt+1 (j)− ptHt+1]]
3.1.6.3 Staggered wage bargaining
The wages are subject to the Calvo-like staggered wage contract friction at the employ-
ment agency level, with the average contract duration of 1/ (1− λ). Therefore, the wage
offered by an employment agency is given by:
wt (j) =
wt (r) with probability 1− λwt−1 (j) ·Qt/Qt−1 with probability λ
7See Gertler & Trigari (2009) for the full argument.
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where wt (r) denotes the wage bargained when employment agencies are allowed to rene-
gotiate. I assume that in the case of being unable to renegotiate wages are indexed with
aggregate quality growth. This assumption is necessary for the balanced growth path
distribution of wages to collapse to a single point. As a consequence, the average wage
will follow the standard Calvo assumption:
wt = λ
Qt
Qt−1
wt−1 + (1− λ)wt (r) (3.25)
An agency that receives a signal to renegotiate in the current period bargains with the
marginal worker over the surplus. The bargained contract wage maximizes the following
Nash product:
wt (r) = arg maxHt (r)ψ Jt (r)1−ψ
where I already impose the Hosios (1990) condition that both sides’ bargaining power
correspond to matching function elasticities. The first order condition for the Nash
bargaining problem is given by:
ψ
∂Ht (r)
∂wt (r)
Jt (r) = (1− ψ) ∂Jt (r)
∂wt (r)
Ht (r)
While Gertler & Trigari (2009) consider a case where the above formula gives rise
to the horizon effect of the agency, the effect disappears under assumption that the
wage bargaining and hiring decisions are simultaneous, i.e. internalizing the first order
condition of the employment agency8. Then the solution of the Nash bargaining problem
is of the conventional surplus sharing form:
ψJt (r) = (1− ψ)Ht (r)
If the wages were renegotiated on the period-by-period basis, then the contract wage
would be equal to:
wft = ψ
(
w˜t +
κ
2x
2
t + ptκxt
)
+ (1− ψ) bt (3.26)
However, the problem is more involved in the case of staggered contracts. Denote
by Wt (j) the expected discounted sum of future wages received over the duration of the
relationship with the employment agency:
Wt (j) = ∆twt (j) + (1− λ) Et
∞∑
s=1
(βρ)s Λt,t+s∆t+swt+s (r)
where the first part represents contract that is not renegotiated and the wage is only
indexed, while the second part represents future, renegotiated contracts at the same
employment agency, and:
∆t = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βρλ)s Λt,t+s
Qt+s
Qt
(3.27)
8In any case, the quantitative impact of the horizon effect is negligible.
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The surplus of workers at renegotiating agency can be then rewritten as:
Ht (r) = wt (r) + Et [βΛt,t+1ρHt+1 (r)]− bt − Et [βΛt,t+1ptHt+1]
= Wt (r)− Et
∞∑
s=0
(βρ)s Λt,t+s (bt+s + pt+sHt+s+1)
Similarly, the surplus value of employed worker from the point of view of the employ-
ment agency can be rewritten as:
Jt (r) = w˜t +
κ
2x
2
t (r) + ρEt [βΛt,t+1Jt+1 (r)]− wt (r)
= Et
∞∑
s=0
(βρ)s Λt,t+s
(
w˜t+s +
κ
2x
2
t+s (r)
)
−Wt (r)
By substituting the above expressions in the surplus sharing equation one can obtain:
Wt (r) = ψEt
∞∑
s=0
(βρ)s Λt,t+s
(
w˜t+s +
κ
2x
2
t+s (r)
)
+ (1− ψ) Et
∞∑
s=0
(βρ)s Λt,t+s (bt+s + pt+sHt+s+1)
or, after simplifying, in the following recursive form:
∆twt (r) = ψ
(
w˜t +
κ
2x
2
t (r)
)
+ (1− ψ) (bt + ptEt [βΛt,t+1Ht+1])
+ ρλEt [βΛt,t+1∆t+1wt+1 (r)] (3.28)
where the first two terms comprise the target wage wot , which in turn can be expressed
in relation to the flexible contract wage:
wot = ψ
(
w˜t +
κ
2x
2
t (r)
)
+ (1− ψ) (bt + ptEt [βΛt,t+1Ht+1])
= wft + ψ
(
κ
2
(
x2t (r)− x2t
)
+ ptκ (xt (r)− xt)
)
+ (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1λ∆t+1 (wt+1 − wt+1 (r))] (3.29)
The above equation emphasizes the presence of spillovers of economy-wide wages on
the bargaining wage. Intuitively, more intensive hiring by an agency requires also higher
bargained wages, which are also upwardly pressured by the expected future average wage.
Finally, let xt denote the average hiring rate:
xt =
∫ 1
0
xt (j)
nt (j)
nt
dj
Then the job creation condition can be used to express xt as:
κxt = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
w˜t+1 − wt+1 + κ2x
2
t+1 + ρκxt+1
)]
(3.30)
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1
∫ 1
0 (κ2 x2t+1(j)+ρκxt+1(j)−wt+1(j))nt(j)nt dj
−(κ2 x2t+1+ρκxt+1−wt+1)
]
Note that along the Balanced Growth Path the deviations of individual employment
agencies’ decisions from average disappear and as a first order approximation one can
take only the first line of the above equation.
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3.1.7 Market clearing
Factor markets are assumed to clear at each period:
Npt = (1− s)nut and N st = snst (3.31)
Kt = Kpt +Kst (3.32)
Supply and demand for skilled inputs are equal:
(Kst /Qt)
α (N st )
1−α = Mtf + (Mt −Mxt )
(
1
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ M
e
t
χet
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
(3.33)
where the three sources of demand are: fixed costs of active establishments, R&D ac-
tivities of incumbents with non-obsolete varieties and fixed costs and R&D activities of
prospective entrants.
Finally, the final goods output is spent on consumption, investment and covering
hiring costs:
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 − (1− dp)Kt + κu (xut )2Npt + κs (xst)2N st (3.34)
3.2 Data and results
3.2.1 Data, calibration and estimation
The data used in this Chapter come from several major sources. The primary source of
data on establishment dynamics comes from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Business Employment Dynamics (BDM) database. Data on GDP, its components and
R&D expenditures are provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analyses (BEA), while
data on R&D employment come from the National Science Foundation (NSF). Historical
establishment employment data are taken from County Business Patterns (CBP). Data
on hours and wages are taken from the Nonfarm Business Sector statistics provided by the
BLS. Data on unemployment rate and vacancy rate are also taken from the BLS, although
for years 1951-2000 the data on vacancies are based on the composite help-wanted index
by Barnichon (2010).
The parameters that influence the balanced growth path of the economy are calibrated
to reflect the long-run averages in the US data and are summarized in Table 3.1. The
values of parameters governing the behavior of the labor markets were taken from previous
literature. Differentiated separation rates for unskilled and skilled workers are taken from
Cairo & Cajner (2017) and adapted to the quarterly model setup9. The adjustment cost
parameters were chosen to match the average job finding probability in the US, which
Shimer (2005) reports to be equal to 0.45 at monthly frequency and Cairo & Cajner
(2017) document that the job finding probabilities differ only slightly among the workers’
education groups. As in Shimer (2005) the unemployment benefits are assumed to be
equal to 40% of the steady state wage. Following Gertler & Trigari (2009) I set the
9Cairo & Cajner (2017) document statistics for workers differentiated by their education level. I treat
skilled workers to be analogous to holders of college degree and unskilled to be analogous to high school
graduates.
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elasticity of matches to unemployment to 0.5 and impose the Hosios (1990) condition that
the bargaining power parameters correspond to matching elasticities. Finally, I set the
matching efficiency parameter to match the observed average vacancy to unemployment
ratio to 0.54, although Shimer (2005) emphasizes that the value of this parameter is
virtually irrelevant as beside influencing the average labor market tightness it has no
impact on other variables.
Both the capital share of income and quarterly depreciation rate are set to values
ubiquitous in the business cycle literature. The discount factor, which in the calibration
process depends on the value of elasticity of intertemporal substitution, is chosen so that
the average annual net interest rate is equal to 5%. The share of skilled workers is picked
to be in the middle of the plausible range of values proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2013)
and corresponds to the value used in the previous Chapter and adjusted to account for
the presence of unemployment in the model.
Finally, the set of parameters governing the establishment dynamics is calibrated to
match specific moments reported in Table 3.2. As I have 6 moments to match with 8 free
parameters, I impose a constraint that the R&D efficiency parameter and fixed cost are
equal for both incumbents and entrants.
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters affecting the steady state
Parameter Description Value Justification
ρu Unskilled retention rate 0.97253 Cairo & Cajner (2017)
ρs Skilled retention rate 0.993 Cairo & Cajner (2017)
κu Unskilled hiring cost 2 Unskilled job finding probability
κs Skilled hiring cost 15.8 Skilled job finding probability
bu Unskilled unemp. benefit 0.14 40% of steady state unskilled wage
bs Skilled unemp. benefit 0.41 40% of steady state skilled wage
ψ Elasticity of matches 0.5 Gertler & Trigari (2009)
σm Matching efficiency 1.7 Average tightness = 0.54
α Capital share of income 0.3 Standard
dp Capital depreciation rate 0.025 Standard
β Discount factor 0.9996 Annual net interest rate of 5%
s Share of skilled workers 0.1039 Chapter 2
ι Innovative step size 1.016 Annual pc. GDP growth
δexo Exog. exit shock prob. 0.0174 Exit rate
a, ae R&D efficiency 7.96 Expansions = contractions
f, f e Fixed cost 0.94 Share of R&D in GDP
θ Inverse of IES 2.3 Share of investment in GDP
σ Elasticity of substitution 4.9 Share of R&D employment
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Table 3.2: Long-run moments: comparison of model and data
Description Model Data Source
Annual pc. GDP growth 2.07% 2.08% BEA, 1948q1-2016q2
Exit ratea 3.07% 3.07% BDM, 1992q3-2016q2
Relative share of expanding estabs. 1.01 1.01 BDM, 1992q3-2016q2
Share of R&D in GDP 2.21% 2.23% BEA, 1948q1-2016q2
Share of investment in GDP 16.91% 17.17% BEA, 1948q1-2016q2
Share of R&D employment 1.25% 0.98% NSF & CBP, 1964-2008
aCalculated from the data as the average between death and birth rates.
To obtain the values of parameters that do not affect the steady state but govern the
cyclical behavior of the model, I employ the estimation procedure. The prior distributions
were chosen to be relatively uninformative, and in particular the prior distribution for
the renegotiation frequency parameter was set to uniform on the unit interval. Table A.1
in the Appendix contains full information on the priors used.
The observable variable used in the estimation is the quarterly growth rate of Real
Gross Domestic Product divided by the Labor Force, observed in periods 1948q2-2017q2.
An advantage of the model with explicitly modeled long-run growth is that there is no
need to detrend the data and valuable information is retained. The model was estimated
using standard Bayesian procedures with help of Dynare 4.5 and results were generated
using two random walk Metropolis-Hastings chains with 200,000 draws each with an
acceptance ratio of around 0.23. Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix demonstrate
that the estimation procedure has been able to converge successfully.
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results. The data were clearly informative about
the estimated parameters, as the posterior and prior means differ significantly and the
highest posterior density (HPD) intervals are relatively tight. This observation can be
also confirmed by comparing the plots of prior and posterior densities displayed in Figure
3.1.
The most interesting parameter here is λ that determines contract renegotiation prob-
ability, and its value implies that wage contracts last on average for 5 quarters. This value
is slightly higher than assumed by Gertler & Trigari (2009) in their calibrated model,
where they consider average duration of 9 and 12 months, and also higher than estimated
by Gertler et al. (2008) where contracts last for 3.5 quarters10. However, assuming this
value of the parameter yields excellent performance in case of labor market variables,
which were not observed directly during the estimation procedure (see Table 3.5).
10Note however that Gertler et al. (2008) impose a relatively tight prior on this parameter.
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Table 3.3: Prior and posterior means of parameters affecting cyclical behavior
Parameter Description Prior mean Post. mean 90% HPD interval
λ Calvo parameter (wages) 0.5 0.796 [0.691, 0.909]
ρZ Autocorr. of TFP process 0.7 0.946 [0.905, 0.990]
σZ Std. dev. of TFP shock 0.01 0.012 [0.011, 0.013]
Figure 3.1: Prior and posterior distributions
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3.2.2 Model performance and impulse response functions
Table 3.4 presents the comparison of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered moments between the
model and data. Data for the variables presented in the upper and middle parts of the
table are based on the 1951q1-2016q4 sample. Output is based on the Gross Domes-
tic Product by BEA, consumption on the sum of Personal Consumption Expenditures
on Nondurable Goods and Services, investment on the sum of Personal Consumption
Expenditures on Durable Goods and Fixed Private Investment, and R&D expenditures
on Gross Domestic Product: Research and Development. Wages are based on Nonfarm
Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour by BLS, and hours on Hours of All Persons.
Unemployment rate is taken from the BLS, and vacancy rate is taken from JOLTS by
BLS and spliced with composite help-wanted index by Barnichon (2010). Data for vari-
ables presented in the lower part of the table are based on the 1992q3-2016q4 sample,
covering 99 periods, and come from the BDM. All variables trending with population size
were divided by the Civilian Labor Force by BLS, and variables in nominal terms were
deflated by the Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator by BEA.
The upper section of the table is concerned with output and its components, as well
as R&D expenditures. The model fits the data very well for output and its components,
and only fails to account for much weaker correlation of R&D expenditures with output.
The middle section of the table focuses on variables pertaining to the operations of
the labor market. The model wages are stronger correlated with output and have higher
autocorrelation than in the data, and model hours are not as volatile as in the data.
However, the model is very successful in matching the cyclical behavior of unemployment,
vacancies and tightness, achieving nearly perfect fit. Additionally, Table 3.5 presents
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correlations between key labor market variables and confirms that the model is able to
replicate the Beveridge curve comovements.
The final section presents the moments related to the establishment dynamics. Al-
though the fit is a bit worse than in the case of previously discussed variables, most
of the model moments remain close to their data counterparts, with the exception that
the model predicts much smaller volatility of establishment dynamics. The model also
predicts that the establishment mass is slightly negatively correlated with output, even
though the correlation of net entry with output is almost exactly the same as in the
data. A brief look at the impulse response functions in Figure 3.2 reveals that this result
is most likely driven by a small and short-lived decrease in the mass of establishments
immediately after the shock hits, and for the subsequent periods the mass of active es-
tablishments moves in tandem with output.
To sum up, although the model is not able to match the data perfectly, the fit is more
than satisfactory and provides a solid foundation for further analysis.
Table 3.4: Business cycle moments: comparison of model and data
Standard deviation Correlation with Y Autocorrelation
Variable Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 1.58 1.58 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.83
Consumption 0.87 0.80 0.78 0.98 0.82 0.75
Investment 4.54 5.55 0.76 0.99 0.87 0.87
R&D 2.36 2.07 0.32 0.94 0.89 0.92
Wages 0.95 0.82 0.10 0.54 0.68 0.96
Hours 1.36 0.65 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.91
Unemployment 12.76 10.80 -0.77 -0.80 0.89 0.91
Vacancies 13.78 12.80 0.83 0.94 0.91 0.88
Tightness 26.00 22.57 0.82 0.92 0.91 0.92
Establishments 0.62 0.22 0.71 -0.14 0.87 0.92
Expansions 2.84 0.47 0.82 0.65 0.75 0.95
Contractions 2.38 0.42 -0.11 -0.89 0.69 0.91
Net Entry 0.31 0.09 0.31 0.35 0.24 0.51
Table 3.5: Correlations between labor market variables
Correlation Data Model
Unemployment, Vacancies -0.92 -0.82
Tightness, Unemployment -0.98 -0.95
Tightness, Vacancies 0.98 0.96
Figure 3.2 displays the impulse response functions to a 1% productivity shock. An
increase in productivity raises output directly, but also induces higher investment which
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raises the stock of physical capital, and it also makes hiring more attractive, which reduces
unemployment and increases hours worked in the economy. The response of output to
the shock is highly persistent, both due to labor market frictions and the endogenous
quality component which permanently shifts output upwards. Expenditures on R&D are
also procyclical and persistent.
Due to staggered wage contracts average wages respond on impact quite modestly
as a large fraction of labor agencies are unable to renegotiate the wages. The impulse
response of wages displays a hump-shaped pattern, reaching its peak around 3 years after
the shock hits. Increased productivity of labor induces the employment agencies to post
vacancies, increasing labor market tightness, which subsequently increases employment
and thus hours worked.
Figure 3.2: Impulse response functions to 1% productivity shock (%)
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Figure 3.3 displays the impulse response functions of establishment dynamics. Fol-
lowing the productivity shock incumbents increase their R&D intensity, and the mass
of expanding establishments increases while the mass of contracting establishment de-
creases. The increased demand from incumbents for scarce skilled labor results in a brief
reduction in net entry rates, which translates to a small decrease in the mass of establish-
ments. As the mass of employed skilled workers increases due to elevated hiring, net entry
becomes positive and the mass of establishments increases substantially. Both elevated
intensity of R&D by the incumbents and higher entry lead to an increase in the rate of
growth of the aggregate quality index. For the first 5 years after the shock the increase
in quality is fueled both by higher employment of skilled workers and bigger stock of
physical capital, afterwards only more abundant physical capital maintains faster growth
in quality level. The level of quality flattens out gradually and stabilizes at a level around
7% higher than it would be absent the shock.
As a robustness check, Figure A.4 in the Appendix presents the Bayesian impulse
response functions taking into account parameter uncertainty. All of the results remain
unchanged.
Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions to 1% productivity shock, continued (%)
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3.3 Policy implications
The previous section documents the hysteresis effect of temporary shocks on the level of
the balanced growth path of the economy. This implies that business cycle fluctuations
bear additional welfare costs which are unaccounted for in the models where growth
results from exogenous processes.
To quantify the welfare comparisons across different states of the world, I employ
the consumption equivalent transformation. The consumption equivalent is equal to
the lifetime percentage change in the path of households’ consumption that make them
indifferent across “living” in two distinct states of the world. The consumption equivalent-
adjusted lifetime utility is given by
W0 (eq) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
((1 + eq) ct)1−θ
1− θ = (1 + eq)
1−θ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−θt
1− θ
The consumption equivalent across two different worlds can be then computed as
follows:
eqa,b =
(
U b0
Ua0
) 1
1−θ
− 1
where Ua0 and U b0 denote expected lifetime utilities in worlds a and b, respectively. Then
eqa,b has the interpretation of which proportion of consumption the agent living in world
a would we willing to forfeit in order to “move” to world b.
Table 3.6 presents the comparison of expected lifetime utilities in three distinct worlds:
non-stochastic, where the economy is not subject to shocks and always remains on its
balanced growth path, and two stochastic worlds. In the first of them growth is fully
exogenous and the quality index does not react in response to stochastic shocks. The
second stochastic world represents the model economy.
The welfare effect of business cycles in the stochastic world with exogenous growth is
very small in magnitude and actually indicates welfare gain. The reason for that is that
an economy with physical capital has on average higher stock of capital when subject
to stochastic shocks, as agents engage in precautionary saving to better smooth their
consumption. This in turn implies that the average level of output, and also consumption,
are also higher. As the welfare costs of volatility around an invariant trend are minuscule,
the level effect dominates. This is a standard result in the business cycle literature.
On the other hand, the welfare costs of business cycles under endogenous growth are
substantial. Since the transitory shocks leave lasting impacts on the level of BGP, it in-
creases dramatically the uncertainty about future consumption paths. As a result, agents
would require a compensation of 5.8% of their consumption in order to be indifferent be-
tween living in the stochastic and non-stochastic worlds.
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Table 3.6: Welfare cost of business cycles
State of the world Welfare Consumption equivalent
Non-stochastic (BGP) -177.55 –
Stochastic with exogenous growth -177.46 -0.04%
Stochastic with endogenous growth -191.04 5.79%
Due to the presence of significant welfare costs of business cycles and the potential
ability to affect the growth rate of the economy, ample space for policy intervention arises.
I analyze the effects of employing two types of subsidy schemes: static and countercyclical,
financed through a lump-sum tax/transfer scheme.
In the static case the subsidy acts as if a certain parameter was lowered or raised by
10%. Accordingly, a subsidy to operation cost acts as if the costs themselves were 10%
lower, and subsidies to R&D act as if the research efficiency was 10% higher. Table 3.7
presents the results of subsidizing operation cost of incumbents and prospective entrants,
their R&D expenditures, and the costs of hiring. Lastly, although it cannot be treated as
a subsidy, I analyze the effects of increasing the labor contract renegotiation probability
by 10%. In the last column I report the consumption equivalent multiplied by negative
one, so that a positive value of the statistic indicates welfare gain.
The results indicate that subsidizing both operating cost and R&D expenditures of
incumbent establishments is strongly welfare improving. This result may be surprising
in the perspective of existing endogenous growth literature that almost unanimously
generates result that subsidizing operating costs of incumbents is welfare deteriorating,
as in e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2013). The reason I obtain the opposite results stems from
the fact that my model features a frictional labor market. As can be seen in Table 3.7,
subsidizing incumbents’ operational cost leads to much lower rate of unemployment, as
an effect of decreased churning in the labor market and higher establishment mass. This
results in a higher level of aggregate output, as both the employment and love-for-variety
effects move in the same direction. The static level gain dominates the effects that stem
from lower rate of growth of the economy.
The remaining results have a very intuitive interpretation. In general, households pre-
fer to live in worlds with ceteris paribus higher growth rates, lower volatility and lower
unemployment rates. The subsidy to entrants’ operating cost helps in lowering the un-
employment rate and generates welfare gain even though the growth rate is slightly lower
and the economy is slightly more volatile. As already discussed, subsidies to incumbents’
R&D expenditures give rise to significant welfare gains, as despite slightly elevated un-
employment rates the rate of growth of economy is much higher and it is less volatile.
The small positive welfare effect from subsidizing entrants’ R&D stems from lower un-
employment rate. Decreasing the hiring costs in the labor market, both for the unskilled
and skilled workers, generates welfare improvement, mostly stemming from decreased
unemployment rates. What is important, subsidizing the hiring in the unskilled labor
market where the majority of workers operate, yields also smaller volatility of the econ-
omy. Finally, increasing contract renegotiation frequency is welfare improving, although
the consumption equivalent is rather small.
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Table 3.7: Effects of static subsidies
γBGP γ ∆Q20 ∆Q100 UBGP U uBGP u -eq
Baseline 2.07 2.09 2.23 5.75 -177.55 -191.04 5.65 5.70 –
f 2.03 2.05 2.35 5.98 -167.63 -180.89 5.18 5.24 4.11%
f e 2.06 2.08 2.25 5.78 -177.16 -190.63 5.63 5.68 0.16%
a 2.12 2.14 2.18 5.57 -174.51 -186.74 5.68 5.73 1.74%
ae 2.07 2.08 2.24 5.76 -177.41 -190.89 5.64 5.69 0.06%
κu 2.07 2.09 2.20 5.67 -175.57 -189.22 5.13 5.19 0.73%
κs 2.07 2.09 2.29 5.83 -177.29 -190.90 5.62 5.68 0.06%
λ 2.07 2.08 1.80 5.15 -177.55 -190.94 5.65 5.64 0.04%
Table 3.8 reports the welfare effects of applying countercyclical subsidies. The subsidy
scheme works as follows: if output is 1% below trend, the subsidy increases by 0.5%. As
such, it is actually a tax in the boom periods. The results fall in line with those obtained
in the previous Chapter. Countercyclical subsidies to operating costs of both incumbents
and entrants are welfare enhancing. On the other hand, subsidizing incumbents’ R&D
expenditures takes away precious resources from entrants when they need them most,
and generates a significant welfare loss. Finally, countercyclical hiring subsidies generate
a negligible positive welfare effect.
Table 3.8: Effects of countercyclical subsidies
∆Q20 ∆Q100 U u -eq
Baseline 2.23 5.75 -191.04 5.698 –
f 2.89 7.50 -190.33 5.687 0.28%
f e 2.27 5.86 -190.99 5.698 0.02%
a 0.96 2.64 -195.16 5.700 -1.66%
ae 2.25 5.79 -191.00 5.698 0.02%
κu 2.22 5.73 -191.07 5.695 0.01%
κs 2.23 5.75 -191.03 5.698 0.00%
To sum up, the most welfare improving subsidies are static subsidies to incumbents’
operating cost and R&D expenditures, and countercyclical subsidies to incumbents’ op-
erating cost. This provides justification for policies aiming to decrease firm exit during
recessions.
3.4 Conclusions
In this Chapter I have extended the model by including physical capital accumulation and
labor market frictions modeled as in Gertler et al. (2008) and Gertler & Trigari (2009).
The model is able to generate volatile and procyclical R&D expenditure patterns and is
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consistent with the business cycle dynamics of GDP and its components, labor market
variables, as well as establishment dynamics.
The model makes predictions on the strength of the impact of business cycle fluctua-
tions on the endogenous growth rates of the economy. Similarly to Chapter 2, the results
suggest that the mechanism governing innovation dynamics generates hysteresis effects
of temporary shocks on the BGP level, translating around 7% of the strength of a shock
to the level shift of the BGP, impacting significantly the assessment of welfare costs of
business cycles.
As in Chapter 2 I find that the welfare effects of business cycles are nontrivial and of
two orders of magnitude higher than in the models with exogenous growth. Considerable
welfare effects and the potential to influence endogenous growth rates creates ample scope
for policy intervention. I examine the welfare effects of both static and countercyclical
subsidy schemes.
In line with the extant endogenous growth literature, I find that static subsidies to
R&D, as well as to the entrants, are welfare improving. In opposition to the previous re-
sults in the literature, I find that subsidizing incumbent firms generates large and positive
welfare effects, as the static gains of bigger number of firms active in the market, leading
to lower unemployment and love-for-variety effects, dwarf dynamic losses of lowered entry
rates. I also confirm that decreasing frictions in labor markets is welfare improving.
In the case of countercyclical subsidies I find that subsidizing incumbents’ R&D ex-
penditures is welfare deteriorating, while subsidizing their operating costs is welfare en-
hancing. This gives further support for policies designed to subsidize existing firms during
recessions.
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Chapter 4
Long shadows of financial shocks:
an endogenous growth perspective
The experience of the Great Recession and its aftermath has compelled many macroe-
conomists to examine links between the financial sector and real activity. This Chapter
extends the model presented in the two previous Chapters by incorporating a form of fi-
nancial frictions by assuming the working capital requirement as in Christiano et al. (2003,
2010) and having a reduced form of financial shocks in the form of the spread between
the deposit and lending interest rates. There already exists literature that recognizes the
impact of financial disturbances on macroeconomic variables1 and firm dynamics, espe-
cially in the context of Great Recession. Aghion et al. (2010) study the effects of credit
friction on the cyclical composition of investment and find that credit constraints can
both decrease growth and increase the economy’s volatility. Severo & Estevao (2010) use
industry-level panel data from Canada and US to show that increases in the cost of funds
for firms have negative effects on TFP growth. Queralto (2011) documents that finan-
cial crises in emerging countries involve large and persistent losses in labor productivity.
Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2011) build a DSGE model with multiple components of the
working capital channel and find that even under flexible prices a disruption to the supply
of credit has large and persistent effects on the real economy. Ates & Saffie (2014) build
an small open economy entry-driven endogenous growth model to analyze the effects of
a sudden stop using Chilean plant-level data. They find that although during financial
shortage entrants are usually better, but they are fewer, generating permanent loss of
output and significant welfare costs. Siemer (2014) finds that tight financial constraints
during the Great Recession were responsible for both low employment growth and firm
entry rates. Hall (2015) documents the effects of the Great Recession on the US econ-
omy and finds multiple negative phenomena, such as depressed investment, reallocation,
and job finding rates. Moreover, he points out that of the 13% drop in 2013 level of
output relative to the pre-recession trend, 3.5% was due to the shortfall in total factor
productivity. Christiano et al. (2015) build a medium-scale DSGE model to quantify the
importance of several shocks during the Great Recession and find that financial frictions
were driving a significant part of the macroeconomic variables’ behavior. This Chapter
builds on this literature by considering the effects of financial frictions within a model that
1Brunnermeier et al. (2012) provide an exhaustive review of the macroeconomic effects of financial
frictions.
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simultaneously accounts for rich firm dynamics, entry and exit decisions, and endogenous
growth.
The Chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the model, focus-
ing on presenting the problem of incumbents and potential entrants, and describing the
labor market and financial frictions. The second section provides a description of the
data sources, parameter values and the estimation procedure, and discusses the cycli-
cal properties of the model economy against the data. The third section applies the
model to quantify the relative importance of the shocks during the Great Recession. It
also analyzes in depth the welfare properties of the model economy and presents the
macroeconomic and welfare effects of applying several subsidy schemes, both static and
counterfactual. The last section concludes.
4.1 Model
Compared to the previous Chapter, the model introduces two key changes. First, as I
am interested in the effect of financial shocks on the model macroeconomy, I introduce
the wedge between the interest rate depositors (households) receive and the interest rate
borrowers (establishments) pay. This allows me to capture the effects of a temporarily
increased risk premium. Second, in line with Christiano et al. (2003, 2010), I incorporate
the working capital channel which was found to be an important amplifier of financial
shocks to the real economy.
4.1.1 Households
The mass of representative households is normalized to unity. Each of the households is
composed of a large family of workers who differ with respect to their employment status
and skill level. Nevertheless, due to within-family sharing, all individuals enjoy identical
levels of consumption. The representative household maximizes the lifetime expected
utility:
U0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−θt
1− θ (4.1)
where ct denotes per capita consumption, β represents the discount factor and θ is the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Following Acemoglu et al. (2013), I assume that workers belong to either of the two
skill groups: unskilled workers of aggregate mass (1− s) supply labor to the production
sector, while skilled of aggregate mass s are hired as managers or to perform research and
development activities. Furthermore, within a time period an individual worker may be
employed and receive wage income, or unemployed and receive unemployment benefits.
Here I abstract from the possibility that an individual is inactive in the labor market2.
The budget constraint of a representative household is given by:
ct + dt+1 = (1− s) [wut nut + but (1− nut )] + s [wstnst + bst (1− nst)] +
(
1 + rdt
)
dt + tt
2The setup of the labor markets is identical to the one considered in the previous Chapter, and for
the sake of brevity I do not repeat the derivation in this Chapter..
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where dt+1 is the end-of-period t stock of deposits supplied to the financial sector which
yields interest at deposit rate rdt , wut and wst represent wage income of employed unskilled
and skilled workers, respectively, while nut and nst are the employment rates, and but and
bst denote unemployment benefits. Finally, tt represents the sum of all dividend payments
and lump-sum transfers net of taxes received by the households.
The intertemporal optimization by households yields the Euler equation:
c−θt = βEt
[(
1 + rdt+1
)
c−θt+1
]
(4.2)
and it is also convenient to define the stochastic discount factor of the households:
Λt,t+1 = Et
[(
ct+1
ct
)−θ]
(4.3)
By assuming that all firms are ultimately owned by households, I impose the condition
that their managers discount future profit streams according to the households’ valuation
depending on the expected relative marginal utilities of consumption.
4.1.2 Final goods producers
The perfectly competitive final goods producers purchase differentiated intermediate
goods varieties and transform them into final goods via the CES aggregator:
Yt =
[∫ Mt
0
yt (i)
σ−1
σ di
] σσ−1
where Yt is the aggregate final goods output, Mt is the mass of active intermediate goods
producing establishments, yt (i) is the quantity demanded from the i-th producer, and σ
is the elasticity of substitution between the varieties.
Solving the profit maximization problem of the final goods producers yields the fol-
lowing Hicksian demand function for the i-th variety:
yt (i) = Ytpt (i)−σ
where pt (i) denotes the i-th variety’s price relative to the aggregate price index, which
can be constructed as follows:
Pt =
[∫ Mt
0
Pt (i)
1−σ
di
] 11−σ
and where Pt (i) is the nominal price for the unit of the i-th intermediate good.
4.1.3 Intermediate goods producers
The monopolistically competitive intermediate goods first have to bear a fixed cost of
operation ft, which represents the costs of management and other non-production activ-
ities. Subsequently they can produce by employing capital and unskilled labor services
according to the following Cobb-Douglas function:
yt (i) = Ztkpt (i)α [qt (i)npt (i)]1−α
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where Zt denotes the stochastic aggregate TFP parameter, kpt (i) and npt (i) are the em-
ployed capital and unskilled labor, respectively, and qt (i) represents the idiosyncratic
quality level of the i-th variety at time period t. Parameter α describes the elasticity of
intermediate goods output with respect to capital.
The intermediate goods producers choose such combination of capital and labor that
minimizes their costs. As in Christiano et al. (2003, 2010) I assume that each producer
has to finance a constant fraction ζ of both the capital rental cost and wage bill in advance
of production by borrowing necessary funds at the lending rate rlt3. The solution of the
cost minimization problem results in the following expression for the marginal cost:
mcpt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
Zt
(
rkt
α
)α (
w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α
where rkt is the real rental rate on capital and w˜ut denotes the unskilled wage paid to
the employment agency. Note that the marginal costs differ across intermediate goods
producers due to their differentiated quality levels.
Given that the producers can freely change their prices on the period-by-perod basis,
the optimal pricing strategy is achieved by applying a constant markup over the marginal
cost:
pt (i) =
σ
σ − 1mct (i)
As in Melitz (2003), I construct the aggregate quality index Qt which will summarize
the aggregate situation in the intermediate goods sector as if it was populated by mass
Mt of producers each with the same quality level. The index is constructed by applying
the following formula:
Qt =
[∫ ∞
0
q(1−α)(σ−1)µt (q) dq
] 1
(1−α)(σ−1)
where µt (q) denotes the period t distribution of the idiosyncratic quality levels.
It is very useful to describe the situation of an individual producer by comparing its
quality level to the aggregate quality index and expressing it in relative terms:
φt (i) =
(
qt (i)
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
It can then be shown that the operating profit of an intermediate goods producer can
be expressed as:
piot (i) =
Yt
σMt
φt (i)− ft
Moreover, the aggregate final goods output is given as follows:
Yt = M
1
σ−1
t Zt (Kpt )α (QtNpt )1−α (4.4)
3In principle Christiano et al. (2003, 2010) allow for the degree of pre-financing to differ between
the payments to capital and labor, but eventually they also assume that they are equal. I impose this
assumption from the start and save on notation.
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where Kpt and Npt denote, respectively, the aggregate employment of capital and unskilled
labor in the production sector while the presence of the active producers mass in the
expression results from the love-for-variety phenomenon. Note that in the long run the
only source of economic growth is the continued increase in aggregate quality level over
time, and both capital stock and output will grow at the corresponding rate.
4.1.4 Incumbents
In the previous subsection I have discussed the static problem of the intermediate goods
producer, where the quality level was given. This subsection describes the problem in the
dynamic setting, where the incumbent producers can engage in research and development
activities to have a chance at increasing their varieties’ quality. The relative quality level
of the i-th variety in period t+ 1 is decided by the following lottery:
φt+1 (i) =
ιφt (i) /ηt with probability χt (i)φt (i) /ηt with probability 1− χt (i)
where ι denotes the size of an innovative step and ηt is the transformed rate of growth of
the aggregate quality index, which individual producers take as given:
ηt =
(
Qt+1
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
The innovative success probability χt (i) is chosen endogenously by each producer and
is a function of engaged R&D resources. The particular form of the success probability
function is based on Pakes & McGuire (1994) and Ericson & Pakes (1995):
χt (i) =
axt (i)
1 + axt (i)
where a is a parameter that describes the efficiency of R&D input xt (i). The R&D
process requires hiring both capital and skilled labor:
xt (i) =
kxt (i)
α [Qtnxt (i)]
1−α
Qtφt (i)
where kxt (i) and nxt (i) denote the employed of capital and skilled labor.
The presence of aggregate and relative quality levels in the expression lends itself to
a very intuitive interpretation. Aggregate quality level in the numerator multiplies with
R&D laborers as they have access to a pool of common knowledge. However, over time
it is harder to come up with new ideas unless more resources are committed to R&D
activities, which is captured by aggregate quality level in the denominator. Finally, the
presence of relative quality level in the denominator represents the catch-up and headwind
effects, depending on establishments’ position in the quality distribution.
The solution of the cost minimization problem results in the following expression for
the marginal cost of R&D activities:
mcxt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
Qαt
(
rkt
α
)α (
w˜st
1− α
)1−α
φt (i) ≡
(
1 + ζrlt
)
m¯cxt φt (i)
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where w˜st denotes the skilled wage paid to the employment agency and m¯cxt denotes the
skilled marginal cost component common to all establishments.
To simplify the setup of the intermediate goods producer, I assume that managerial
activities require identical combination of capital and skilled labor as R&D activities.
The fixed cost of operation can then be rewritten as follows:
ft =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
m¯cxt f
Furthermore, to simplify notation I define the cost of skilled input relative to the
current aggregate final goods output:
ωt = m¯cxt /Yt (4.5)
The real profit of an incumbent can then be expressed as the following function, affine
in terms of the relative quality level:
pit (i) = Yt
[(
1
σMt
−
(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
)
φt (i)−
(
1 + ζrlt
)
ωtf
]
Since all producers with the same relative quality levels will behave identically, from
now on I drop the subscript i. The value of a producer with relative quality level φt can
be expressed as follows:
Vt (φt) = max
χt∈[0,1]
{pit (φt, χt) + max {0,Et [βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)Vt+1 (φt+1|φt, χt)]}}
where δt is an endogenous probability that a producer will receive a death shock and
the max {0, ·} operator allows the producers with low enough relative quality levels to
voluntarily exit when the expected continuation value turns negative.
As the aggregate quality level trends upwards over time, causing other variables to
trend as well, the above expression does not lend itself well to casting in the recursive
form. I employ the following stationarization:
vt (φt) =
Vt (φt)
Yt
where vt (φt) denotes now the value of a producer relative to the current aggregate final
goods output. The normalized value function is now stationary and can be stated as:
vt (φt) = max
χt∈[0,1]
{
pit (φt, χt)
Yt
+ max
{
0,Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
vt+1 (φt+1|φt, χt)
]}}
As the model will be solved via the perturbation methods, I need to split the popula-
tion of producers into two groups: those for which the max {0, ·} operator is not binding,
and those that exit.
As far as the first group is concerned, for large enough φt the probability that the
particular producer shall exit in the foreseeable future is negligible and the operator can
be safely omitted. Then it is trivial to show that since the value function is a weighted
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sum of current and future profit flows, all of which are affine in φt, then the value function
is also affine in φt and the following functional form can be imposed:
At +Btφt = max
χt∈[0,1]

(
1
σMt
−
(
1 + ζrlt
)
ωt
a
χt
1−χt
)
φt −
(
1 + ζrlt
)
ωtf
+Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
) (
At+1 +Bt+1 χt(ι−1)+1ηt φt
)]  (4.6)
where At and Bt are state-dependent coefficients that fluctuate over the business cycle.
The first order and envelope conditions of those producers can be then stated as
follows:
0 = −
(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
1
(1− χt)2
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
Bt+1
(ι− 1)
ηt
)]
(4.7)
Bt =
(
1
σMt
−
(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
]
(4.8)
As the relative quality level drops out of the above optimality conditions, one can
conclude that all producers with high enough relative quality level will choose the same
success probability, and their size and growth rate will be uncorrelated, as postulated by
the Gibrat’s law.
The second group consists of the producers with negative continuation value and they
will exit at the end of the current period and optimally choose not to engage in R&D
activities at all. Their value function is then also affine in relative quality level and is
equal to:
vt (φt) = Yt
[ 1
σMt
φt (i)−
(
1 + ζrlt
)
ωtf
]
(4.9)
At this stage the above division does not account for producers with intermediate
quality levels. I then impose that all continuing producers have to choose the same
success probability as their higher quality competitors. This results in the extension of
Equations 4.6 and 4.9 until they intersect at the relative quality level at which a producer
is indifferent between exiting and continuing conditional on choosing the common R&D
intensity. This level is given implicitly by the following condition:
(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
χt
1− χtφ
∗
t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt)
(
Yt+1
Yt
)(
At+1 +Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
φ∗t
)]
(4.10)
Furthermore, I assume that the relative quality levels follow the Pareto distribution
with power parameter equal to one, an often made assumption in the literature dealing
with firm size distribution4. This allows me to provide a closed form expression for the
mass of the exiting producers:
Mxt = Mt (1− χt−1)
(
1− φ
∗
t−1
φ∗tηt−1
)
(4.11)
4Axtell (2001) provides empirical support for this assumption.
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4.1.5 Entrants
The mass of potential entrants is assumed to be unbounded, although it will be pinned
down by the equilibrium conditions. Similar to incumbents, they engage in R&D activ-
ities, although in this case the successful outcome of the innovation process results in
entry, rather than an improvement over the existing product.
The entry attempt requires hiring capital and skilled labor, both for the purpose of
performing R&D and managerial activities. The cost function mirrors the incumbents’
case and the normalized value of entry can be stated as:
vet = max
χet∈[0,1]
{
−
(
1 + ζerlt
)
ωt
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
+ χetEt
[
βΛt,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
vt+1
(
φet+1
)]}
where χet is the desired entry probability, ζe denotes the share of factor rental costs that
has to be paid in advance and borrowed at lending rate, f e is the fixed cost of operation
of potential entrants, ae is the efficiency of R&D inputs in the case of entrants, and φet+1
represents the expected relative quality level determined upon successful entry.
The first order condition of the potential entrants is given as follows:
0 = −
(
1 + ζerlt
) ωt
ae
1
(1− χet )2
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
Yt+1
Yt
)
vt+1
(
φet+1
)]
(4.12)
The unbounded mass of potential entrants implies that whenever the expected value
of entry is positive, more candidates engage in the attempts, driving up the effective
costs, and ensuring that the free entry condition holds:
vet = 0 (4.13)
Following the observations of Acemoglu & Cao (2015) and Garcia-Macia et al. (2016) I
assume that entrants enjoy a degree of entry advantage. To account for that and rule out
limit pricing in equilibrium, I assume that entrants draw their quality from appropriately
upscaled quality distribution of incumbents. As a consequence, the expected relative
quality level upon entry is given by:
Et
[
φet+1
]
= σ
σ − 1
By denoting with M et the mass of successful entrants, one can pin down the mass of
effective potential entrants, which is then given by M et /χet . Entry is constrained by the
supply of skilled resources and is implicitly given by:
(Kst )
α (QtN st )
1−α
Qt
= Mtf + (Mt −Mxt )
(
1
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ M
e
t
χet
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
(4.14)
where the left hand side equals the effective supply of skilled input which is (on the right
hand side) split between operating cost of incumbents, R&D activities by continuators,
and finally operating cost and R&D activities of potential entrants.
The rate of change in the aggregate quality index depends on the intensity of the
R&D activities performed by the incumbents and the mass of new entrants relative to
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active establishments. By assuming Pareto distribution of quality levels it is possible to
derive the exact closed form expression for the rate of growth of the aggregate quality
index:
ηt = (1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
(4.15)
Finally, the endogenous probability of incumbent receiving a death shock depends on
the exogenous, constant component, and the rate of entry of new establishments that
potentially creatively destroy existing establishments. There are three conditions under
which an active establishment exits, and I assume that at the end of each period the
events follow a specific order. First, the incumbents with relative quality level below
φ∗t exit “voluntarily” as their varieties become obsolete. Second, incumbents receive
exogenous exit shocks. Finally, a fraction of incumbents are leapfrogged by entrants and
thus creatively destroyed. Therefore, the mass of active establishments in the next period
is given by:
Mt+1 = Mt −Mxt − δexo (Mt −Mxt ) + [1− (1− δexo) (Mt −Mxt )]M et
where δexo is the exogenous exit shock probability and the mass of successful entrantsM et
is multiplied by the probability that an entrant draws an “unoccupied” location. As by
definition creative destruction replaces an incumbent with an entrant, it does not directly
affect the mass of active establishments. The expression for active establishment mass
can be also written as:
Mt+1 = Mt −Mxt − δt (Mt −Mxt ) +M et (4.16)
Then by comparing the two formulations one gets the following expression for endoge-
nous exit shock probability:
δt = 1− (1− δexo) (1−M et ) (4.17)
Intuitively, the probability of not receiving an exit shock is a product of the probabil-
ities of not receiving an exogenous shock and not being creatively destroyed, as the two
are independent from each other.
4.1.6 Capital goods producers and the financial system
Perfectly competitive capital goods producers are also the owners of the capital stock
which they rent to the establishments. They also borrow from the financial intermediary,
at the lending interest rate rlt, in order to finance investment in new capital. Therefore,
they aim to maximize the expected discounted flow their profits, expressed as:
Πkt = rktKt − It + Lkt+1 −
(
1 + rlt
)
Lkt
where It is aggregate investment and Lkt are loans from the financial intermediary. Phys-
ical capital accumulation is subject to the standard constraint:
Kt+1 = It + (1− dp)Kt (4.18)
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The solution of the capital goods producers’ problem yields the following equality
between the lending rate and the capital rental rate net of depreciation:
rlt = rkt − dp (4.19)
The financial intermediaries collect deposits from households and lend them to two
types of entities: intermediate goods producers and potential entrants, and capital pro-
ducers. The profit of the intermediaries is given by:
Πft =
(
1 + rlt
)
Lkt +
(
1 + rlt
)
Let −
(
1 + rdt
)
dt + dt+1 − Lkt+1 − Let+1
where Let denote loans to establishments to finance their working capital requirement,
and subject to the loanable funds constraint:
Lkt+1 + Let+1 ≤ dt+1
The financial intermediaries are owned by the households and discount the future in
the same manner. Here I make the assumption that the financial intermediaries enjoy
a degree of market power that drives a wedge between the deposit and lending interest
rates, such that:
rlt = rdt + spt (4.20)
where spt is the spread between the interest rates. While taken literally the variation in
spread would imply that the market power of banks is changing over time, it can be also
interpreted as a reduced-form way to capture the frictions in the financial markets. The
spread is assumed to evolve according to the following AR(1) process:
log spt = (1− ρsp) log spss + ρsp log spt−1 + εsp,t (4.21)
4.1.7 Market clearing
The markets for factors of production clear:
Npt = (1− s)nut and N st = snst (4.22)
Kt = Kpt +Kst (4.23)
As all profits are paid to the households, the budget constraint results in the standard
resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It + κu (xut )
2Npt + κs (xst)
2N st (4.24)
Finally, the process for aggregate productivity is assumed to follow the standard
AR(1) form:
logZt = ρZ logZt−1 + εZ,t (4.25)
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4.2 Data and results
4.2.1 Data, calibration and estimation
The data used in the Chapter come from several sources. The data on establishment
dynamics comes from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Business Employment
Dynamics (BDM) database. The data on GDP and its components come from the US
Bureau of Economic Analyses (BEA). The data on labor market statistics come pre-
dominately from the BLS. To construct the data on vacancies the data from the JOLTS
survey, available from December 2000 were spliced with the Composite Help Wanted
Index provided by Barnichon (2010). Following Christiano et al. (2014), the series for
interest spread was chosen as the Moody’s Seasoned BAA Corporate Bond Yield Relative
to Yield on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, provided by the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, starting in April 1953. The data on R&D spending were taken from the
BEA and the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF also provides the data on
Full-Time Equivalent number of employees performing R&D, although the series ends in
2008.
The model is calibrated to replicate key features of the US economy. The parameters
that influence the steady state of the economy are calibrated to reflect the long-run
averages in the US data and are summarized in Table 4.1. The average quarterly spread
was calculated directly from the corresponding data series. The degree of pre-financing
was taken from Christiano et al. (2010). I decided not to differentiate the pre-financing
parameters across incumbents and entrants. The values of parameters governing the
behavior of the labor markets were taken from previous literature, and their justification
was discussed in the previous Chapter.
Both the capital share of income and quarterly depreciation rate are set to values
ubiquitous in the business cycle literature. Note that since in the model firms generate
positive profits, the labor share of income is lower than 1 - capital share. The discount
factor, which in the calibration process depends on the value of elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, is chosen so that the average annual net deposit interest rate is equal to
4.75%, which together with the assumed average spread implies that the lending rate,
equal to the rate of return on capital, equals 6.65%, a value consistent with literature,
see e.g. Nishiyama & Smetters (2007). The share of skilled workers is picked to be
in the middle of the plausible range of values proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2013) and
corresponds to the value used in the previous Chapter. Finally, the set of parameters
governing the establishment dynamics is calibrated to match specific moments reported in
Table 4.2. As I have 6 moments to match with 8 free parameters, I impose a constraint
that the R&D efficiency parameter and fixed cost are equal for both incumbents and
entrants.
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Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters affecting the steady state
Parameter Description Value Justification
spss Average quarterly spread 0.0047 Annualized spread = 1.9%
ζ, ζe Working capital share 0.75 Christiano et al. (2010)
ρu Unskilled retention rate 0.97253 Cairo & Cajner (2017)
ρs Skilled retention rate 0.993 Cairo & Cajner (2017)
κu Unskilled hiring cost 2 Unskilled job finding probability
κs Skilled hiring cost 15.8 Skilled job finding probability
bu Unskilled unemp. benefit 0.14 40% of steady state unskilled wage
bs Skilled unemp. benefit 0.41 40% of steady state skilled wage
ψ Elasticity of matches 0.5 Gertler & Trigari (2009)
σm Matching efficiency 1.7 Average tightness = 0.54
α Capital share of income 0.3 Standard
dp Capital depreciation rate 0.025 Standard
β Discount factor 0.9998 Annual net interest rate of 4.75%
s Share of skilled workers 0.1039 Chapter 2
ι Innovative step size 1.016 Annual pc. GDP growth
δexo Exog. exit shock prob. 0.0174 Exit rate
a, ae R&D efficiency 7.96 Expansions = contractions
f , f e Operating fixed cost 0.94 Share of R&D in GDP
θ Inverse of IES 2.3 Share of investment in GDP
σ Elasticity of substitution 4.9 Share of R&D employment
Table 4.2: Long-run moments: comparison of model and data
Description Model Data Source
Annual pc. GDP growth 2.06% 2.08% BEA, 1948q1-2016q4
Exit rate 3.06% 3.07% BDM, 1992q3-2016q4
Relative share of expanding estabs. 1.01 1.01 BDM, 1992q3-2016q2
Share of R&D in GDP 2.18% 2.23% BEA, 1948q1-2016q4
Share of investment in GDP 17.50% 17.17% BEA, 1948q1-2016q4
Share of R&D employment 1.31% 0.98% NSF & CBP, 1964-2008
To obtain the values of parameters that do not affect the steady state but govern the
cyclical behavior of the model, I employ the estimation procedure. The prior distributions
were chosen to be relatively uninformative, and in particular the prior distribution for
the renegotiation frequency parameter was set to uniform on the unit interval. Table 4.3
in the Appendix contains full information on the priors used.
The estimation makes use of two observable data series. The first one is the growth
rate of Real Gross Domestic Product divided by the Labor Force, observed from 1948q2-
2017q2. An advantage of the model with explicitly modeled long-run growth is that
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there is no need to detrend the data and valuable information is retained. The second
is the demeaned spread between BAA and long-term government bonds. The model was
estimated using standard Bayesian procedures with help of Dynare 4.5 and results were
generated using two random walk Metropolis-Hastings chains with 200,000 draws each
with an acceptance ratio of around 0.24.
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results. The data were clearly informative about the
estimated parameters, as the posterior and prior means differ and the highest posterior
density (HPD) intervals are relatively tight. This observation can be also confirmed by
comparing the plots of prior and posterior densities displayed in Figure 3.1.
Table 4.3: Prior and posterior means of parameters affecting cyclical behavior
Parameter Description Prior mean Post. mean 90% HPD interval
λ Calvo wage contract prob. 0.5 0.858 [0.766, 0.950]
ρZ Autocorr. of prod. process 0.7 0.939 [0.896, 0.991]
σZ Std. dev. of prod. shock 0.01 0.012 [0.011, 0.013]
ρsp Autocorr. of spread process 0.7 0.930 [0.895, 0.968]
σsp Std. dev. of spread shock 0.1 0.163 [0.151, 0.174]
Figure 4.1: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
0
200
400
600
800
SE_eps_Z
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
20
40
SE_eps_sp
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
rho_Z
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
rho_sp
0 0.5 1
0
2
4
6
8
lambda
4.2.2 Model performance and impulse response functions
The data moments were generated on the sample 1948q1-2016q4, with the exception of
vacancies and tightness, available from 1951q1, and establishment dynamics, available
from 1992q3. The variables trending with population growth, such as GDP and number
of establishments, were divided by the Civilian Labor Force and subsequently detrended
with Hodrick-Prescott filter.
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Table 4.4 presents the comparison of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered moments between
the model and data. The upper section of the table is concerned with output and its
components, as well as R&D expenditures. The model fits the data very well for out-
put and its components, and only fails to account for much weaker correlation of R&D
expenditures with output.
The middle section of the table focuses on variables pertaining to the operations of
the labor market. The model wages are stronger correlated with output and have higher
autocorrelation than in the data, and model hours are not as volatile as in the data.
However, the model is very successful in matching the cyclical behavior of unemployment,
vacancies and tightness, achieving nearly perfect fit.
The final section presents the moments related to the establishment dynamics. Al-
though the fit is a bit worse than in the case of previously discussed variables, most
of the model moments remain close to their data counterparts, with the exception that
the model predicts much smaller volatility of establishment dynamics. The model also
predicts that the establishment mass is slightly negatively correlated with output, even
though the correlation of net entry with output is almost exactly the same as in the
data. A brief look at the impulse response functions in Figure 4.2 reveals that this result
is most likely driven by a small and short-lived decrease in the mass of establishments
immediately after the shock hits, and for the subsequent periods the mass of active es-
tablishments moves in tandem with output. In the case of interest rate spread shocks,
Figure 4.3 shows that output and establishment mass comove.
To sum up, although the model is not able to match the data perfectly, the fit is more
than satisfactory and provides a solid foundation for further analysis.
Table 4.4: Business cycle moments: comparison of model and data
Standard deviation Correlation with Y Autocorrelation
Variable Data Model Data Model Data Model
Output 1.58 1.58 1.00 1.00 0.82 0.83
Consumption 0.87 0.69 0.78 0.90 0.82 0.75
Investment 4.54 5.33 0.76 0.97 0.87 0.89
R&D 2.36 2.26 0.32 0.91 0.89 0.92
Wages 0.95 0.73 0.10 0.41 0.68 0.96
Hours 1.36 0.76 0.86 0.92 0.89 0.89
Unemployment 12.76 11.96 -0.77 -0.82 0.89 0.89
Vacancies 13.78 13.47 0.83 0.92 0.91 0.90
Tightness 26.00 24.45 0.82 0.89 0.91 0.91
Establishments 0.62 0.31 0.71 -0.38 0.87 0.89
Expansions 2.84 0.58 0.82 0.78 0.75 0.89
Contractions 2.38 0.76 -0.11 -0.93 0.69 0.89
Net Entry 0.31 0.15 0.31 0.18 0.24 0.45
Figure 4.2 displays the impulse response functions to a standard deviation productiv-
ity shock. An increase in productivity raises output both directly and indirectly, through
higher investment and hiring rates, which in turn cause an increase in physical capital
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stock and hours worked. The response of output to the shock is highly persistent, both
due to labor market frictions and the endogenous quality component which permanently
shifts output upwards. Expenditures on R&D are also procyclical and persistent.
Staggered wage contract friction prevents wages from responding strongly on impact of
the shock, as a large fraction of employment agencies is not allowed to renegotiate wages.
Over time, the wage renegotiations take place, and the response of wages exhibits a hump-
shaped pattern, reaching the peak at around 3 years after the initial shock. Increased
productivity of labor induces the employment agencies to post vacancies, increasing labor
market tightness.
Positive productivity shock incentivizes incumbents to increase their R&D expendi-
tures and consequently success probability, and as a consequence the mass of expanding
establishments increases, and the mass of contracting establishments decreases. At im-
pact elevated incumbents’ demand for scarce resources, especially for skilled labor, results
in a temporary decline in net entry rates. However, as more skilled employees become
available, net entry turns positive and translates to an increase in the active establish-
ments mass. The rate of growth of aggregate quality index is higher than along the
balanced growth path, due to both higher R&D intensity and entry rates. This faster
pace of growth is at first maintained by both higher skilled employment and bigger capi-
tal stock, although after around 4 years employment returns to its balanced growth path
level, leading to a decrease in the rate of quality growth. Nevertheless, more abundant
physical capital allows the economy to continue growing faster, and eventually the level
of quality relative to balanced growth path trend flattens out and stabilizes at a level
around 7% higher than it would be if the shock never happened.
Figure 4.3 displays the impulse response functions to a standard deviation interest
spread shock. Broadly speaking, an increase in the wedge between the deposit and lending
rates generates effects opposite to the positive productivity shock, and their quantitative
size is of order of magnitude smaller. Immediately on impact investment decreases, as
it is now more costly to produce new units of physical capital, and consumption rises
in response to lower deposit interest rates. Expenditures on R&D initially increase, as
incumbents face lower risk of being creatively destroyed due to decreased entry, but after
about a year drop below the balanced growth path trend as the recession deepens. Both
hours worked and wages decrease in a hump-shaped pattern, while unemployment in-
creases. Creating new vacancies is discouraged, and as a result the labor market becomes
less tight. Increased costs of lending deter entry which remains depressed for about 5
years after the initial shock, which also causes a decrease in the mass of establishments.
Aggregate quality level remains near its trend level for around 2 years following the
shock, as expansions and net entry move in opposite directions. After that period both
depressed entry and incumbents’ R&D intensity translate to the downward deviation of
the quality level from trend, which eventually is lowered by about 0.85% relative to its
trend path. Thus the financial shocks, compared to productivity shocks, create similar,
although smaller in magnitude, shifts in the balanced growth path of the economy. As
a robustness check, Figures A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix presents the Bayesian impulse
response functions taking into account parameter uncertainty. All of the results remain
unchanged.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse response functions to standard deviation productivity shock
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Figure 4.3: Impulse response functions to standard deviation interest rate spread shock
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4.3 Long shadows of financial shocks
4.3.1 The experience of Great Recession
The model features mechanisms through which temporary shocks translate to permanent
shifts to the balanced growth path of the economy. Therefore it is an attractive laboratory
to study the experience of the Great Recession.
The Great Recession has been associated with the largest output drop in the postwar
economic history of the United States, which until now remains around 10% below its
pre-recession trend. A similar behavior was observed for the R&D expenditures, although
the drop was even deeper than for output. Increased establishment exits and depressed
entry has resulted in fewer active establishments.
Figure 4.3.1 presents the shock decomposition of key macroeconomic variables since
the first quarter of 2000 until the second quarter of 2017. The financial shocks, modeled as
increases in the spread between deposit and lending interest rates, account for a nontrivial
fraction of the deviation of the variables from their trend. In particular, about a third
of the total decline in the establishment mass is attributed to increased spreads, as they
are especially harmful to entrants. Depressed entry rates and R&D expenditures result
in continuing fall of the aggregate quality index. It has profound implications as while
physical capital stock and employment levels can in principle return to their balanced
growth path levels, a decline in the aggregate quality is of a more permanent nature and
essentially pushes the economy to a balanced growth path below the pre-crisis one.
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Figure 4.1: Shock decomposition: key macroeconomic variables since 2000
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4.3.2 Policy implications
Since temporary shocks can exert level effects on the balanced growth path of the econ-
omy, this implies that business cycle fluctuations are associated with additional welfare
costs compared to the models where growth results from exogenous processes.
The consumption equivalent method allows to quantify the welfare differences across
states of world. The equivalent is equal to the lifetime percentage adjustment in the path
of households’ consumption that make them indifferent between “living” in two worlds.
For the utility function assumed in this Chapter the equivalent-adjusted welfare is given
by:
W0 (eq) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
((1 + eq) ct)1−θ
1− θ = (1 + eq)
1−θ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−θt
1− θ
The consumption equivalent across two different worlds can be then computed as
follows:
eqa,b =
(
U b0
Ua0
) 1
1−θ
− 1
where Ua0 and U b0 denote expected lifetime utilities in worlds a and b, respectively. Then
eqa,b has the interpretation of which proportion of consumption the agent living in world
a would we willing to forfeit in order to “move” to world b.
Table 4.5 presents the comparison of expected lifetime utilities in five distinct worlds.
In the non-stochastic world the economy is not subject to shocks and always remains on
its balanced growth path. In the two stochastic worlds the economy is affected by shocks
but in the first of them growth is exogenous and the aggregate quality index increases at
a constant rate. As a consequence, any welfare losses result from the volatility around
the trend and are estimated to be quite low, in accordance with existing literature.
The second stochastic world is identical to the model economy. Here welfare losses are
significantly larger and stem from the fact that both shocks result in the level shifts of the
consumption paths. Finally, the lower section of Table 4.5 is concerned with the relative
importance of two shocks for welfare. It turns out that the spread shocks account for
about a third of the total welfare costs.
Table 4.5: Welfare cost of business cycles
State of the world Welfare Consumption equivalent
Non-stochastic (BGP) -172.84 –
Stochastic with exogenous growth -172.97 0.05%
Stochastic with endogenous growth -191.13 8.04%
Endogenous growth without spread shocks -178.85 2.66%
Endogenous growth without prod. shocks -185.52 5.60%
The presence of significant welfare costs of business cycles poses questions on whether
economic policy can alleviate some of them. To answer them I examine the macroeco-
nomic and welfare effects of applying several subsidy schemes. Those schemes fall into
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two groups: static and countercyclical subsidies. All subsidy schemes are financed via
lump-sum taxation.
Static subsidies are designed to act as if a parameter in question was changed by 10%.
The direction of change is always in the direction favored by the subsidized agent, e.g.
a lowering of operation costs or increasing the R&D efficiency. Table 4.6 documents the
results of applying. The first result column displays the average growth rate in stochastic
equilibrium. The next two present the extent of change in the aggregate quality index
in response to a standard deviation productivity shock, over the horizon of 20 and 100
quarters, respectively, while the following two columns do the same for the spread shock.
Next column reports the expected lifetime utility measure, and the following the average
unemployment rate in stochastic equilibrium. For ease of interpretation, the last column
presents the opposite number to the consumption equivalent, so that the positive value of
the statistic indicates welfare gain. As a rule of thumb, ceteris paribus households prefer
if the aggregate growth rate is higher, volatility (understood as the extent of the reaction
of aggregate quality in response to the shock) is lower and unemployment rate is lower.
In agreement with the endogenous growth literature I find that subsidizing R&D
expenditures of incumbent establishments is strongly welfare improving, as both the
average growth rate is increased and volatility is decreased, at a cost of slightly higher
unemployment rate. Welfare gains are also associated with lowering the barriers to entry,
either through lowering the fixed costs of prospective entrants or subsidizing their R&D
activities. Contrary to the previous literature, e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2013), I find that
subsidizing incumbents’ operating costs is welfare improving. This discrepancy stems
from the fact that although the subsidized economy exhibits lower rate of growth and
higher volatility, those effects are dwarfed by gains from decreased churning in the labor
market, the full extent of which become apparent only in the stochastic setting.
The lower section of the table presents the effects of subsidies that aim to reduce
frictions in the financial markets. Subsidizing the working capital costs of incumbents
lowers slightly the volatility of the economy and generates a small welfare gain, while
subsidies to working capital of entrants do not have a significant welfare effect. Finally,
subsidizing all borrowers in a manner that acts as if the average spread was lower decreases
both volatility and average unemployment rate, resulting in welfare gain.
Table 4.6: Effects of static subsidies
γ ∆QZ20 ∆QZ100 ∆Q
sp
20 ∆Qsp100 U u -eq
Baseline 2.09 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.13 5.65 –
f 2.06 3.33 6.63 0.24 0.87 -187.07 5.53 1.64%
f e 2.09 3.18 6.36 0.22 0.82 -190.91 5.65 0.09%
a 2.15 3.08 6.12 0.22 0.80 -186.97 5.67 1.68%
ae 2.10 3.17 6.34 0.22 0.82 -191.05 5.65 0.03%
ζ 2.10 3.16 6.32 0.21 0.82 -190.92 5.65 0.09%
ζe 2.10 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.15 5.65 -0.01%
spss 2.10 3.16 6.31 0.19 0.74 -189.28 5.63 0.75%
Table 4.7 presents the welfare effects of countercyclical subsidies. As they by construc-
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tion do not impact significantly the economy’s average growth rate or unemployment rate,
those variables are not displayed. I consider two variants of subsidies: in the first, if out-
put is observed at level 1% lower than trend, the subsidy increases by 0.5%. Conversely,
in the times of boom the subsidy becomes a tax. In the second variant subsidy increases
by 5% if the spread is 1 percentage point higher than on average.
The qualitative effects of the two subsidy variants are almost identical, and thus I will
discuss only the effects of subsidies reacting to output. Intuitively, subsidy schemes that
lower the volatility bring welfare gains. The biggest welfare gains are associated with sub-
sidizing operating costs of active establishments, which gives support for policies aimed
at supporting existing firms during recessions. On the other hand, countercyclical sub-
sidies to incumbents’ R&D activities are welfare deteriorating, as by redirecting limited
resources towards incumbents it exacerbates the difficulties entrants face during down-
turns. Finally, subsidies to entrants carry small positive welfare gains, while subsidies to
working capital have almost no impact on volatility and welfare.
Table 4.7: Effects of countercyclical subsidies
0.5% subsidy if output is 1% below trend
∆QZ20 ∆QZ100 ∆Q
sp
20 ∆Qsp100 U -eq
Baseline 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.13 –
f 3.11 6.16 0.21 0.79 -187.00 1.67%
f e 3.16 6.31 0.21 0.82 -190.99 0.06%
a 3.30 6.60 0.22 0.86 -195.82 -1.88%
ae 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.08 0.02%
ζ 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.17 -0.01%
ζe 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.13 0.00%
5% subsidy if spread is 1 percentage point above average
∆QZ20 ∆QZ100 ∆Q
sp
20 ∆Qsp100 U -eq
Baseline 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.13 –
f 3.17 6.32 0.20 0.79 -189.28 0.75%
f e 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.07 0.02%
a 3.17 6.32 0.26 0.88 -193.20 -0.83%
ae 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.11 0.01%
ζ 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.15 -0.00%
ζe 3.17 6.32 0.21 0.82 -191.13 0.00%
4.4 Conclusions
The Great Recession has resulted in a seemingly permanent level shift in many macroe-
conomic variables. This Chapter has presented an endogenous growth model where mo-
nopolistically competitive, heterogeneous establishments choose the level of R&D expen-
ditures. The model economy is also subject to the search and matching friction in the
labor market, as well as financial friction modeled as a reduced-form shock to the spread
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between deposit and lending interest rates. This setup generates volatile and procyclical
R&D expenditure patterns and is consistent with the business cycle dynamics of GDP
and its components, labor market variables, as well as establishment dynamics.
I find that both productivity and financial shocks affect the endogenous growth rate
of the economy, resulting in level shifts in the balanced growth path. This significantly
increases the estimate of the welfare costs of business cycles. As a consequence, economic
policy can play an important role in alleviating the consequences of those shocks. I
analyze the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a series of static and countercyclical
subsidy schemes.
Regarding the static subsidies, I find that subsidizing R&D expenditures, as well as
lowering barriers to entry, is welfare improving, in line with endogenous growth literature.
At odds with this literature, static subsidies to incumbents’ operating costs are also found
to be welfare improving. This result stems from taking into account the effects of business
cycle fluctuations in an economy with frictional labor and financial markets.
Regarding the countercyclical subsidies, I find that subsidizing R&D expenditures of
active establishments is welfare deteriorating, as it redirects precious resources from more
efficient uses. On the other hand, subsidizing incumbents’ operating costs is welfare en-
hancing, regardless of whether the economy is hit by productivity or financial shock. This
result supports implementing policies that aim to reduce exits of active establishments
during recessions.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and policy
recommendations
How (and if) should we foster innovations? Should we reduce entry barriers for new firms,
or maybe should we subsidize firms investing in research and development? What are
the consequences of those policies on economic growth rate and the effects of business
cycles? Finally, are active labor market policies conducive for economic growth and
innovativeness?
Economic literature has attempted to answer the above, and similar, questions. How-
ever, existing studies usually had to pick between analyzing those issues from the vantage
points of either endogenous economic growth, or business cycles. My PhD thesis adopts
a novel, tractable approach that enables to analyze the effects of aforementioned policies
in a model featuring both endogenous economic growth and business cycle fluctuations,
as well as generating establishment dynamics in line with the data. Thanks to that the
results are more robust and it is possible to analyze the effects of additional policies that
are absent in the extant literature.
I have built a model in which heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive firms decide
on their outlays on research and development activities, depending on the degree of
competition and the business cycle phase. The R&D intensity in turn determines the
rate of arrival of innovations and in consequence the rate of endogenous growth. By using
this model and the United States data on macroeconomic variables for years 1948-2017,
as well as data on establishment dynamics for years 1992-2017, I was able to conclude
the following:
1. Business cycles of amplitude observed in the United States have a slightly positive
effect on the average annual rate of growth (increasing it from 2.02% to 2.04%).
Despite this higher rate of growth, the welfare effects of business cycles are of two
orders of magnitude higher than in the traditional business cycle studies. This
implies that the households would prefer to live in the world without fluctuations.
[Chapter 2]
2. In line with existing endogenous growth literature I find that the barriers to entry
and cost of innovation are important in determining the rate of growth and impact
welfare. I conclude that it would be welfare improving to lower the barriers to
entry and subsidize research and development activities. Taking business cycle
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fluctuations into account allows to analyze countercyclical subsidy schemes, that
is subsidies that are active during recessions. It turns out that countercyclical
subsidies for existing firms are welfare improving, which is a novel result. [Chapter
2]
3. The above results are qualitatively unchanged in the extended versions of the model
which take into account labor market frictions, as well as financial market frictions
and shocks. Under these conditions it turns out that it is welfare improving to sub-
sidize incumbent firms, which is a novel result. Despite lowering the average rate of
growth (from 2.09% to 2.05-2.06%), the effects of business cycles are moderated and
the labor markets are stabilized, resulting in lower average rate of unemployment
(5.2-5.5% relative to 5.7% without subsidies). [Chapters 3 and 4]
4. Active labor market policies do not affect perceptibly the rate of economic growth,
but are clearly welfare improving. Lowering the costs in the search and matching
process yields welfare increase equivalent to increasing consumption by about 0.75%,
which is supportive for the flexicurity model of the labor market. [Chapter 3]
5. Taking into account financial market frictions and shocks significantly increases
the welfare costs of business cycles. It turns out that they may be responsible for
around 1/3 of total welfare costs. It is then important to aim to reduce average
spread between the borrowing and lending interest rates, as well as mitigate the
shocks to spread. [Chapter 4]
As I am not the first to analyze the effects of subsidy schemes within the endogenous
growth framework, a discussion of similarities and dissimilarities with existing literature
is in order. The effects of static subsidies were analyzed exhaustively in the literature,
and have received textbook treatments in e.g. Aghion & Howitt (1998), Barro & Sala-i
Martin (2004), Aghion & Howitt (2008) and Acemoglu (2009). A ubiquitous result in
the neo-Schumpeterian quality-ladder framework is that subsidies incentivizing higher
R&D spending are welfare improving, at least when the business stealing effect is small
or properly internalized. As in my dissertation growth results from innovations by both
incumbents and entrants, the business stealing effect does not dominate the results, and
I also find a welfare enhancing role of R&D subsidies. Another often reached conclusion
is that subsidies to the operating costs of incumbents are welfare deteriorating, as they
effectively increase barriers to entry, see e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2013). I also obtain this
result in the stochastic setting. However, the results from the model extended by includ-
ing frictions in the labor markets overturn this conclusion, as the welfare costs of labor
market turnover are substantial. As a consequence, static subsidies to incumbents, while
lowering the average rate of growth, decrease the average rate of unemployment, gener-
ating positive level effects. This result could not be obtained in a purely deterministic
model, and this is where I contribute the most to the existing literature.
Concerning countercyclical subsidies, Nuño (2011) considers a stochastic extension
of the Aghion & Howitt (1998) model and finds that countercyclical subsidies to R&D
have no positive effect on welfare. In his setup, growth results from entrants leapfrogging
over incumbents. In this dissertation I consider a model which allows for innovation by
both incumbents and entrants, and find that indeed the welfare effects of countercyclical
R&D subsidies to entrants are positive but minuscule. On the other hand, countercyclical
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subsidies to incumbents’ R&D are strongly welfare deteriorating, as such subsidies redirect
precious R&D resources away from the entrants at times where the entry rates are already
depressed. This “crowding out” effect is ignored by the literature that focuses solely on
the impact of R&D subsidies on the performance of the incumbents, e.g. Brautzsch et al.
(2015).
I also consider the effects of countercyclical subsidies to both incumbents’ and en-
trants’ operating costs. The results from all variants of the model imply that coun-
tercyclical subsidies to incumbents are strongly welfare improving, as they boost R&D
expenditure during recessions and thus mitigate the negative effects of business cycle
fluctuations on the endogenous rate of growth, while generating smaller “crowding out”
effects on the R&D expenditures of entrants.
To summarize, while more research on the macroeconomic and welfare effects of coun-
tercyclical subsidies is needed, the results of this dissertation imply that implementing
static subsidies to R&D expenditures and supporting existing establishments and firms
during severe downturns may constitute an optimal endogenous growth policy.
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Appendix A
Appendices
A.1 Chapter 2
A.1.1 Formula for real operating profit
Real operating profit:
piot (i) = pt (i) yt (i)− wut nut (i)− wstf
= pt (i) yt (i)−mct (i) yt (i)− wstf
= pt (i) yt (i)− σ − 1
σ
pt (i) yt (i)− wstf
=
(
1− σ − 1
σ
)
pt (i)Ytpt (i)−σ − wstf
= 1
σ
Yt
(
σ
σ − 1
wut
Ztqt (i)
)1−σ
− wstf
= (σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
Yt (wut )
1−σ Zσ−1t qt (i)
σ−1 − wstf (A.1.1)
Aggregate price index:
Pt =
[∫ Mt
0
Pt (i)1−σ di
] 1
1−σ
=
[
Mt
∫ ∞
0
Pt (q)1−σ µt (q) dq
] 1
1−σ
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(A.1.2)
Real unskilled wage:
wut =
σ − 1
σ
ZtQtM
1
σ−1
t (A.1.3)
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Real operating profit again:
piot (i) =
(σ − 1)σ−1
σσ
Yt (wut )
1−σ Zσ−1t qt (i)
σ−1 − wstf
= (σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
Yt
(
M
1
σ−1
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σ − 1
σ
ZtQt
)1−σ
Zσ−1t qt (i)
σ−1 − wstf
= 1
σ
Yt
Mt
(qt (i) /Qt)σ−1 − wstf
= 1
σ
Yt
Mt
φt (i)− wstf (A.1.4)
A.1.2 Formula for aggregate output
Relative labor input:
yt (i)
yt (j)
= ytpt (i)
−σ
ytpt (j)−σ
=
 σσ−1 wutztqt(i)
σ
σ−1
wut
ztqt(j)
−σ = ( qt (i)
qt (j)
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qt (j)
)σ
nut (i)
nut (j)
=
(
qt (i)
qt (j)
)σ−1
−→ nut (i) =
(
qt (i)
Qt
)σ−1
nut (Qt)
where nut (Qt) is the level of employment by establishment with quality level equal to the
aggregate quality index.
Aggregate labor input:
Nut =
[∫ Mt
0
nut (i) di
]
=
[
Mt
∫ ∞
0
nut (q)µt (q) dq
]
= Mt
∫ ∞
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(A.1.5)
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Aggregate output:
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A.1.3 Aggregate quality evolution
Aggregate quality index at the end of period t:
Qt =
[∫ ∞
0
qσ−1µt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
=
[
1
1−Gt (q∗t−1)
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(A.1.7)
The aggregate quality level after exits and innovation resolution but before entry:
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Aggregate quality index in t+ 1 after entry:
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(A.1.9)
Transformed aggregate growth rate ηt:
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(A.1.10)
where if the distribution is invariant with respect to the cutoff points q∗t−1 and q∗t (as
is the case with Pareto and other power-law distributions) then the above relationship
holds with equality.
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A.1.4 Labor market equilibrium
Unskilled consumption-labor choice:
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σ
Z1−θt M
1−θ
σ−1
t (1− s)−θ−1 /ψu
] 1
κ+θ
(A.1.11)
Skilled consumption-labor choice:
sψst (nst)
κ = wst c−θt
s
(
ψsQ1−θt
)
(nst)
κ =
(
ωtQtZtM
1
σ−1
t N
u
t
)(
QtZtM
1
σ−1
t N
u
t
)−θ
sψs (nst)
κ = ωt
(
ZtM
1
σ−1
t N
u
t
)1−θ
nst =
[
ωt
(
ZtM
1
σ−1
t N
u
t
)1−θ
/ (sψs)
] 1
κ
(A.1.12)
A.1.5 Shape of the relative quality distribution
Consider the situation of incumbents with relative quality levels φ > φ∗t such that they
will all choose the same success probability α. Therefore, for all of them:
φt+1 =
ιφt/ηt with probability αtφt/ηt with probability 1− αt (A.1.13)
Define the counter-cumulative distribution of relative establishment quality byHt (ϕ) =
P (φt > ϕ). The equation for motion of H is given by:
Ht+1
(
ϕ
ζt
)
= αtHt
(
ηtϕ
ι
)
+ (1− χt)Ht
(
ϕ
ι
)
for ϕ > φ∗t (A.1.14)
where ζt ≡ [χt (ι− 1) + 1] /ηt takes into account that an incumbent in expectation “slides
down” in the relative quality distribution due to presence of entry advantage.
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Conjecture that the counter-cumulative distribution takes the power-law formHt (ϕ) =
Γϕ−k. Under this conjecture, the ergodic distribution satisfies:
Γ(
ϕ
ζt
)k = χtΓ(ηtϕ
ι
)k + (1− χt) Γ(ηtϕ)k
ζkt =
χt(
ηt
ι
)k + (1− χt)(ηt)k
(ζtηt)k = ιkχt + (1− χt) (A.1.15)
Only two values of k can satisfy the above equation: k = 0 and k = 1. The first case
is a degenerate one where the distribution collapses to a point mass, which we disregard.
Therefore, the only other possibility is that the BGP distribution is Pareto with shape
parameter k = 1 and scale parameter Γ = φ∗:
P (ϕ ≤ φ) = 1− φ
∗
φ
(A.1.16)
Note however, that this conclusion only applies to the right of φ∗, that is, we know that
the distribution possesses a Pareto right tail. As the establishments located to the left
of φ∗ will exit anyway and do not invest in R&D, the effects on aggregate growth rate
from this portion of the distribution are negligible and I opt to approximate the “true”
relative quality distribution with Pareto distribution for the entire support.
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A.1.6 Solution of incumbents’ problem along the BGP
First order and envelope conditions of incumbents:
B = ω
a
1
(1− χ)2
1
ξ
η
ι− 1
B =
(
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1− χ
)
+ ξBα (ι− 1) + 1
η
Use ζ = [χ (ι− 1) + 1] /η to simplify the envelope condition:
B =
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1−χ
1− ξζ (A.1.17)
A.1.6.1 “Partial equilibrium” approach
Rework the first order condition:
B = ω
a
1
(1− χ)2
1
ξ
η
ι− 1 =
ω
a
1
ξ
1
1− χ
η
ι− [χ (ι− 1)− 1] =
ω
a
1
ξ
1
1− χ
η
ι− ζη
Equate both expressions for B:
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1−χ
1− ξζ =
ω
a
1
ξ
1
1− χ
η
ι− ζη
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1− χ =
ω
a
1− ξζ
ξ
1
1− χ
η
ι− ζη | ·
a
ω
(1− χ)
1
σM
a
ω
(1− χ)− χ = 1− ξζ
ξ
η
ι− ζη
1
σM
a
ω
− χ
(
1 + 1
σM
a
ω
)
= 1− ξζ
ξ
η
ι− ζη
χ =
1
σM
a
ω
− 1−ξζ
ξ
η
ι−ζη
1 + 1
σM
a
ω
(A.1.18)
Solution exists if:
χ ∈ [0, 1] ⇐⇒ 1
σM
a
ω
≥ 1− ξζ
ξ
η
ι− ζη (A.1.19)
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A.1.6.2 “Explicit solution” approach
Equate both expressions for B:
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1−χ
1− ξζ =
ω
a
1
(1− χ)2
1
ξ
η
ι− 1
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1− χ =
ω
a
1− ξζ
ξ
1
(1− χ)2
η
ι− 1
1
σM
− ω
a
χ
1− χ =
ω
a
1− ξζ
ξ
1
(1− χ)2
η
ι− 1
1
σM
a
ω
(1− α)2 ξ (ι− 1)− χ (1− χ) ξ (ι− 1) =
(
1− ξχ (ι− 1) + 1
η
)
η
Define:
X ≡ 1
σM
a
ω
ξ (ι− 1) (A.1.20)
X
(
1− 2χ+ χ2
)
−
(
χ− χ2
)
ξ (ι− 1) = η − ξ (ι− 1)χ− ξ
χ2 (X + ξ (ι− 1)) + χ (−2X − ξ (ι− 1) + ξ (ι− 1)) + (X + ξ − η) = 0
χ2 (X + ξ (ι− 1)) + χ (−2X) + (X + ξ − η) = 0
Solve:
χ =
X ±
√
X2 − (X + ξ (ι− 1)) (X + ξ − η)
(X + ξ (ι− 1)) (A.1.21)
Existence of real roots is assured:
X2 − (X + ξ (ι− 1)) (X + ξ − η) > 0
X2 −
(
X2 +X (ξ − η) +Xξ (ι− 1) + ξ (ι− 1) (ξ − η)
)
> 0
−(X (ξι− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ξ (ι− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(ξ − η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
) > 0 (A.1.22)
since ι > ξι > η > 1 > ξ.
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Uniqueness is also almost certain. Consider :
X +
√
X2 − (X + ξ (ι− 1)) (X + ξ − η)
(X + ξ (ι− 1)) > 1
X +
√
X2 − (X + ξ (ι− 1)) (X + ξ − η) > X + ξ (ι− 1)√
− (X (ξι− η) + ξ (ι− 1) (ξ − η)) > ξ (ι− 1) | ·2
−(X (ξι− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ξ (ι− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(ξ − η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
) > ξ2 (ι− 1)2 ≈ 0 (A.1.23)
We know from Equation A.1.22 that the LHS of above equation is positive. The above
inequality is likely to hold since (ι− 1)2 ≈ 0.
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A.1.7 Additional figures
Figure A.1: Chapter 2: Policy functions of incumbents and entrants, 3d graphs
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A.2 Chapter 3
A.2.1 Additional derivations
A.2.1.1 Solutions of cost minimization problems
Intermediate goods production sector
min tcpt (i) = w˜ut n
p
t (i) + rtkpt (i)
subject to yt (i) = Ztkpt (i)α [qt (i)npt (i)]1−α
FOCs
nt (i) : w˜ut = λp (1− α)Ztkpt (i)α qt (i)1−α npt (i)−α
kt (i) : rt = λpαZtkpt (i)α−1 qt (i)1−α npt (i)1−α
Divide
w˜ut
rt
= 1− α
α
kpt (i)
npt (i)
kpt (i) =
α
1− α
w˜ut
rt
npt (i)
npt (i) =
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
kpt (i)
Production function
yt (i) = Ztkpt (i)α [qt (i)npt (i)]1−α = Ztkpt (i)α
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
kpt (i)
]1−α
= Ztkpt (i)
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
]1−α
kpt (i) =
yt (i)
Zt
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
]α−1
Total cost
tcpt (i) = w˜ut n
p
t (i) + rtkpt (i) = w˜ut
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
kpt (i) + rtkpt (i) =
(1− α
α
+ 1
)
rtk
p
t (i) =
rt
α
kpt (i)
= rt
α
yt (i)
Zt
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
]α−1
= yt (i)
Zt
(
rt
α
)α (w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α
Real marginal cost
mcpt (i) =
1
Zt
(
rt
α
)α (w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α
Research and development sector
min tcxt (i) = w˜stnxt (i) + rtkxt (i)
subject to xt (i) =
kxt (i)
α [Qtnxt (i)]
1−α
Qtφt (i)
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FOCs
nxt (i) : w˜st = λ (1− α)
Ztk
x
t (i)
αQ1−αt nxt (i)
−α
Qtφt (i)
kxt (i) : rt = λα
Ztk
x
t (i)
α−1Q1−αt nxt (i)
1−α
Qtφt (i)
Divide
w˜st
rt
= 1− α
α
kxt (i)
nxt (i)
kxt (i) =
α
1− α
w˜st
rt
nxt (i)
nxt (i) =
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
kxt (i)
R&D production function
xt (i) =
kxt (i)
α [Qtnxt (i)]
1−α
Qtφt (i)
= Q−αt kxt (i)
(
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
)1−α
/φt (i)
kxt (i) = xt (i)Qαt
(
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
)α−1
φt (i)
Total cost
tcxt (i) =
rt
α
kxt (i) =
rt
α
xt (i)Qαt
(
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
)α−1
φt (i)
= xt (i)Qαt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜st
1− α
)1−α
φt (i)
Real marginal cost
mcxt (i) = Qαt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜st
1− α
)1−α
φt (i) ≡ m¯cxt φt (i)
Total cost as function of desired innovative success probability
χt (i) =
axt (i)
1 + axt (i)
xt (i) =
1
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
tcxt (i) =
m¯cxt
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)φt (i)
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A.2.1.2 Aggregate production function
Relative inputs
yt (i)
yt (j)
= Ytpt (i)
−σ
Ytpt (j)−σ
=
 σσ−1 1Zt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜ut /qt(i)
1−α
)1−α
σ
σ−1
1
Zt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜ut /qt(j)
1−α
)1−α

−σ
=
(
qt (i)α−1
qt (j)α−1
)−σ
=
(
qt (i)1−α
qt (j)1−α
)σ
yt (i)
yt (j)
=
Ztk
p
t (i)
[
qt (i) 1−αα
rt
w˜ut
]1−α
Ztk
p
t (j)
[
qt (j) 1−αα
rt
w˜ut
]1−α
kpt (i) qt (i)1−α
kpt (j) qt (j)1−α
=
(
qt (i)1−α
qt (j)1−α
)σ
kpt (i)
kpt (j)
=
(
qt (i)
qt (j)
)(1−α)(σ−1)
kpt (i) =
(
qt (i)
qt (j)
)(1−α)(σ−1)
kpt (j)
kpt (i) =
(
qt (i)
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
k¯pt
npt (i) =
(
qt (i)
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
n¯pt
where k¯pt ≡ Kpt /Mt and n¯pt ≡ Npt /Mt.
Final goods output
Yt =
[∫ Mt
0
yt (i)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
=
[
Mt
∫ ∞
0
yt (q)
σ−1
σ µt (q) dq
] σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1
t
[∫ ∞
0
[
Ztk
p
t (q)α q1−αnpt (q)1−α
]σ−1
σ µt (q) dq
] σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1
t Zt
∫ ∞
0
( q
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1) (
k¯pt
)α
(n¯pt )1−α q1−α

σ−1
σ
µt (q) dq

σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1
t Zt
(
k¯pt
)α
(n¯pt )1−αQ
(1−α)(1−σ)
t
[∫ ∞
0
[(
q1−α
)σ]σ−1σ µt (q) dq
] σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1−1
t Zt (Kpt )α (Npt )1−αQ
(1−α)(1−σ)
t
[[∫ ∞
0
(
q1−α
)σ−1
µt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
]σ
= M
1
σ−1
t Zt (Kpt )α (Npt )1−αQ
(1−α)(1−σ)
t
(
Q1−αt
)σ
= M
1
σ−1
t Zt (Kpt )α (QtNpt )1−α
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A.2.1.3 Real profit function
Real operating profit
piot (i) = pt (i) yt (i)−mcpt (i) yt (i)− ft = pt (i) yt (i)− pt (i)
σ − 1
σ
yt (i)− ft
=
(
1− σ − 1
σ
)
Ytpt (i)1−σ − ft = 1
σ
Yt
 σ
σ − 1
1
Zt
(
rt
α
)α (w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α1−σ − ft
= (σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
YtZ
σ−1
t
(rt
α
)α (w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α1−σ − ft
Price index (where Rt ≡ Ptrt and W ut ≡ Ptw˜ut )
Pt =
[∫ Mt
0
Pt (i)1−σ di
] 1
1−σ
=
[
Mt
∫ ∞
0
Pt (q)1−σ µt (q) dq
] 1
1−σ
= M
1
1−σ
t
∫ ∞
0
 σ
σ − 1
1
Zt
(
Rt
α
)α (W ut /q
1− α
)1−α1−σ µt (q) dq

1
1−σ
= σ
σ − 1M
1
1−σ
t
1
Zt
(
Rt
α
)α ( W ut
1− α
)1−α [∫ ∞
0
(
qα−1
)1−σ
µt (q) dq
] 1
1−σ
= σ
σ − 1M
1
1−σ
t
1
Zt
(
Rt
α
)α ( W ut
1− α
)1−α [[∫ ∞
0
(
q1−α
)σ−1
µt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
]−1
= σ
σ − 1M
1
1−σ
t
1
Zt
(
Rt
α
)α ( W ut
1− α
)1−α (
Q1−αt
)−1
= σ
σ − 1M
1
1−σ
t
1
Zt
(
Rt
α
)α (W ut /Qt
1− α
)1−α
Real input cost index
(
Rt
α
)α (W ut /Qt
1− α
)1−α
= σ − 1
σ
PtM
1
σ−1
t Zt(
rt
α
)α ( w˜ut
1− α
)1−α
= σ − 1
σ
M
1
σ−1
t ZtQ
1−α
t
1
Zt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜ut
1− α
)1−α
= σ − 1
σ
M
1
σ−1
t Q
1−α
t
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Real operating profit
piot (i) =
(σ − 1)σ−1
σσ
YtZ
σ−1
t
(rt
α
)α (wt/qt (i)
1− α
)1−α1−σ − ft
= (σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
YtZ
σ−1
t
[
σ − 1
σ
M
1
σ−1
t ZtQ
1−α
t qt (i)
α−1
]1−σ
− ft
= Yt
σMt
(qt (i)
Qt
)1−ασ−1 − ft
= Yt
σMt
φt (i)− ft
Real profit
pit (i) = piot (i)−
m¯cxt
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)φt (i)
=
(
Yt
σMt
− m¯c
x
t
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
)
φt (i)− ft
=
(
Yt
σMt
− m¯c
x
t
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
)
φt (i)− m¯cxt f
= Yt
[(
1
σMt
− ωt
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
)
φt (i)− ωtf
]
A.2.1.4 Evolution of aggregate quality index
Following Melitz (2003), I consider the current period distribution of quality levels µt (q)
to be a truncated part of an underlying distribution gt (q), so that:
µt (q) =
1/
[
1−Gt
(
q∗t−1
)]
gt (q) if q ≥ q∗t−1
0 otherwise
where q∗t = (φ∗t )
1/[(1−α)(σ−1)]Qt.
Aggregate quality index at the end of period t:
Q1−αt =
[∫ ∞
0
(
q1−α
)σ−1
µt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
=
[
1
1−Gt (q∗t−1)
∫ ∞
q∗t−1
(
q1−α
)σ−1
gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
The aggregate quality level after exits and innovation resolution but before entry:
Q∗t =
{
1
1−Gt (q∗t )
[
(1− χt)
∫ ∞
q∗t
(
q1−α
)σ−1
gt (q) dq + χt
∫ ∞
q∗t
(
ι
1
(1−α)(σ−1) q
)(1−α)(σ−1)
gt (q) dq
]} 1
σ−1
=
[
(1− χt + χtι) 11−Gt (q∗t )
∫ ∞
q∗t
(
q1−α
)σ−1
gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
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Aggregate quality index in t+ 1 after entry:
Qt+1 =
1− χt + χtι1−Gt (q∗t )

(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
)∫∞
q∗
t
(q1−α)σ−1gt(q)dq
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
∫∞
q∗
t
(
( σσ−1)
1
(1−α)(σ−1) q
)(1−α)(σ−1)
gt(q)dq


1
σ−1
=
[
(1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
1
1−Gt (q∗t )
∫ ∞
q∗t
(
q1−α
)σ−1
gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
Transformed aggregate growth rate ηt:
ηt =
(
Qt+1
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
=

[
(1− χt + χtι)
(
1− Met
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ−1
)
1
1−Gt(q∗t )
∫∞
q∗t
(q1−α)σ−1 gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1
[
1
1−Gt(q∗t−1)
∫∞
q∗t−1
(q1−α)σ−1 gt (q) dq
] 1
σ−1

σ−1
≈ (1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
where if the distribution is invariant with respect to the cutoff points q∗t−1 and q∗t (as
is the case with Pareto and other power-law distributions) then the above relationship
holds with equality.
A.2.1.5 Target wage
Expression for target wage
wot = w
f
t + ψ
(
κ
2
(
x2t (r)− x2t
)
− ptκxt
)
+ (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1Ht+1]
Average vs conditional on renegotiation worker surplus
Ht = Ht (r) + ∆t (wt − wt (r))
Therefore
(1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1Ht+1] =
= (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1 [Ht+1 (r) + λ∆t+1 (wt+1 − wt+1 (r))]]
= (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1Ht+1 (r)] + (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1λ∆t+1 (wt+1 − wt+1 (r))]
= ψptEt [βΛt,t+1Jt+1 (r)] + (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1λ∆t+1 (wt+1 − wt+1 (r))]
= ψptκxt (r) + (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1λ∆t+1 (wt+1 − wt+1 (r))]
Resulting target wage
wot = w
f
t + ψ
(
κ
2
(
x2t (r)− x2t
)
+ ptκ (xt (r)− xt)
)
+ (1− ψ) ptEt [βΛt,t+1λ∆t+1 (wt+1 − wt+1 (r))]
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A.2.2 Full set of model equations
Stationarized variables notation
Xˆt ≡ Xt/Qt
Stationarizing variables
gQt ≡ Qt+1/Qt = η
1
(1−α)(σ−1)
t (A.2.1)
γt,t+1 ≡ Yt+1/Yt = gQt · Yˆt+1/Yˆt (A.2.2)
Incumbents’ problem
φt = 1 (A.2.3)
vt = At +Btφt (A.2.4)
pit =
(
1
σMt
− ωt
a
χt
1− χt
)
φt − ωtf (A.2.5)
At +Btφt = pit + Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
φt
)]
(A.2.6)
0 = −ωt
a
1
(1− χt)2
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1Bt+1 (ι− 1)φt
ηt
]
(A.2.7)
Bt =
1
σMt
− ωt
a
χt
1− χt + Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1Bt+1χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
]
(A.2.8)
Entrants’ problem
vet = −ωt
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
+ χetEt
[
βΛt,t+1γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
σ
σ − 1φt+1
)]
(A.2.9)
0 = −ωt
ae
1
(1− χet )2
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
σ
σ − 1φt+1
)]
(A.2.10)
vet = 0 (A.2.11)
Establishment dynamics
δt = 1− (1− δexo) (1−M et ) (A.2.12)
ωt
a
χt
1− χtφ
∗
t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
φ∗t
)]
(A.2.13)
Mxt = Mt (1− χt−1)
(
1− φ
∗
t−1
φ∗tηt−1
)
(A.2.14)
Mt+1 = (1− δt) (Mt −Mxt ) +M et (A.2.15)
ηt = (1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
(A.2.16)
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Skilled sector
ωtYˆt =
(
rkt
α
)α ( ˆ˜wst
1− α
)1−α
(A.2.17)
(
Kˆst
)α
(N st )
1−α = Mtf + (Mt −Mxt )
(
1
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ M
e
t
χet
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
(A.2.18)
rkt
ˆ˜wst
= α1− α
N st
Kˆst
(A.2.19)
Unskilled sector
Yˆt = ZtM
1
σ−1
t
(
Kˆpt
)α
(Npt )1−α (A.2.20)
ˆ˜wut = (1− α)
σ − 1
σ
ZtM
1
σ−1
t
(
Kˆpt
)α
(Npt )−α (A.2.21)
rkt = α
σ − 1
σ
ZtM
1
σ−1
t
(
Kˆpt
)α−1
(Npt )1−α (A.2.22)
Households
1 = Et
[
β
(
gQt · Cˆt+1/Cˆt
)−θ (
1 + rkt − dp
)]
(A.2.23)
Λt,t+1 = Et
[(
gQt · Cˆt+1/Cˆt
)−θ]
(A.2.24)
Frictional labor markets (notation w∗t ≡ wt (r))
mut = σm (uut )
ψ (vut )
1−ψ (A.2.25)
mst = σm (ust)
ψ (vst )
1−ψ (A.2.26)
nut+1 = (ρu + xut )nut (A.2.27)
nst+1 = (ρs + xst)nst (A.2.28)
uut = 1− nut (A.2.29)
ust = 1− nst (A.2.30)
qut = mut /vut (A.2.31)
qst = mst/vst (A.2.32)
put = mut /uut (A.2.33)
pst = mst/ust (A.2.34)
xut = qut vut /nut (A.2.35)
xst = qst vst /nst (A.2.36)
103
κuxut = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wut+1 − wˆut +
κu
2
(
xut+1
)2
+ ρuκuxut+1
)]
(A.2.37)
κsxst = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wst+1 − wˆst +
κs
2
(
xst+1
)2
+ ρsκsxst+1
)]
(A.2.38)
κuxu∗t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wut+1 − wˆu∗t +
κu
2
(
xu∗t+1
)2
+ ρuκuxu∗t+1
)]
(A.2.39)
κsxs∗t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wst+1 − wˆs∗t +
κs
2
(
xs∗t+1
)2
+ ρsκsxs∗t+1
)]
(A.2.40)
∆ut = 1 + βρuλEt
[
Λt,t+1gQt ∆ut+1
]
(A.2.41)
∆st = 1 + βρsλEt
[
Λt,t+1gQt ∆st+1
]
(A.2.42)
∆ut wˆu∗t = wˆuot + ρuλEt
[
βΛt,t+1∆ut+1wˆu∗t+1
]
(A.2.43)
∆st wˆs∗t = wˆsot + ρsλEt
[
βΛt,t+1∆st+1wˆs∗t+1
]
(A.2.44)
wˆuft = ψ
(
ˆ˜wut +
κu
2 (x
u
t )
2 + put κuxut
)
+ (1− ψ) but (A.2.45)
wˆsft = ψ
(
ˆ˜wst +
κs
2 (x
s
t)
2 + pstκsxst
)
+ (1− ψ) bst (A.2.46)
wˆuot = wˆ
uf
t + ψ
(
κu
2
(
(xu∗t )
2 − (xut )2
)
+ put κu (xu∗t − xut )
)
+ (1− ψ) put Et
[
βΛt,t+1λ∆ut+1g
Q
t (wˆut − wˆu∗t )
]
(A.2.47)
wˆsot = wˆ
sf
t + ψ
(
κs
2
(
(xs∗t )
2 − (xst)2
)
+ pstκs (xs∗t − xst)
)
+ (1− ψ) pstEt
[
βΛt,t+1λ∆st+1g
Q
t (wˆst − wˆs∗t )
]
(A.2.48)
wˆut = λwˆut−1 + (1− λ) wˆu∗t (A.2.49)
wˆst = λwˆst−1 + (1− λ) wˆs∗t (A.2.50)
bˆut = 0.4wˆuss (A.2.51)
bˆst = 0.4wˆsss (A.2.52)
Market clearing
Yˆt = Cˆt + Iˆt + κu (xut )
2Npt + κs (xst)
2N st (A.2.53)
gQt Kˆt+1 = (1− dp) Kˆt + Iˆt (A.2.54)
Kˆt = Kˆpt + Kˆst (A.2.55)
Npt = (1− s)nut (A.2.56)
N st = snst (A.2.57)
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Shock
logZt = ρZ logZt−1 + εZ,t (A.2.58)
Welfare
Ut =
(
CˆtQt
)1−θ
1− θ + βEt [Ut+1] (A.2.59)
A.2.3 Additional tables and figures
Table A.1: Chapter 3: Prior distributions of parameters
Parameter Description Distribution shape Mean Std. dev.
λ Average contract duration Uniform [0, 1] 0.5 0.289
ρZ Autocorr. of TFP process Beta 0.7 0.175
σZ Std. dev. of TFP shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 ∞
Figure A.1: Chapter 3: Results of the maximum likelihood estimation step
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Figure A.2: Chapter 3: Univariate convergence of parameters
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Figure A.3: Chapter 3: Multivariate convergence of parameters
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Figure A.4: Chapter 3: Bayesian impulse response functions
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A.3 Chapter 4
A.3.1 Full set of stationarized model equations
Stationarized variables notation
Xˆt ≡ Xt/Qt
Stationarizing variables
gQt ≡ Qt+1/Qt = η
1
(1−α)(σ−1)
t (A.3.1)
γt,t+1 ≡ Yt+1/Yt = gQt · Yˆt+1/Yˆt (A.3.2)
Incumbents’ problem
φt = 1 (A.3.3)
vt = At +Btφt (A.3.4)
pit =
(
1
σMt
−
(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
χt
1− χt
)
φt −
(
1 + ζrlt
)
ωtf (A.3.5)
At +Btφt = pit + Et
[
Λt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
φt
)]
(A.3.6)
0 = −
(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
1
(1− χt)2
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1Bt+1 (ι− 1)φt
ηt
]
(A.3.7)
Bt =
(
1
σMt
−
(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1Bt+1χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
]
(A.3.8)
Entrants’ problem
vet = −
(
1 + ζerlt
)
ωt
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
+ χetEt
[
βΛt,t+1γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
σ
σ − 1φt+1
)]
(A.3.9)
0 = −
(
1 + ζerlt
) ωt
ae
1
(1− χet )2
+ Et
[
βΛt,t+1γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
σ
σ − 1φt+1
)]
(A.3.10)
vet = 0 (A.3.11)
Establishment dynamics
δt = 1− (1− δexo) (1−M et ) (A.3.12)(
1 + ζrlt
) ωt
a
χt
1− χtφ
∗
t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1 (1− δt) γt,t+1
(
At+1 +Bt+1
χt (ι− 1) + 1
ηt
φ∗t
)]
(A.3.13)
Mxt = Mt (1− χt−1)
(
1− φ
∗
t−1
φ∗tηt−1
)
(A.3.14)
Mt+1 = (1− δt) (Mt −Mxt ) +M et (A.3.15)
ηt = (1− χt + χtι)
(
1− M
e
t
Mt+1
+ M
e
t
Mt+1
σ
σ − 1
)
(A.3.16)
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Skilled sector
ωtYˆt =
(
rkt
α
)α ( ˆ˜wst
1− α
)1−α
(A.3.17)
(
Kˆst
)α
(N st )
1−α = Mtf + (Mt −Mxt )
(
1
a
χt
1− χt
)
+ M
e
t
χet
(
f e + 1
ae
χet
1− χet
)
(A.3.18)
rkt
ˆ˜wst
= α1− α
N st
Kˆst
(A.3.19)
Unskilled sector
Yˆt = ZtM
1
σ−1
t
(
Kˆpt
)α
(Npt )1−α (A.3.20)
ˆ˜wut = (1− α)
σ − 1
σ
ZtM
1
σ−1
t
(
Kˆpt
)α
(Npt )−α /
(
1 + ζrlt
)
(A.3.21)
rkt = α
σ − 1
σ
ZtM
1
σ−1
t
(
Kˆpt
)α−1
(Npt )1−α /
(
1 + ζrlt
)
(A.3.22)
Households
1 = Et
[
β
(
gQt · Cˆt+1/Cˆt
)−θ (
1 + rdt+1
)]
(A.3.23)
Λt,t+1 = Et
[(
gQt · Cˆt+1/Cˆt
)−θ]
(A.3.24)
Financial system
rlt = spt + rdt (A.3.25)
rlt = rkt − dp (A.3.26)
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Frictional labor markets (notation w∗t ≡ wt (r))
mut = σm (uut )
ψ (vut )
1−ψ (A.3.27)
mst = σm (ust)
ψ (vst )
1−ψ (A.3.28)
nut+1 = (ρu + xut )nut (A.3.29)
nst+1 = (ρs + xst)nst (A.3.30)
uut = 1− nut (A.3.31)
ust = 1− nst (A.3.32)
qut = mut /vut (A.3.33)
qst = mst/vst (A.3.34)
put = mut /uut (A.3.35)
pst = mst/ust (A.3.36)
xut = qut vut /nut (A.3.37)
xst = qst vst /nst (A.3.38)
κuxut = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wut+1 − wˆut +
κu
2
(
xut+1
)2
+ ρuκuxut+1
)]
(A.3.39)
κsxst = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wst+1 − wˆst +
κs
2
(
xst+1
)2
+ ρsκsxst+1
)]
(A.3.40)
κuxu∗t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wut+1 − wˆu∗t +
κu
2
(
xu∗t+1
)2
+ ρuκuxu∗t+1
)]
(A.3.41)
κsxs∗t = Et
[
βΛt,t+1
(
ˆ˜wst+1 − wˆs∗t +
κs
2
(
xs∗t+1
)2
+ ρsκsxs∗t+1
)]
(A.3.42)
∆ut = 1 + βρuλEt
[
Λt,t+1gQt ∆ut+1
]
(A.3.43)
∆st = 1 + βρsλEt
[
Λt,t+1gQt ∆st+1
]
(A.3.44)
∆ut wˆu∗t = wˆuot + ρuλEt
[
βΛt,t+1∆ut+1wˆu∗t+1
]
(A.3.45)
∆st wˆs∗t = wˆsot + ρsλEt
[
βΛt,t+1∆st+1wˆs∗t+1
]
(A.3.46)
wˆuft = ψ
(
ˆ˜wut +
κu
2 (x
u
t )
2 + put κuxut
)
+ (1− ψ) but (A.3.47)
wˆsft = ψ
(
ˆ˜wst +
κs
2 (x
s
t)
2 + pstκsxst
)
+ (1− ψ) bst (A.3.48)
wˆuot = wˆ
uf
t + ψ
(
κu
2
(
(xu∗t )
2 − (xut )2
)
+ put κu (xu∗t − xut )
)
+ (1− ψ) put Et
[
βΛt,t+1λ∆ut+1g
Q
t (wˆut − wˆu∗t )
]
(A.3.49)
wˆsot = wˆ
sf
t + ψ
(
κs
2
(
(xs∗t )
2 − (xst)2
)
+ pstκs (xs∗t − xst)
)
+ (1− ψ) pstEt
[
βΛt,t+1λ∆st+1g
Q
t (wˆst − wˆs∗t )
]
(A.3.50)
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wˆut = λwˆut−1 + (1− λ) wˆu∗t (A.3.51)
wˆst = λwˆst−1 + (1− λ) wˆs∗t (A.3.52)
bˆut = 0.4wˆuss (A.3.53)
bˆst = 0.4wˆsss (A.3.54)
Market clearing
Yˆt = Cˆt + Iˆt + κu (xut )
2Npt + κs (xst)
2N st (A.3.55)
gQt Kˆt+1 = (1− dp) Kˆt + Iˆt (A.3.56)
Kˆt = Kˆpt + Kˆst (A.3.57)
Npt = (1− s)nut (A.3.58)
N st = snst (A.3.59)
Shocks
logZt = ρZ logZt−1 + εZ,t (A.3.60)
log spt = (1− ρsp) log spss + ρsp log spt−1 + εsp,t (A.3.61)
Welfare
Ut =
(
CˆtQt
)1−θ
1− θ + βEt [Ut+1] (A.3.62)
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A.3.2 Additional derivations
A.3.2.1 Solutions of cost minimization problems
Intermediate goods production sector
min tcpt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
(w˜ut n
p
t (i) + rtkpt (i))
subject to yt (i) = Ztkpt (i)α [qt (i)npt (i)]1−α
FOCs
nt (i) :
(
1 + ζrlt
)
w˜ut = λp (1− α)Ztkpt (i)α qt (i)1−α npt (i)−α
kt (i) :
(
1 + ζrlt
)
rt = λpαZtkpt (i)α−1 qt (i)1−α npt (i)1−α
Divide
w˜ut
rt
= 1− α
α
kpt (i)
npt (i)
kpt (i) =
α
1− α
w˜ut
rt
npt (i)
npt (i) =
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
kpt (i)
Production function
yt (i) = Ztkpt (i)α [qt (i)npt (i)]1−α = Ztkpt (i)α
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
kpt (i)
]1−α
= Ztkpt (i)
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
]1−α
kpt (i) =
yt (i)
Zt
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
]α−1
Total cost
tcpt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
(w˜ut n
p
t (i) + rtkpt (i)) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)(
w˜ut
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
kpt (i) + rtkpt (i)
)
=
(
1 + ζrlt
) (1− α
α
+ 1
)
rtk
p
t (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
) rt
α
kpt (i)
=
(
1 + ζrlt
) rt
α
yt (i)
Zt
[
qt (i)
1− α
α
rt
w˜ut
]α−1
=
(
1 + ζrlt
) yt (i)
Zt
(
rt
α
)α (w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α
Real marginal cost
mcpt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
Zt
(
rt
α
)α (w˜ut /qt (i)
1− α
)1−α
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Research and development sector
min tcxt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
(w˜stnxt (i) + rtkxt (i))
subject to xt (i) =
kxt (i)
α [Qtnxt (i)]
1−α
Qtφt (i)
FOCs
nxt (i) :
(
1 + ζrlt
)
w˜st = λ (1− α)
Ztk
x
t (i)
αQ1−αt nxt (i)
−α
Qtφt (i)
kxt (i) :
(
1 + ζrlt
)
rt = λα
Ztk
x
t (i)
α−1Q1−αt nxt (i)
1−α
Qtφt (i)
Divide
w˜st
rt
= 1− α
α
kxt (i)
nxt (i)
kxt (i) =
α
1− α
w˜st
rt
nxt (i)
nxt (i) =
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
kxt (i)
R&D production function
xt (i) =
kxt (i)
α [Qtnxt (i)]
1−α
Qtφt (i)
= Q−αt kxt (i)
(
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
)1−α
/φt (i)
kxt (i) = xt (i)Qαt
(
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
)α−1
φt (i)
Total cost
tcxt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
) rt
α
kxt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
) rt
α
xt (i)Qαt
(
1− α
α
rt
w˜st
)α−1
φt (i)
=
(
1 + ζrlt
)
xt (i)Qαt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜st
1− α
)1−α
φt (i)
Real marginal cost
mcxt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
)
Qαt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜st
1− α
)1−α
φt (i) ≡ m¯cxt φt (i)
Total cost as function of desired innovative success probability
χt (i) =
axt (i)
1 + axt (i)
xt (i) =
1
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)
tcxt (i) =
(
1 + ζrlt
) m¯cxt
a
χt (i)
1− χt (i)φt (i)
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A.3.2.2 Aggregate production function
Relative inputs
yt (i)
yt (j)
= Ytpt (i)
−σ
Ytpt (j)−σ
=
 σσ−1 (1+ζr
l
t)
Zt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜ut /qt(i)
1−α
)1−α
σ
σ−1
(1+ζrlt)
Zt
(
rt
α
)α ( w˜ut /qt(j)
1−α
)1−α

−σ
=
(
qt (i)α−1
qt (j)α−1
)−σ
=
(
qt (i)1−α
qt (j)1−α
)σ
yt (i)
yt (j)
=
Ztk
p
t (i)
[
qt (i) 1−αα
rt
w˜ut
]1−α
Ztk
p
t (j)
[
qt (j) 1−αα
rt
w˜ut
]1−α
kpt (i) qt (i)1−α
kpt (j) qt (j)1−α
=
(
qt (i)1−α
qt (j)1−α
)σ
kpt (i)
kpt (j)
=
(
qt (i)
qt (j)
)(1−α)(σ−1)
kpt (i) =
(
qt (i)
qt (j)
)(1−α)(σ−1)
kpt (j)
kpt (i) =
(
qt (i)
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
k¯pt
npt (i) =
(
qt (i)
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1)
n¯pt
where k¯pt ≡ Kpt /Mt and n¯pt ≡ Npt /Mt.
Final goods output
Yt =
[∫ Mt
0
yt (i)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
=
[
Mt
∫ ∞
0
yt (q)
σ−1
σ µt (q) dq
] σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1
t
[∫ ∞
0
[
Ztk
p
t (q)α q1−αnpt (q)1−α
]σ−1
σ µt (q) dq
] σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1
t Zt
∫ ∞
0
( q
Qt
)(1−α)(σ−1) (
k¯pt
)α
(n¯pt )1−α q1−α

σ−1
σ
µt (q) dq

σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1
t Zt
(
k¯pt
)α
(n¯pt )1−αQ
(1−α)(1−σ)
t
[∫ ∞
0
[(
q1−α
)σ]σ−1σ µt (q) dq
] σ
σ−1
= M
σ
σ−1−1
t Zt (Kpt )α (Npt )1−αQ
(1−α)(1−σ)
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A.3.2.3 Real profit function
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Real profit
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A.3.3 Additional tables and figures
Table A.2: Chapter 4: Prior distributions of parameters
Parameter Description Distribution shape Mean Std. dev.
λ Calvo wage contract prob. Uniform [0, 1] 0.5 0.289
ρZ Autocorr. of prod. process Beta 0.7 0.175
σZ Std. dev. of prod. shock Inverse Gamma 0.01 ∞
ρsp Autocorr. of spread process Beta 0.7 0.175
σsp Std. dev. of spread shock Inverse Gamma 0.1 ∞
Figure A.1: Chapter 4: Results of the maximum likelihood estimation step
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Figure A.2: Chapter 4: Univariate and multivariate convergence of parameters
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Figure A.3: Chapter 4: Bayesian impulse response functions to productivity shock
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Figure A.4: Chapter 4: Bayesian impulse response functions to interest rate spread shock
20 40 60 80 100
-0.2
-0.1
0
Output
20 40 60 80 100
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Consumption
20 40 60 80 100
-1
-0.5
0
Investment
20 40 60 80 100
-0.2
0
0.2
ResearchDevel
20 40 60 80 100
-0.2
-0.1
0
Wages
20 40 60 80 100
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
Hours
20 40 60 80 100
0
1
2
Unemployment
20 40 60 80 100
-2
-1
0
Vacancies
20 40 60 80 100
-4
-2
0
Tightness
20 40 60 80 100
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Establishments
20 40 60 80 100
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Expansions
20 40 60 80 100
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
Contractions
20 40 60 80 100
×10-3
-20
-10
0
NetEntry
20 40 60 80 100
0.1
0.2
0.3
Spread
20 40 60 80 100
×10-3
-15
-10
-5
0
Quality
119
List of Figures
1.1 Cyclical behavior of US R&D expenditures, 1948q1-2017q3 . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Cyclical behavior of US establishment annual net entry rates, 1985-2016 . 6
1.3 Cyclical behavior of US establishments, 1992q3-2017q1 . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Establishment size distribution over time, 1975-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Accurate and approximated value and policy functions . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1 Incumbents’ policy function χ (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Entrants’ policy function (expressed as desired entry rate M e/M, %) . . 27
2.1 Hodrick-Prescott trend deviations: comparison of model and data (%) . . 31
2.2 Impulse response functions to 1% productivity shock (%) . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1 Prior and posterior distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 Impulse response functions to 1% productivity shock (%) . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Impulse response functions to 1% productivity shock, continued (%) . . . 56
4.1 Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Impulse response functions to standard deviation productivity shock . . . 76
4.3 Impulse response functions to standard deviation interest rate spread shock 77
4.1 Shock decomposition: key macroeconomic variables since 2000 . . . . . . 78
A.1 Chapter 2: Policy functions of incumbents and entrants, 3d graphs . . . . 95
A.1 Chapter 3: Results of the maximum likelihood estimation step . . . . . . 105
A.2 Chapter 3: Univariate convergence of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.3 Chapter 3: Multivariate convergence of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.4 Chapter 3: Bayesian impulse response functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
A.1 Chapter 4: Results of the maximum likelihood estimation step . . . . . . 116
A.2 Chapter 4: Univariate and multivariate convergence of parameters . . . . 117
A.3 Chapter 4: Bayesian impulse response functions to productivity shock . . 118
A.4 Chapter 4: Bayesian impulse response functions to interest rate spread shock119
120
List of Tables
2.1 Calibration of the model parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Long-run moments: comparison of model and data . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Business cycle moments: comparison of model and data . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Welfare cost of business cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6 Effects of countercyclical subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Calibrated parameters affecting the steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Long-run moments: comparison of model and data . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Prior and posterior means of parameters affecting cyclical behavior . . . 53
3.4 Business cycle moments: comparison of model and data . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Correlations between labor market variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Welfare cost of business cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.7 Effects of static subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.8 Effects of countercyclical subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.1 Calibrated parameters affecting the steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Long-run moments: comparison of model and data . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Prior and posterior means of parameters affecting cyclical behavior . . . 73
4.4 Business cycle moments: comparison of model and data . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5 Welfare cost of business cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Effects of static subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.7 Effects of countercyclical subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
A.1 Chapter 3: Prior distributions of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A.2 Chapter 4: Prior distributions of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
121
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. (2009). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., Bloom, N., & Kerr, W. R. (2013). Innovation, Reallocation
and Growth. Working Paper 18993, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, D. & Cao, D. (2015). Innovation by entrants and incumbents. Journal of
Economic Theory, 157, 255–294.
Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V. M., Ozdaglar, A., & Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2012). The Network
Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica, 80(5), 1977–2016.
Aghion, P., Angeletos, G.-M., Banerjee, A., & Manova, K. (2010). Volatility and growth:
Credit constraints and the composition of investment. Journal of Monetary Economics,
57(3), 246–265.
Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. W. (1992). A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction.
Econometrica, 60(2), 323–351.
Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. W. (1994). Growth and Unemployment. Review of Economic
Studies, 61(3), 477–494.
Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. W. (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory. Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press.
Aghion, P. & Howitt, P. W. (2008). The Economics of Growth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press.
Aghion, P. & Saint-Paul, G. (1998). Virtues of Bad Times: Interaction Between Produc-
tivity Growth and Economic Fluctuations. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2(3), 322–344.
Akcigit, U. & Kerr, W. R. (2010). Growth Through Heterogeneous Innovations. Working
Paper 16443, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Andolfatto, D. (1996). Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search. American Economic
Review, 86(1), 112–132.
Annicchiarico, B. & Pelloni, A. (2016). Innovation, Growth and Optimal Monetary Policy.
Technical Report 376, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
122
Annicchiarico, B., Pelloni, A., & Rossi, L. (2011). Endogenous growth, monetary shocks
and nominal rigidities. Economics Letters, 113(2), 103–107.
Annicchiarico, B. & Rossi, L. (2015). Taylor rules, long-run growth and real uncertainty.
Economics Letters, 133(C), 31–34.
Anzoategui, D., Comin, D., Gertler, M., & Martinez, J. (2016). Endogenous Technology
Adoption and R&D as Sources of Business Cycle Persistence. Working Paper 22005,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ates, S. T. & Saffie, F. E. (2014). Fewer but Better: Sudden Stops, Firm Entry, and
Financial Selection. Technical Report 14-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
Atkeson, A. & Burstein, A. T. (2011). Aggregate Implications of Innovation Policy.
Working Paper 17493, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Axtell, R. L. (2001). Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes. Science, 293(5536), 1818–1820.
Barlevy, G. (2004). The Cost of Business Cycles Under Endogenous Growth. American
Economic Review, 94(4), 964–990.
Barlevy, G. (2007). On the Cyclicality of Research and Development. American Economic
Review, 97(4), 1131–1164.
Barnichon, R. (2010). Building a composite Help-Wanted Index. Economics Letters,
109(3), 175–178.
Barro, R. J. & Sala-i Martin, X. I. (2004). Economic Growth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 2nd edition edition.
Bartelsman, E. J. & Doms, M. (2000). Understanding Productivity: Lessons from Lon-
gitudinal Microdata. Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3), 569–594.
Bassanini, A., Nunziata, L., & Venn, D. (2009). Job Protection Legislation and Produc-
tivity Growth in OECD Countries. Economic Policy, 24(58), 349–402.
Benigno, G. & Fornaro, L. (2017). Stagnation traps. Technical Report 2038, European
Central Bank.
Bilbiie, F. O., Ghironi, F., & Melitz, M. J. (2012). Endogenous Entry, Product Variety,
and Business Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), 304–345.
Boppart, T. & Krusell, P. (2016). Labor Supply in the Past, Present, and Future: a
Balanced-Growth Perspective. Working Paper 22215, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Brautzsch, H.-U., Günther, J., Loose, B., Ludwig, U., & Nulsch, N. (2015). Can R&D
subsidies counteract the economic crisis? – Macroeconomic effects in Germany. Re-
search Policy, 44(3), 623–633.
123
Brock, W. A. & Mirman, L. J. (1972). Optimal economic growth and uncertainty: The
discounted case. Journal of Economic Theory, 4(3), 479–513.
Brunnermeier, M. K., Eisenbach, T. M., & Sannikov, Y. (2012). Macroeconomics with
Financial Frictions: A Survey. Working Paper 18102, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Cairo, I. & Cajner, T. (2017). Human Capital and Unemployment Dynamics: Why
More Educated Workers Enjoy Greater Employment Stability. The Economic Journal,
forthcoming.
Campbell, J. R. (1998). Entry, Exit, Embodied Technology, and Business Cycles. Review
of Economic Dynamics, 1(2), 371–408.
Chatterjee, S. & Cooper, R. (2014). Entry and Exit, Product Variety, and the Business
Cycle. Economic Inquiry, 52(4), 1466–1484.
Christiano, L., Rostagno, M., & Motto, R. (2010). Financial factors in economic fluctu-
ations. Technical Report 1192, European Central Bank.
Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M. S., & Trabandt, M. (2015). Understanding the Great
Recession. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1), 110–167.
Christiano, L. J., Motto, R., & Rostagno, M. (2003). The Great Depression and the
Friedman-Schwartz Hypothesis. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35(6), 1119–
1197.
Christiano, L. J., Motto, R., & Rostagno, M. (2014). Risk Shocks. American Economic
Review, 104(1), 27–65.
Christiano, L. J., Trabandt, M., & Walentin, K. (2011). Introducing financial frictions
and unemployment into a small open economy model. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 35(12), 1999–2041.
Christopoulou, R. & Vermeulen, P. (2010). Markups in the Euro area and the US over
the period 1981-2004: a comparison of 50 sectors. Empirical Economics, 42(1), 53–77.
Clementi, G. L. & Palazzo, B. (2016). Entry, Exit, Firm Dynamics, and Aggregate
Fluctuations. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 8(3), 1–41.
Comin, D. & Gertler, M. (2006). Medium-Term Business Cycles. American Economic
Review, 96(3), 523–551.
Cooley, T. F. & Prescott, E. C. (1995). Economic growth and business cycles. In T. F.
Cooley (Ed.), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research chapter 1, (pp. 1–38). Princeton
University Press.
Cozzi, G., Pataracchia, B., Ratto, M., & Pfeiffer, P. (2017). How much Keynes and how
much Schumpeter? An Estimated Macromodel of the US Economy. Technical Report
77771, University Library of Munich, Germany.
124
Da-Rocha, J.-M., Tavares, M. M., & Restuccia, D. (2016). Firing Costs, Misallocation,
and Aggregate Productivity. Working Paper 23008, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Davis, S. J. & Haltiwanger, J. (2014). Labor Market Fluidity and Economic Performance.
Working Paper 20479, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Devereux, M. B., Head, A. C., & Lapham, B. J. (1996). Aggregate fluctuations with
increasing returns to specialization and scale. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 20(4), 627–656.
Diamond, P. A. (1982). Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium. Journal
of Political Economy, 90(5), 881–894.
Dinopoulos, E. & Thompson, P. (1998). Schumpeterian Growth Without Scale Effects.
Journal of Economic Growth, 3(4), 313–335.
Dunne, T., Roberts, M. J., & Samuelson, L. (1989). The Growth and Failure of U. S.
Manufacturing Plants. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), 671–698.
Ericson, R. & Pakes, A. (1995). Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for
Empirical Work. Review of Economic Studies, 62(1), 53–82.
Evans, D. S. (1987). The Relationship Between Firm Growth, Size, and Age: Estimates
for 100 Manufacturing Industries. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), 567–581.
Fatas, A. (2000). Do Business Cycles Cast Long Shadows? Short-Run Persistence and
Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 5(2), 147–162.
Fernandez-Corugedo, E., McMahon, M., Millard, S., & Rachel, L. (2011). Understanding
the macroeconomic effects of working capital in the United Kingdom. Technical Report
422, Bank of England.
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J. C., & Krizan, C. J. (2001). Aggregate Productivity Growth:
Lessons from Microeconomic Evidence. In NBER Chapters (pp. 303–372). National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Fujita, S. (2004). Vacancy persistence. Technical Report 04-23, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.
Gabaix, X. (2011). The Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations. Econometrica,
79(3), 733–772.
Garcia-Macia, D., Hsieh, C.-T., & Klenow, P. J. (2016). How Destructive is Innovation?
Working Paper 22953, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gertler, M., Sala, L., & Trigari, A. (2008). An Estimated Monetary DSGE Model with
Unemployment and Staggered Nominal Wage Bargaining. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking, 40(8), 1713–1764.
125
Gertler, M. & Trigari, A. (2009). Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash Wage
Bargaining. Journal of Political Economy, 117(1), 38–86.
Gibrat, R. (1931). Les inegalites economiques. Recueil Sirey.
Grossman, G. M. & Helpman, E. (1991). Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth.
Review of Economic Studies, 58(1), 43–61.
Hall, B. H. (1987). The Relationship Between Firm Size and Firm Growth in the US
Manufacturing Sector. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), 583–606.
Hall, R. E. (2015). Quantifying the Lasting Harm to the US Economy from the Financial
Crisis. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 29(1), 71–128.
Hodrick, R. J. & Prescott, E. C. (1997). Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical
Investigation. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29(1), 1–16.
Hopenhayn, H. & Rogerson, R. (1993). Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General
Equilibrium Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 101(5), 915–938.
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992). Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium.
Econometrica, 60(5), 1127–1150.
Hopenhayn, H. A. (2014). Firms, Misallocation, and Aggregate Productivity: A Review.
Annual Review of Economics, 6(1), 735–770.
Hosios, A. J. (1990). On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and
Unemployment. Review of Economic Studies, 57(2), 279–298.
Howitt, P. W. (1999). Steady Endogenous Growth with Population and R. & D. Inputs
Growing. Journal of Political Economy, 107(4), 715–730.
Jaimovich, N. & Floetotto, M. (2008). Firm dynamics, markup variations, and the
business cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(7), 1238–1252.
Jones, C. I. (1995). R & D-Based Models of Economic Growth. Journal of Political
Economy, 103(4), 759–784.
Jones, L. E., Manuelli, R. E., Siu, H. E., & Stacchetti, E. (2005). Fluctuations in convex
models of endogenous growth, I: Growth effects. Review of Economic Dynamics, 8(4),
780–804.
Jovanovic, B. (1982). Selection and the Evolution of Industry. Econometrica, 50(3),
649–670.
King, R. G., Plosser, C. I., & Rebelo, S. T. (1988). Production, growth and business
cycles. Journal of Monetary Economics, 21(2), 195–232.
Klette, T. & Kortum, S. (2004). Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation. Journal of
Political Economy, 112(5), 986–1018.
126
Kopecky, K. A. & Suen, R. M. H. (2010). Finite state Markov-chain approximations to
highly persistent processes. Review of Economic Dynamics, 13(3), 701–714.
Krusell, P. & Smith, Anthony A., J. (1998). Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the
Macroeconomy. Journal of Political Economy, 106(5), 867–896.
Kydland, F. E. & Prescott, E. C. (1982). Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations.
Econometrica, 50(6), 1345–1370.
Laincz, C. A. & Peretto, P. F. (2006). Scale effects in endogenous growth theory: an
error of aggregation not specification. Journal of Economic Growth, 11(3), 263–288.
Lee, Y. & Mukoyama, T. (2015). Entry and exit of manufacturing plants over the business
cycle. European Economic Review, 77(Supplement C), 20–27.
Lentz, R. & Mortensen, D. T. (2008). An Empirical Model of Growth Through Product
Innovation. Econometrica, 76(6), 1317–1373.
Lucas, R. E. (1987). Models of Business Cycles. Wiley.
Lucas, R. E. (2003). Macroeconomic Priorities. American Economic Review, 93(1), 1–14.
Luttmer, E. G. J. (2010). Models of Growth and Firm Heterogeneity. Working Paper
2010-1, University of Minnesota, Department of Economics.
Maliar, L. & Maliar, S. (2004). Endogenous Growth And Endogenous Business Cycles.
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 8(5), 559–581.
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity. Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725.
Melitz, M. J. & Redding, S. J. (2014). Chapter 1 - Heterogeneous Firms and Trade. In
E. H. a. K. R. Gita Gopinath (Ed.), Handbook of International Economics, volume 4
of Handbook of International Economics (pp. 1–54). Elsevier.
Mertens, K. & Ravn, M. O. (2011). Understanding the aggregate effects of anticipated
and unanticipated tax policy shocks. Review of Economic Dynamics, 14(1), 27–54.
Merz, M. (1995). Search in the labor market and the real business cycle. Journal of
Monetary Economics, 36(2), 269–300.
Messer, T., Siemer, M., & Gourio, F. (2016). A Missing Generation of Firms? Aggregate
Effects of the Decline in New Business Formation. 2016 Meeting Paper 752, Society
for Economic Dynamics.
Milgrom, P. & Roberts, J. (1990). Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games
with Strategic Complementarities. Econometrica, 58(6), 1255–1277.
Mortensen, D. T. & Pissarides, C. A. (1994). Job Creation and Job Destruction in the
Theory of Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 397–415.
127
Mukoyama, T. & Osotimehin, S. (2017). Barriers to Reallocation and Economic Growth:
the Effects of Firing Costs. Working Paper, mimeo.
Nishiyama, S. & Smetters, K. (2007). Does Social Security Privatization Produce Effi-
ciency Gains? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1677–1719.
Nuño, G. (2011). Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles.
Journal of Economic Growth, 16(3), 257–283.
Ozlu, E. (1996). Aggregate economic fluctuations in endogenous growth models. Journal
of Macroeconomics, 18(1), 27–47.
Pakes, A. & McGuire, P. (1994). Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical
Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model. RAND Journal of Economics,
25(4), 555–589.
Peretto, P. F. (1998). Technological Change and Population Growth. Journal of Economic
Growth, 3(4), 283–311.
Petrongolo, B. & Pissarides, C. A. (2008). The Ins and Outs of European Unemployment.
American Economic Review, 98(2), 256–262.
Phillips, K. L. & Wrase, J. (2006). Is Schumpeterian ’creative destruction’ a plausible
source of endogenous real business cycle shocks? Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 30(11), 1885–1913.
Queralto, A. (2011). Financial Market Frictions, Productivity Growth and Crises in
Emerging Economies. Technical Report 697, Society for Economic Dynamics.
Ramsey, F. P. (1928). A Mathematical Theory of Saving. The Economic Journal, 38(152),
543–559.
Romer, P. M. (1987). Growth Based on Increasing Returns Due to Specialization. The
American Economic Review, 77(2), 56–62.
Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change. Journal of Political Economy,
98(5), S71–S102.
Rossi-Hansberg, E. & Wright, M. L. J. (2007). Establishment Size Dynamics in the
Aggregate Economy. American Economic Review, 97(5), 1639–1666.
Rouwenhorst, G. K. (1995). Asset pricing implications of equilibrium business cycle
models. In T. F. Cooley (Ed.), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research chapter 10, (pp.
294–330). Princeton University Press.
Rozsypal, F. (2015). Schumpeterian business cycles. 2015 Meeting Paper 320, Society for
Economic Dynamics.
Samaniego, R. M. (2008). Entry, exit and business cycles in a general equilibrium model.
Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(3), 529–541.
128
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper & brothers.
Severo, T. & Estevao, M. M. (2010). Financial Shocks and TFP Growth. Technical
Report 10/23, International Monetary Fund.
Shimer, R. (2005). The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies.
American Economic Review, 95(1), 25–49.
Shimer, R. (2012). Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 15(2), 127–148.
Shleifer, A. (1986). Implementation Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, 94(6), 1163–
1190.
Siemer, M. (2014). Firm Entry and Employment Dynamics in the Great Recession. Fi-
nance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-56, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (U.S.).
Solow, R. M. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65–94.
Tauchen, G. (1986). Finite state markov-chain approximations to univariate and vector
autoregressions. Economics Letters, 20(2), 177–181.
Tauchen, G. & Hussey, R. (1991). Quadrature-Based Methods for Obtaining Approximate
Solutions to Nonlinear Asset Pricing Models. Econometrica, 59(2), 371–396.
Trabandt, M. & Uhlig, H. (2011). The Laffer curve revisited. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 58(4), 305–327.
Walde, K. (2005). Endogenous Growth Cycles. International Economic Review, 46(3),
867–894.
Walde, K. & Woitek, U. (2004). R&D expenditure in G7 countries and the implications
for endogenous fluctuations and growth. Economics Letters, 82(1), 91–97.
Weintraub, G. Y., Benkard, C. L., & Van Roy, B. (2008). Markov Perfect Industry
Dynamics With Many Firms. Econometrica, 76(6), 1375–1411.
Young, A. (1998). Growth without Scale Effects. Journal of Political Economy, 106(1),
41–63.
129
